INDIA’S GRIP ON KASHMIR LAVISH POLICY OF AID WITH “STRINGS”

Press, Volume XCII, Issue 27735, 12 August 1955, Page 10

INDIA’S GRIP ON KASHMIR LAVISH POLICY OF AID WITH “STRINGS”

[From a Special Correspondent of '‘The Times" lately in Kashmiri

II

The impression that the Kashmir problem has been overtaken by events and that the State is now part of the Indian Unidn is a surprise for those who have studied the problem from Delhi There your correspondent has frequently asked the obvious question: Would the result of a free and fair plebiscite be in favour of India or Pakistan? . The laconic answer has never varied’—Pakistan, 60—40. That is, 60 per cent, would vote for union with Pakistan, and the remainder for India. This official estimate, Unofficially expressed, is presumably responsible for the methods of Indian negotiators; and for the generous aid and progressive internal policy in Kashmir which can arouse so much admiration. The published correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan and Mr Nehru’s subsequent remarks prove beyond doubt that in its present mood Delhi will not agree to a plebiscite being held. The policy behind the aid programme is clear; if the hearts and minds of Kashmiris cannot be won, a determined effort must be made to buy them. Indians seem to see little wrong m this policy of political stone-walling and “aid with strings.” The aid programme is regarded as a demonstration of the advantages of union with India. If Kashmir takes the high road to Pathankot it can look forward to a rosy future of steady, progress in partnership with a large, united, and developing Power. If it takes the low road to Rawalpindi in Pakistan it must expect a cessation of external assistance, mis-government by bigoted mullahs, and a military junta, and foreign dominion by the AngloAmerican imperialists. The alternatives were clearly stated at the last session of the State’s ruling party, the National Conference. Divided Opposition Indian aid is munificent, far more in comparison than American aid to India. Complete figures are not readily available, but . loans amount to about 70,000.000 rupees and grants to about 110,000,000 rupees. The approximate total is £13,500,000 for 4,000,000 people, a not inconsiderable sum for a country also dependent upon foreign aid for many of its development projects. Apart from direct aid, tens of millions of rupees are being spent by India on the improvement of the Pathankot road and services taken over by the Indian authorities.

For this Kashmir pays nothing; even customs duty charged at Indian ports On imported goods is returned to the State in the form of an annual grant. The maintenance of the Indian Army in the State also brings in millions of rupees. Much of its food is purchased locally, and the thousands of labourers employed receive exceptionally high pay by local standard. Technical skill, management, and advice provided by Delhi compare favourably with any foreign technical co-operation programme. If any Indians have uneasy consciences the co-operation of the National Conference provides a ready balm. While the instrument of accession signed by the discredited and deposed Maharaja is the legal basis of union, the willingness of the present State Government is doubly reassuring. The National Conference claims a membership of 750,000, and if this does not include babes in arms and senile grandmothers, as political memberships in Asia tend to do, ti.c ;?arty must be supported by the majority of Kashmiris. The majority, if it exists, becomes overwhelming when the Hindu communal ists of Jammu and the Buddhists of Ladakh are added. Nevertheless, the opposition is most vocal, individually. It seems that every other Kashmiri your correspondent has met has spoken of his loyalty to Pakistan. Moreover, Sheikh Abdullah Will remain in gaol, according to two members of the Government, until he promises not to disrupt the State. Liberally translated, this probably means that the former Prime Minister still has a considerable following, and has come to represent those opposed to union with India.

The pto-Pakistani and anti-Indian elements are, of course, not United even as groups. The Indian Army behaves correctly, but its presence in

such large numbers must make many Kashmiris rather thoughtful. There are seven membefs of the Assembly in opposition, but they are divided and have no programme or party organisation. Their unorganised following expect their battles to be won in a third world war, but the possible repercussions of war or of an organised movement towards Pakistan cannot be contemplated lightly. For a withdrawal of Indian aid could be economically disastrous. This prospect is rarely forgotten, and increases the importance of the aid programme. It does not increase popular affection for India, but Indians, like Americans, no longer expect their assistance to be received with gratitude. Aid is strictly a political operation with very obvious strings.

Dangers of Split The latent fissiparous tendencies of the State are never forgotten. If Pakistan’s claim was met, Jammu would certainly light to retain the Indian connexion, and it would be rejected by Ladakh. Ladakhis are Buddhists owing spiritual allegiance to the Dalai Lama and their country was once part of Tibet. Kushuk-Bakola, the Head Lama, has threatened to seek political union with Tibet rather than accept Moslem rule. At present the strategic value ef Kashmir seems to be exaggerated, but the situation could be changed radically if Ladakh became part ot China. India would lose its airfields at Kargil, Leh, and other centres, and Chinese troopa would be on the Zoji La pass where the all-weather road begins. Finally, the disruption of the State would almost certainly lead to communal strife in India and Pakistan ■ as well as in Kashmir. It is obvious that no positive action can be expected from the opposition. On the other hand the present Government, supported by the military and economic power of India, a State militia, special powers, the only organised political movement, censorship and the control Of press and »<Uo, is firmly and forcefully in control. It must be said in its favour that most of its Ministers appear to be sincere secularists and to be to improve material conditions in Kashmir. , _ There have been charges of Communist influence in the Government, but the Indians rightly insist that there is very little evidence tor it. There is more difficulty in explaining the forceful and often brutal methods of the Peace Brigade, the private army of the National Conference Party, but tew reports of its activities have been published, presumably because of the patriotism of Indian correspondents 4 and editors, who seem to see Kashmir I as only part of a larger struggle between Pakistan and India, between the allegedly belligerent intentions of the . West in league with Pakistan and India’s brave campaign for peace and Asian independence. Symbol for Indiana This above all has conditioned the Indian attitude; Kashmir has now come to represent something more than mere territorial profit or loss. In a way, Kashmir is now a symbol, and in this connexion the work of Indian artiste cannot be ignored. For them, Kashmir is a beautiful land that must not be sullied by foreign bases—or Pakistan: and they speak for most northern Indians, who know with all the certainty of revealed truth that anybody who disagrees with them is wrong. It is useless to point out that the majority of Kashmiris ungratefully look to Pakistan; they know that the benefits of Indian rule will be acknowledged eventually. As Pandit Pant said, the tide cannot be turned. This is, of course, based on something more substantial than Nationalist sentiment and prejudice. Possession is nine points of the law. and the National Conference Government is the tenth. The opposition is without leadership, and another decade of interna! progress and munificent Indian aid may reduce its numbers. This is the goal of Indian policy, and if there is no outside interference it will surely ’ be reached. Then only dangerously bad relations with Pakistan will remain, but this is unlikely to cause much perturbation in Delhi. i (Concluded)