Conflict Of Opinion On Matsu And Quemoy

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27637, 19 April 1955, Page 11

Conflict Of Opinion On Matsu And Quemoy

[Specially Written tor the N.Z.P.A. by FRANK OLIVER]

WASHINGTON, April 17. It is* perfectly apparent that Mr Adlai Stevenson’s remarks about the Far East blew through the country like a clean breeze and lifted enough fog for most people to see the conflict of moral, political and military considerations that make up official thinking about Matsu and Quemoy and the whole problem of the Formosa Strait.

The Secretary of State (Mr Dulles) responded that the Administration was ahead of Mr Stevenson in this matter, that he merely endorsed the Administration’s programme on Formosa.

But the troublesome thing for many Americans is that Mr Dulles appears to be juggling still with many policy balls, and no one in the audience can tell which one he will finally catch and which will be allowed to fall to the ground. The ball marked “Defence of Quemoy and Matsu” is still busily spinning. Most people are morally confident that this is the one the President will eventually say must fall to the earth, but they would be a whole lot happier and more confident if he said it soon. One main trouble is that the circumstances now are that a statement of no defence of these islands would look like abject retreat and raise a fearful noise from the followers of Senator Knowland and Senator McCarthy, and evoke such phrases as “appeasement” and “abandonment ot Asia.”

And Mr Dulles is very sensitive to Congressional opinion. If it is -not straining metaphor too far, he appears to be juggling Congress with one hand while he keeps his policy balls flying up and down with the other. It is widely reported, and as widely believed, that Sir Anthony Eden did his best to get America off the hook by offering to guarantee the American position in Formosa if America would refrain from guaranteeing Quemoy and Matsu and hold a plebiscite in Formosa. Doubt About Plebiscite

The third condition was what Americans might call the “killer diller,” for almost none believes that

an honest plebiscite among Formosans would give Marshal Chiang Kai-shek a vote of confidence, but that it would go overwhelmingly against him, which is believed to be why the Republican Old Guard advised Mr Dulles against the Eden proposal. Such a plebiscite result would blow to smithereens the case of extreme Rightists in America that Marshal Chiang is either a demigod or the White Knight of Asia holding back the advancing Red scourge. It is doubtful whether Mr Dulles so regards him, but Mr Dulles deserves sympathy for the dilemma he would be in if such a plebiscite result was reached.

America is an ally of the so-called Nationalist Government of China in the first place, and in the second if the plebiscite went against Marshal Chiang, what would or could be done with Marshal Chiang and bi* troops, most of whom are believed to be loyal to him? Further, as Mr Dulles says, in the event of a Chinese Communist attack upon Formosa Marshal Chiang’s troops will be the ground forces of the defence.

The problem is neither pretty nor easy, and a plebiscite, however desirable, would illuminate but not resolve

“Weakening Grand Alliance” What Mr Stevenson argues and what many people, including some Republicans, believe is that the alliance to Marshal Chiang and his men is weakening the grand alliance of free people, and that Quemoy and Matsu, even if held securely, can scarcely compare in value with a solid, united front of the free nations drawing a line down the middle of the Formosa Strait.

A great number of Americans feel that Mr Stevenson put his finAr on the core of the problem when he said that America faces a humiliating retreat or the hazard of war and his speech may have considerable effects.

After all, 27,000,000 voted for him in 1952. He seems to have lost none of his popularity, and there can be little doubt that in 1956 he would win hands down against any opponent except the ever-popular Eisenhower. His is a voice not to be ignored.