The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1955. Jugoslav Independence Acknowledged

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27678, 7 June 1955, Page 10

The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1955. Jugoslav Independence Acknowledged

Marshal Tito seems to have come very well out of his discussions with the Russian mission to Belgrade, giving nothing away and receiving acknowledgement of Jugoslavia’s ' right to be independent though comImunist. Jugoslavia made some smaller but still important gains, such as the agreement for the repatriation of Jugoslav citizens held by Russia, the prospect of lessened tension along the frontier (which would relieve the strain on Jugoslav manpower), and the possibility of freer trade along the Danube. On the other hand, Jugoslavia did not accept permanent neutrality on the 'Austrian model, which was probably 5 second on the list of Russian hopes. The first, that Jugoslavia could be [talked into return to the satellite family, could have been held only faintly by Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin. This refusal of Jugoslavia to limit its freedom of action in unstable Europe is a natural precaution against being left friendless if the time ever comes for a Russian move westward. It is also good sense in the light of the economic benefits Jugoslavia can get from the democratic Powers while it occupies a “middle-of-the-road” position. From Russia’s point of view the absence of this Jugoslav commitment prevents the formation of a neutral screen fdong the whole length of the iron curtain. Secret agreements may have been made conferring some advantages on the orthodox Communist group, but the only gains mentioned in the communique are a somewhat nebulous Jugoslav promise to support China’s claim to Formosa and permission for Comintern communists to take some part in Jugoslav political life. It is likely to be an insignificant part. The Russians are probably not very disappointed by the results of this high-level (and therefore somewhat humiliating) mission to Belgrade. They are too hard-headed to believe in the efficacy of smooth talk alone. The current Russian line of promoting peaceful coexistence (which is obviously what Jugoslavia wants) does not leave much room for threats; and, in any case, when threats were possible in the past, they failed to shake the nerve of Marshal Tito. The Russians had some useful economic bargaining points, since Jugoslavia’s interests lie generally to the east. Marshal Tito could not, however, be expected to overlook the economic advantages of being not unfriendly with the West. Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin have probably achieved their basic purpose of getting back on to speaking terms with Marshal Tito after due apologies for the bad behaviour of the late Mr Beria in disturbing their old friendship. In other words, Mr Khrushchev and Marshal Bulganin may have been merely preparing the ground for the time when circumstances will give

them real bargaining power. This was evidently not the time to talk big.