IMPERIAL PREFERENCE

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27990, 9 June 1956, Page 5

IMPERIAL PREFERENCE

Sir, —It is interesting to note that the authority I have quoted at length in support of Imperial preference has caused confusion. Your comment that, “No-one questioned Amery's patriotism; many questioned his judgment on economic matters,” is apparently disputed by “Free-Trader,” who appears to question Amery’s patriotism but not his judgment on economic matters. The following words of Amery prove his patriotism and his soundness on economic issues: “No economic policy can work in the world of today which is not co-ordin-ated with the whole of national life. The idea of the world as one economic unit for production, trade and finance, irrespective of national frontiers, is divorced from all practical reality as is the idea of a world governed by a single economic ideology.” I would remind “Free-Trader” that Social Credit enthusiasts have but one leader, in whom they Jhave the greatest confidence.—Yours, etc., GEO. M. EDMONDS. June 7, 1956.

Sir, —“Flambeau” forgets that Britain implemented a financial crisis by returning to the gold standard in 1925. After six years of muddling, Britain discarded it in-1931. But by J then the slump was in full blast. It was ' further augmented by British stockgambling on Wall Street. This took Britain’s vital gold to the United States. It is ridiculous trying to libel our fine American friends who invariably rescue us from financial stupidity. In 1945-1951, the difficult period of war adjustments, our American friends delivered to us, and others, goods and services representing 118 billion dollars, and took in exchange goods representing 69 billion dollars. The difference, 49 billion dollars, was split in two equal parts: 33 billion dollars worth of goods were delivered free of charge as gifts, and 16 billion dollars worth as long-term credits. Then we never thanked the United States for 'Lease-lend!— Yours, etc., RALPH S. WHEELER. Timaru, June 8, 1956. a Sir,—Your footnote recommends G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. Here is G.A.T.T. (Bretton Woods), quoted: “The price of gold at the time of the Bretton Woods Agreement was fixed at £8 12s 6d. The price outside the agreement rose this year to as high as £23 10s. Britain has to deplete her gold reserves to pay for her imports at £8 12s 6d. Because of the deadly disparity in price the production value of gold to the British Commonwealth has decreased between 1946 and 1948 by £289,000.000. By being bound by this ridiculous price under the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Commonwealth has already lost, through the reduction in price alone, another £615,000.000. making together a loss of £904.000.000; truly a ruinous price to pay for the ‘America aid’ devised under the name of Bretton Woods —so crooked, indeed, that it might well be honestly repudiated.” Has I.M.F. made this good?—Yours, etc., FLAMBEAU. June 8, 1956. [The correspondent does not give the source of his quotation. The figures are misleading and the deductions fallacious. The “official” price of gold would presumably have risen a little if freed, but not to the average level of the price on the “free” or “black” market, and certainly not to the peaks on which the correspondent apparently bases his calculations. Nor is It true to say that “the Commonwealth” would benefit from a higher price for gold. South Africa, as the principal producer, would benefit. Britain, as the banker for the sterling area, has to buy most of its gold from South Africa. The fact is that nearly all countries, both within and outside the 1 Commonwealth, have regarded a stable gold price as beneficial; and. recognising the inflationary dangers in writing up the “book values” of their gold reserves, have consistently refused to support South Africa’s almost annu*.* plea for a higher official price. To relieve the special hardships of South Africa and other goldproducing countries, the LM.F. has. since 1951, given member countries a great deal of freedom to sell their gold on the free market.— Ed., “The Preas.”]