CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Press, Volume XCIII, Issue 27874, 24 January 1956, Page 10

CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

[By

THE TRUMAN MEMOIRS

Mr Attlee Expresses His Concern

II The next instalment of the second volume of memoirs of Mr Harry S. Truman, formerly President of the United States of America, deals with his correspondence with Mr Attlee, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, about the control of atomic weapons.

The British expressed concern over the McMahon Bill for the control of atomic energy in the United States. They said that this bill would deprive them of the opportunity to share our knowledge and "know-how” and the advantage derived from the years of war-time collaboration with us on the bomb project. Attlee said he feared the McMahon Bill would prohibit the disclosure or sharing of atomic secrets with any foreign Power, including the British. The British Government took the position that until such a time as United Nations control might become effective, the British should either have atomic weapons made available to them or at least be -supplied with the data necessary to start their own production. The Combined Policy Committee, which was the British-American body that handled such questions, came to a complete deadlock on April 15, 1946, and on the following dav Attlee sent me a long message in which he sought to justify the British stand. He said that the Agreed Declaration of November 16, 1945, indicated that it was our desire that there should be "full and effective co-operation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.” This, he thought, could not mean less than full interchange of information and a fair division of the material. The declaration, Attlee said, contained nothing about the sharing of information between us; and the clear indication was that this was already provided for. The war-time arrangements under which the major share of the development work and the construction and operation of full-scale plants were carried out in the United States had naturally meant that technological and engineering information had accumulated in our hands. Now, if there was to be full and effective cooperation between us, Attlee declared, it was essential that this information be shared.

Reply to Attlee I replied to Attlee on April 20: “. . .1 think it is agreed by all of us that during the war, under the Quebec Agreement, the United States was not obligated to furnish to the United Kingdom in the postwar period the designs and assistance in construction and operation of plants necessary to the building of a plant. Therefore, the question is whether this situation was changed and such an obligation assumed by the United States under the language of the memorandum above quoted. [That of November 16, 1945, referred to by Mr Attlee.]

"The language ‘full and effective co-operation’ is very general ... I must say that no one at any time informed me that the memorandum was proposed with the intention of having the United States obligate itself to furnish the engineering and operation assistance necessary for the construction of another atomic energy plant. Had that been done, I would not have signed the memorandum. . . . "As to our entering at this time into an arrangement to assist the United Kingdom in building an atomic energy plant, I think it would be exceedingly unwise from the standpoint of the United Kingdom as well as the United States.

"On November 15, the day prior to the signing of the memorandum first above referred to, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States issued jointly a declaration of our intention to request the United Nations to establish a commission to control the production of atomic energy so as to prevent its use for military purposes. Our action led to the adoption later by the General Assembly of a resolution creating a commission for that purpose. “I would not want to have it said that on the morning following the issuance of our declaration to bring about international control we entered into a new agreement, the purpose of which was to have the United States furnish the information as to construction and operation of plants which would enable the United Kingdom to construct another atomic energy plant. No such purpose was suggested by you or thought of by me. . . .” The British Prime Minister did not answer until June 7, when he cabled

that he had delayed his reply in order to discuss the matter with the Canadian Prime Minister, MacKenzie King. It was a long summary of the effort of British scientists who, in 19H0 and 1941, had been among the first, Attlee said, to explore the military possibilities of atomic energy. In October, 1941, President Roosevelt had proposed to Churchill that efforts be co-ordinated. The British had agreed to assist the enterprise in the United States “in the confident belief that the experience and knowledge gained in America would be made freely available,” the British Prime Minister said, enabling the- British to concentrate on radar and jet propulsion. Mr Attlee’s Reply Attlee repeated his claim that at Quebec it had been agreed that there should be a complete exchange of ideas and information, and because of this, the interchange of information in the field of design and construction of large scale plants was not ruled out. It had been left to the President of the United States, he said, to specify the terms on which any post-war advantages of an industrial or a commercial character should be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain.

Attlee said that British scientists continued their contribution until the atom bomb was dropped; and at that point the British had considered development of atomic energy at home, expecting to be able to "make use of the experience which had been gained up to that point in the joint enter-, prise.”

When war came to an end, the British were told that until new arrangements were concluded the supply of information from the United States must stop; and for that reason, the Prime Minister said, he had gone to Washington to see that the war-time co-operation be continued.

Attlee contended that he could find no support in the document drawn up by the Combined Policy Committee that there was no obligation to exchange information about the construction of large-scale plants. He referred to a draft agreement drawn up by a sub-committee of the Combined Policy Committee, providing for continuance of full and effective co-opera-tion in the exchange of information. “We made it clear in the discussions that our own programme would include the construction of large-scale plants,” he added. But it came as a surprise to him, Attlee said, when the sub-committee report had been submitted to the Combined Policy Committee, “to find that your Government was not prepared to enter into any agreement, nor to proceed on the basis of the agreements previously reached between us, nor yet to agree that cooperation should, in fact, continue by administrative action.”

Attlee declared that he could not agree with the argument that to continue such co-operation would be inconsistent with the public declaration or. the control of atomic energy ‘which you and MacKenzie King and T issued in November. That our three governments stand on a special relationship to one another in this field is a matter of record, and was in fact the reason why we took the initiative m issuing the declaration. It is surely not inconsistent with its purpose that the co-operation begun during the war should continue during the peace unless and until it can be replaced by a wider system.” Raw Materials

The Prime Minister said that in the one important field of joint control of raw materials co-operation was continuing. adding, “Why, then, should we abandon all further pooling of information? ...”

He closed his long cable by urging that the continuing co-operation' over raw materials be balanced by exchange of information which “will give us, with all proper precautions in -o gard to security, that full information to' which we believe that we are entitled, both by the documents and by the history of our common efforts in the past.”

In view of developments in Congress, I was unable to send an immediate reply to Attlee’s message. It was not possible foi' me to make any statement on policy to Great Britain until Congress had acted. But, in any case, it was already apparent that whatever bill Congress passed it would seriously hamper and restrict our cooperation with the British in the atomic field.

Congress finally passed the McMahon bill in amended form, and I signed it on August 1. 1946. The Atomic Energy Commission, which was established by this bill, took up its duties on January 1. 1947. The United States was now ready to embark on a programme of planned development of atomic energy, for the security of the nation until international control became fact, and for the general benefit of all mankind. (To be continued.) (Copyright 1956 by Time Inc. (Life). World serial rights outside the U.S.A, and Canada in International Co-operation Press Service, Inc. Exclusive rights in New Zealand reserved by New Zealand Associated Press. Reproduction in full or in part strictly prohibited.)