DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CHINA

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27896, 18 February 1956, Page 4

DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CHINA

TRUMAN MEMOIRS—24

Frank Exchanges In Talks

With Attlee

[By

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

Clement Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, 1950, and we had our first formal talks from 4 to 5.35 that afternoon.

I said that we were faced with very grave military decisions, but that the political decisions were no less difficult. We had obligations in the East and in the West, I stated, and did not intend to run out on any of them ’ even though it might prove difficult to meet all our obligations. .1 expressed the belief, however, thai we should first discuss the problem of the Chinese Communist intervention, and asked for Attlee’s comments. Attlee began by saying that it was important to maintain the prestige and authority of the United Nations. He„ pointed out that the United States had' been the principal instrument for supporting the United Nations and that the United Kingdom was giving what help it could. The Prime Minister said that opinion in the United Nations and in the Countries of Europe, Asia, and America had to be considered. He had been in close touch through all this time with the Asian members of the Commonwealth, and suggested that we ought to look, also, at *he point of view of the Chinese Communists. They were feeling flushed with success and would not want to settle for some principle announced by the United Nations, to which they did not belong. Even if the Russians might think of a settlement, that might pot necessarily convince Mao Tse-turig. What, Attlee asked, were the Communists likely to demand as the price for a cease-fire? Holding the Line I asked Secretary Acheson to express our position. He pointed out that, first of all, it had to be remembered that the central enemy was not China, but the Soviet. He added that he could not be optimistic about prospects of negotiations with the Chinese Communists. We did not have alternatives of either negotiating or becoming involved m war. We were actually involved at the moment. From a military point of view, he observed, there seemed to be an advantage to us from a cease-fire as soon as possible. But the Chinese would not be likely to accept it. It seemed predictable that the Chinese Communists would ask for recognition of their Government, for a seat in the United Nations Security Council, and for concessions on Formosa, They might even insist that any Japanese peace settlement had to have their assent. i The Prime Minister inquired what the reaction of the Am,erican public would be if we continued to hold the beachheads with continuing losses. Would there not be a demand for ailcut war against China? I replied that- such demands could be heard now. I admitted that all my military advisers had told me that there was no Chance to hold the line. But [I said] that I still wanted to try. Satellites? Attlee observed that opinions differed on the extent to which the Chinese Communists were Kremlin satellites. I said that in my opinion the Chinese Communists were Russian satellites. After Korea, it would be Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya. Acheson remarked that it really did not matter too much whether the Chinese Communists were Stellites or not. He said there was a saying among State Department officials that with Communistic regimes you could not bank goodwill; they balance their books every night. «. General Marshall recalled the several meetings he had had with Mao Tsetung and with Chou En-lai during his mission to China. He said that Chou on one occasion had with great emphasis told Mrs Marshall at the dinner table that there was no doubt they were Marxist Communists and that he resented people referring to them as merely agrarian reformers. Marshall said there had been not the slightest attempt to conceal their Moscow affiliations. They regarded the Russians as coreligionists and this feeling was thoroughly indoctrinated in their „ troops. I wanted to add emphasis to what - Acheson had said about our desire to avoid war with China. I therefore recounted what had transpired on Wake

Island between MacArthur and myself, especially pointing out that I had told MacArthur to avoid giving any provocation to the Chinese in Manchuria and the Russians in Vladivostok and adding that we had no desire to act in this matter except as members of the United Nations. Fight to the Finish

I emphatically repeated that it was out of the question that we should get out voluntarily. All the Koreans left behind who had been loyal to the United Nations would face death. The Communists care nothing about human life.

Our next session was aboard the Presidential yacht Williamsburg the following day. I spoke about my deep concern and extreme preoccupation with the military situation in Korea. “We did not get into this fight,” I said, “with the idea.of getting licked. We will fight to the finish to stop this aggression. I don’t intend to take over military command of the situation in Korea—l leave that to the generals —but I want to make it perfectly :plain that we cannot desert our friends when the going gets rough.”

I got a little warm as I talked, but Clement Attlee was no less sincere when he answered “We are in it with you. We’ll support you. We’ll stand together on those bridgeheads. How long we can hold on is a matter of opinion.” I thanked him for his attitude and for his words. Loyalty to principles and friends and also treaty commitments is a British attitude, and it is ours, too. “Natural Rivals” Atlee then proceeded to give us the point of view of his Government. In his opinion the Chinese Communists were potentially ripe for “Titoism.” He could not consider that China was completely in the hands of Russia, and therefore the aim ought to be to divide the Russians and the Chinese —who are natural rivals in the Far East. “I think,” he said, “that all of us should try to keep the Chinese from thinking that Russia is • their only friend. If we just treat the Chinese as Soviet Satellites, we are playing the Russian game.” Acheson then made a telling point: It would be a very confusing thing to try to get the American people to accept aggression in the Far East and not accept it in Europe. We could not buy the friendship of the Chinese Communists, Acheson insisted, and we ought not to try to prove that we were more friendly to them than the Russians. After what they had done to us, it seemed to him that the Chinese would have to prove that they were our friends. Our position, Acheson went on, was now that we ought to get the military power and the strength to stop this sort of thing from happening in the future. Seat ip, United Nations

I added that it was important to realise that the United States could do nothing abroad without solid backing at home. We could not back out of the Far East. The American people would not stand for it. It was impossible. Attlee said he understood that our foreign policy was dependent upon keeping the American people together. But it was also essential, he to keep the United Nations together. Furthermore, we had to keep Asiatic opinion together—nothing would be more dangerous than for the Asiatics to split away from us. Acheson broke in: “Weakening the United States,” he said, “would be definitely more dangerous.”

Attlee continued to argue the case for a policy that would consider the adherence of the Asiatic nations to the West as the primary aim. He turned to me. saying that he knew that I would have to consider public opinion about Chiang Kai-shqk and, Formosa, but that he hoped I would also remember that whatever we did would have to be done through the United Nations, and it could not . be done there by the efforts and votes of just the United States and the United Kingdom, “important as we are.” This brought the discussion to the question of , whether the seating of

the Chinese Communists at the United Nations should be considered as a subject that might be included in negotiations with them. Acheson took the position that we should not even consider it. If we did. we would, in effect, be saying to the Communists that they had won the game and could now collect the stakes. “Two Chinas” Proposal General Marshall said that he had very strong feelings in the matter from a military point of view. Supported by General Bradley, he stated the reasons why we could not afford to have our chain of island outposts split by a Formosa in hostile possession. The British then advanced the idea that perhaps Chiang could be left in control of Formosa while at the same time we might recognise that China (proper) was under the Peking regime General Marshall made the comment that the biggest problem connected with Chiang was the fact that there was no replacement for him—that it had long been “brutally evident” that, in spite of the strong opposition to Chiang, there was nobody who could succeed him. Two meetings were held on December 6. The morning meeting was given over almost entirely to economic matters. Shortly before we went into the meetin sr. Under-Secretary Lovett called from the Pentagon reporting that the ladar screens of some air defence installations in the far north were reporting large formations of unidentified planes approaching. Fighter planes were sent up to and alerts were flashed to air centres in New England and beyond. But about an hour later—while I . was meeting with Attlee —Lovett notified me that the report had been in error. Some unusual disturbances in the Arctic atmosphere had thrown the radar off. Limiting War The afternoon session was devoted to discussion of the European situation, especially the matter of getting the countries of NATO to agree on an integrated militarv set-up. The British renewed their arguments that American troops - in Europe—even if they were green and had to be trained there—would serve better than anything else to stimulate European efforts. Our meeting on December 7 brought us back to the Far Eastern situation. Attlee pointed out that it had been agreed that we would try to avoid a general war with China, but that we would hold on in Korea as long as we could. He was of the opinion that this would still force us to corhe to a Far Eastern settlement, sooner or later, and he wanted to develop his thoughts on that subject. First, his Government thought that China (meaning Communist China) ought to be seated in the United Nations. The British, he said, had found out that it did not pay to pretend that the “nasty fellow” on the other side was not there. Attlee also had doubts about a limited war in Korea. He foresaw trouble because, he believed, we would find people clamouring for total victory—and that meant unlimited war Acheson admitted that there was not very much that we could do to Communist China unless we wished to engage in all-out war. If we assumed that the Communists were indeed moving with great speed towards war, then it would be a grievous mistake to try to buy off the aggressor just before he broke loose. w Attlee Taken Aback “My own guess is that it wouldn’t work.” the Secretary continued. “All we might get would be time, but never enough time to do any good. Just enough time to divide our people' bitterly. Just enough time "to lose our moral strength.” Attlee seemed a little taken aback. Acheson, he said, was assuming that negotiations would mean retreat all along the line. Acheson replied that his point was that we should not get into negotiations until we knew where we were going. Of course, if we got thrown out of Korea there would be no negotiations, but we would have made our point. I added that we would face terrible divisions among our people here at home if the Chinese Communists were admitted to the United Nations. Would they be any different from the Russians? I said I expected them to behave just like the other satellites. I talked, as strongly as I knew how. about the language the Chinese Reds were using about us at Lake Success, and the falsehoods they were spreading. I said their handling of our missionaries and of our consuls was a blot on humanity. There was nothing in getting them admitted to the’ United Nations until they changed their ways. To be Continued.

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