The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1956. Cyprus

Press, Volume XCIV, Issue 28160, 26 December 1956, Page 6

The Press WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1956. Cyprus

Strong Creek and Cypriot disapproval of the proposed constitution for Cyprus seems less an objection to the details of the plan proposed by Lord Radcliffe than a protest against the failure of the British Government to put some term to the colonial stage. Lord Radcliffe’s report, from cabled summaries, is as liberal as his terms of reference would allow. He was specifically instructed that external affairs, internal security, and defence were to be reserved to the Crown. The question of currency, which is also reserved to the Crown in his draft, and the clause entrenching the constitution itself are more or less machinery provisions. Possibly some objection might be taken to the reservation of a seat in the Colonial Cabinet for the Turkish minority, which might be inconvenient for the Greek-speaking members of the Government. This is offset, however, by a reasonable arrangement for co-ordination of the reserved powers of the Crown and of the colonial government through a joint council. The constitution would almost certainly be acceptable to Greek-speaking Cypriots, and therefore to the Greek Government, if the British Government had clearly declared that it was an interim measure, to be followed within the foreseeable future by a plebiscite on the ultimate sovereignty of the colony. The British Government made a tentative suggestion of selfdetermination in 10 or 15 years, hastily withdrew the offer when the Turkish Government objected, and now qualifies reaffirmation of the principle of eventual self-determin-ation by raising the possibility of partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey. This, not the form of immediate colonial government, is the real issue in Cyprus. If the island is at some time to decide its own future, it is hard to escape the conclusion that British interests would be best served by frankly acknowledging this, and thus obtaining the co-operation of Greek-speaking Cypriots in making the interim constitution work. The sooner internal peace is restored and the colony able to make material progress, the more favourable to Britain the ultimate decision is likely to be. The longer terrorism continues, in spite of new repressions, the less likely Britain is to find friends in Cyprus 20 years hence.

The Suez operation disclosed the limitations of Cyprus as a base. It also showed that it had real value. The present Greek Government, which has been more or less forced into supporting enosis by pressure from extremists of both Right and Left, would not want to deprive Britain of a secure base in Cyprus while the Middle East was in turmoil. It would not press for a fixed date for a plebiscite and might be able to restrain Eoka, the Cypriot terrorist organisation, from making this demand, if it were given a satisfactory alternative. Influential Greeks have suggested a form of international arbitration on the date of self-determination by referring it to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They argue that, if N.A.T.O. considered full British control of the base was no longer essential in the common interest, Britain could safely accept the finding. Under such an arrangement Britain would retain the right to use its present base in Cyprus and would be given new bases in Greece. This would not altogether dispose of the objections of Turkey to having an island close to its coast, with a substantial Turkish-speaking minority, pass into Greek hands, because Turkey, though a member of N.A.T.0., is not primarily a European country with European interests. The guarantees offered by Greece might noi be acceptable to Turkey. Nevertheless, the N.A.T.O. approach to the Cyprus problem has always seemed the most promising. It may be even more promising with the prospect of bringing American influence and interest to bear at a time when the United States is being drawn more closely into the whole tangle of Middle East politics.