LOSS OF TRADE WITH SOVIET

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27634, 15 April 1955, Page 13

LOSS OF TRADE WITH SOVIET

Australia’s Exports Down £20,000,000 (Bee. 8 pm.) CANBERRA, April 14. The virtual stoppage of Russian purchases has cost Australia more than £20,000,000 so far this fiancial year. This loss equalled nearly half of Australia’s unfavourable trade balance over the period. The tailing-off of exports to Russia coincided with the suspension of diplomatic relations with Russia after the defection of Vladimir Petrov, the former Russan diplomat in Canberra, last year. The loss is shown in the trade figures for the first eight months of 1954-55, issued by the Acting-Com-monwealth Statistician (Mr S. R. Carver). Exports to Russia were worth only £153,000 compared with £20,892,000 in the same period of the last financial year. Britannia Airliner Returns. —The;93seeter Bristol Britannia turbinepropeller plane, which has been carrying out high altitude and tropical trials in Africa, landed at its home, field near Bristol today from Khartoum. The British Overseas Airways Corporation hopes to introduce the Britannia on the South African route next year and later to the Far East and Australia.—London, April 13.

It was learned authoritatively, the correspondent said, that the Communist Government in Peking in the last few days had sternly rebuffed the latest of a continuing series of diplomatic feelers aimed at finding a means of bringing about consultations to effect a de facto, or de jure, cease fire. The accepted view now of the United States and British Commonwealth officials was that China would remain adamant in its stand against negotiating the Formosa dispute. At the same time China would strive vigorously at the Bandung conference —beginning next Monday—to win a moral mandate from the representatives of half the world’s population to press ahead with its announced intention of “liberating” Matsu, Quemoy, the Pescadores, and Formosa, the correspondent said. In short, the Bandung conference had come to be regarded now by most Asian experts in Washington as a key factor in the vital question of war or

It was learned authoritatively, the correspondent said, that New Zealand did not plan to take any new initiative m the United Nations concerning Formosa.

With Britain’s concurrence, New Zealand had decided that the moment was not propitious to renew its call for a cease fire in the straits of Formosa, or to introduce a new resolution in the Security Council to denounce the use of force in the area. The British and New Zealand view was that if such moves were launched at this time, before China had exploited its chance at Bandung, they would be doomed to failure, either through a Soviet veto or a public repetition of China’s refusal to negotiate. Such a failure, it was thought, would cripple United Nations effectiveness in the crisis. The present position, with the New Zealand cease-fire resolution still available as a basis for action on the Security Council agenda, was regarded as preferable until after the 28 nations had given their answer to China at Bandung. “Bowed to Arguments” Some American and Australian officials were understood to feel that more positive action should be taken in the United Nations immediately, but thev had bowed to arguments of their allies. The suggestion of Mr Adlai Steven-, son that the United States should explore with its allies a joint pledge for the defence of Formosa, and pending settlement, abandonment by the Nationalist regime of their reliance on Quemoy and Matsu, had been widely published and become a factor in Formosa considerations. Senator Walter George, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and probably the most powerful single voice in the United States Congress, had said the Formosa dispute was one of the main subjects he would like to see on the agenda of the “Big Four” meeting suggested by him. Preliminary plans for such a meeting were now going forward. This fitted with Mr Stevenson’s suggestion that a settlement of the Formosa question would be facilitated if the Soviet Union would join in calling for a general renunciation of force in the area.

The correspondent said that the Eisenhower Administration had been put on clear notice by its principal allies that if it decided to fight China over Quemoy and Matsu it would not have their help.

But in their London conferences, the Prime Ministers of Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia, agreed that they could not passively abide open aggression against Formosa. and that they must respond to a United Nations call for action. Thus, according to diplomatic sources, the British Commonwealth nations’ suggestion for easing the tensions in the Western Pacific theatre had become the basis for present United States planning to stabilise the Formosa Straits.