THE TRUMAN MEMOIRS THE “BIG THREE” DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

Press, Volume XCII, Issue 27795, 21 October 1955, Page 12

THE TRUMAN MEMOIRS THE “BIG THREE” DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

[By

HARRY S. TRUMAN]

(XXIII)

Molotov brought up [at the sixth meeting of the Potsdam Conference] the subject of trusteeships, and said that the San Francisco Conference had settled, in principle, a trusteeship system, and there was now the question of the disposition of specific territories, such as Italy’s colonies and also, perhaps, Korea. He had learned from the foreign press that Italy had lost its colonies, and the question was, “who had received them, and where had this matter been decided?”

Churchill replied by referring to the heavy losses which the British had suffered and the victories which the British Army had achieved by “conquering alone all of the colonies of Italy except Tunis.” [Tunisia was, in fact, a French protectorate.]

I turned to the Prime Minister and repeated, “All?” Churchill explained that when he referred to Italian colonies, he meant Libya, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli. They had conquered these at a time when they were under heavy attacks and were without help, he said, at least during the early part. Molotov interjected that Berlin had been conquered by the Red Army. Churchill, ignoring Molotov, continued, saying that they were not expecting any gain out of this war. British losses had been terrible, although not so heavy in human life as those of their gallant Soviet allies. They came out of the war, however, a great debtor to the world. Britain Makes no Claims

In spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, they had made no teritorial claims—no Koenigsberg; no Baltic States; nothing. With regard to the Italian colonies, he said he regarded Italy as having lost them, but this did not preclude the peace conference from considering whether some of these colonies should be restored to Italy. He was not declaring himself in favour of restoration but was willing to discuss it. At present, Churchill said, the British held these colonies. He wanted to know who wanted them. If there were claimants, said Churchill, they should put forward their claims. I said that the United States did not want them, nor did we want a trusteeship over them. Molotov said that the Soviet proposal had been submitted in writing and that they would like the conference to consider them. Churchill asked: What did their Soviet Allies want? Did Stalin wish to put forward a claim to one of these Italian colonies? Stalin replied that they would like to learn whether this conference was going to deal with the question of whether Italy was to lose these colonies. In such an event, they could decide to what States they would be transferred for trusteeship. Russia in Africa? Churchill said he had not considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring a large tract of the African shore. If that were the case, it would have to be considered in relation to many other problems. Stalin declared that at San FranSoviet delegation had stated that they were anxious to receive mandates for certain territories, and the matter was now set forth in the Russian paper. I pointed out that the Soviet proposal was a matter for the Foreign Ministers to discuss and that I had no objection to this. Churchill said he had no objection either. [At the same meeting the question of revising the Montreux Convention on the control of the Straits was brought up. Sir Winston Churchill expressed his readiness to welcome an arrangement for .the free movement of Russian ships out of and into the Black Sea. However, he complained of pressure being brought on Turkey by Bulgarian and Soviet troop concentrations and by Mr Molotov’s conversations with the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, in which the modification of Turkey’s eastern frontier and a Soviet base in the Straits had been mentioned. These subjects were revived the next day.] With regard to the Black Sea Straits, Stalin said Russia regarded the Montreux Convention as inimical. Under this treaty, he complained, Turkey had the right to block the Straits not only if Turkey were at war, but if it seemed to Turkey that there was a threat of war.

The result was that a small State supported by Great Britain held a great State by the throat and gave it no outlet. He could imagine what commotion there would be in'England if a similar regime existed in Gibraltar or in the Suez Canal, or what a commotion there would be in the United States if such a regime existed with regard to the Panama Canal. The point at issue, he concluded, was to give Soviet shipping the possibility to pass to and from the Black Sea freely. As Turkey was too weak to guarantee the possibility of free passage in case complications arose, the Soviet Union would like to see the Straits defended by force. International Waterways

I said that the attitude of the American Government was that the Montreux Convention should be revised. I thought, however, that the Straits should be a free waterway open to the whole world, and that they should be guaranteed py all of us. I announced that I was presenting a paper proposing free access to all the seas of the world by Russia and by all other countries. I was offering as a solution of the Straits problem the suggestion that the Kiel Canal in Denmark, the Rhine-Danube waterway from the North Sea to the Black Sea, the Black Sea Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal be made free waterways for the passage of freight and passengers of all countries, except for the fees for their necessary operation and maintenance.

The question of territorial concessions was a Turkish and Russian dispute which they would have to settle themselves and which the Marshal had said he was willing to do. But the question of the Black Sea Straits, I pointed out, concerned the United States and the rest of the world.

Churchill expressed agreement with Stalin’s proposal for revision of the Montreaux Convention to give Russia freedom of navigation in the Straits by merchant and warships alike in peace and war. He also agreed with my proposal that this should be guaranteed by all of us. A guarantee by the Great Powers and the Powers interested wtmld certainly be effective. He earnestly hoped that the Marshal would accept this alternative in contrast to that of a base in the Straits in close proximity to Constantinople. With regard to the other waterways, the British were in full accord with the general line that I had taken in my statement. Churchill thought that the Kiel Canal should certainly be free and open and guaranteed by all the' Great Powers. He attached great importance to the free navigation of the Danube and the Rhine. Syria and Lebanon [Stalin next raised the question of Koenigsberg and then the situation in Syria and Lebanon, on which he suggested that France ■should be invited to a four-Power conference.] Churchill said that the burden of defending Syria and Lebanon had fallen upon the shoulders of the British. At the time they entered Syria and Lebanon to throw out the Germans and the troops of Vichy, he said, they had made an arrangement with the French in which they both recognised Syria and Lebanon. The British had told General de Gaulle that the moment he made a satisfactory treaty with Syria and Lebanon, the British would withdraw their troops. If the British withdrew their troops now. It would lead to the massacre of the French civilians and the small* number of troops there. This, he warned, would cause a great outbreak of turbulence and warfare in the Arab world, which might affect

Egypt too, and thus senousiy endanger communication lines through the Suez Canal, which were now being used by the Allies in the war against Japan.

He expressed confidence that an» agreement could be reached with the French, in which de Gaulle should guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon and which would reserve . for the French some of their cultural and commercial interests in this territory. The British would not welcome a proposal for a four-Power conference on this question which concerned only Britain, France and the areas of Syria and Lebanon. The whole burden had been borne by the British, except fsr the diplomatic approval of the United States, which they had enjoyed. Of course, if the United States wanted to take their place, that would be a different matter. I replied, “No, thanks.” French Privilege? When this controversy arose, I pointed out, there had been an exchange of correspondence between the Prime Minister and myself. The Prime Minister had offered to keep British troops in that region to stop the outbreak of war, and I had asked him to do so immediately in order to protect our line of communication to the Far East through the Suez Canal. I thought, however, that no country should have a special privilege such as that being considered for France. The French did not deserve a special position after the way they had stirred up all this trouble. AU countries should have equal rights.

[Stalin withdrew this Soviet proposal. In the next discussion, on Persia, he resisted a British proposal for withdrawing all Allied troops from that country, but agreed to withdraw from Teheran at once. He promised that no action would be taken by the Russians against Persia. The next subject was the feeding of Vienna, on which FieldMarshal Alexander reported to the conference.] Churchill then brought up the matter of the British elections. He informed Stalin and me that Mr Attlee and he would have to be in London on the following Thursday for the elections, and that they would take Eden with them. They would be back for the evening sitting on July 27. “Or some of us wiU be back,” he added. He asked if we could meet on the Wednesday morning before his departure. This was agreed to, and it was also agreed that the Foreign Minister! would continue to meet and that, in Eden’s absence. Sir Alexander Cadogan would represent him. The meeting then adjourned, and at 8 o’clock that evening I walked with Secretary Byrnes and Admiral Leahy to Churchill’s residence, where we attended a State dinner given by the Prime Minister in honour of Generalissimo Stalin and myself. The War Against Japan The following morning—it was July 24—Admirals Leahy and King and Generals Marshal, Arnold, and Somervell accompanied me to the British headquarters to go over the military strategy for the next stages of the war with Japan. The British and American Chiefs of Staff had held daily meetings since our arrival at Potsdam, and now placed before us the draft of their final report to Churchill and me.

We examined it paragraph by paragraph. The unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible moment was the main objective of the strategy. Churchill and I apprbved the report in full. That same day, in the afternoon, the Combined Chiefs met for the first and only time with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy presided at the meeting, and later, he and General Marshall gave me a detailed report. The primary purpose was to co-ordin-ate strategy in the Far East, an important step -toward bringing Russia into the war on our side. General Antonov, the Red Army Chief of Staff, reported that Soviet troops were being concentrated in the Far East so as to be ready to start operations against the Japanese in the latter half of August. The exact date would depend on the satisfactory completion of the negotiations with the Chinese.

Antonov defined the Russian objective in the Far East to be the destruction of the Japanese in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After the defeat of the Japanese, he said, it was the intention of the Soviet to withdraw all Russian troops from Manchuria.

General Marshall then informed the Russians of the general disposition of Japanese troop strength as known to us. He gave them a very general picture of our position in the Pacific and discussed some possible courses of action open to the Japanese. Admiral King and General Arnold discussed the effect of sea and air activities against the Japanese forces. General Antonov showed particular interest in any intentions we might have to undertake operations against the Kuriles or in Korea. He was told by Admiral King that we would not be able to operate against the Kuriles but that a line of communications could be maintained through that island chain without the seizure of any of them. General Marshall stated that we had no present plans for amphibiout operations Korea. Friendly Meeting

Admiral Leahy reported that the meeting was friendly. Another meeting was held two days later on July 26, but with only the Americans and the Russians present. The primary purpose was to receive the Russian answers to a number of questions of detail which General Marshall had given them. The Russians agreed to the establishment of weather stations at Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk and, although initially reluctant, they agreed that American personnel should man them. Agreement was also reached on lines to mark off areas of operation for the respective air and naval forces. These ran generally from the northern tip of Japan across extreme northern Korea. No lines were set up for land operations since it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea. The two military groups also agreed to exchange liaison groups, including a Soviet military mission in Washington, and to make designated ports and airfields in Siberia available to our units for repair needs and emergency use.

T x he Russians took pains to point out that all these agreements would become effective only upon Russia’s entry into the war against Japan, but the general atmosphere of this meeting, like the one before, was one of co-operation and friendship. (Copyright 1955 by Time Inc. (Life) World serial rights outside the U.S.A, and Canada in International Co-opera-tion Press Service Inc. Exclusive right! in Jlew Zealand by New Zealand Associated Press. Reproduction in full or in part strictly prohibited.]

• Charge d’Affaires at the Swedish Legation in Wellington (Mr O. Ripa), with Mrs Ripa, paid an official call on the Deputy-Mayor (Mr George Manning) in Christchurch yesterday morning. They were accompanied by the Honorary Vice-Consul for Sweden in Christchurch (Mr I. Machin). Last evening, Mr Ripa addressed a meeting under the joint auspices of j Workers’ Educational Association and the Federation of Labour on industrial relations in Sweden.