Yalta Papers Release Seen As Political Blunder

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27614, 22 March 1955, Page 13

Yalta Papers Release Seen As Political Blunder

(Specially written for the N.Z.P.A. by FRANK OLIVER] WASHINGTON, March 20. That incisive and much-respected commentator on American affairs, James Reston, of the “New York Times,” once wrote that while the Democrats stumbled into political blunders the Republicans seemed to plan theirs carefully. They seem to have planned yet another in the publication of the Yalta documents, which appear to add little real knowledge and much oil to the flames of controversy. The general assumption is that the publication is to assist the Republican domestic political policy for election purposes. Already, on the basis of these documents, it is being argued that Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt, by his concessions to Russia, precipitated the present Communist problem in Asia. In other words, without mentioning the name of McCarthy, the implication is that the Democrats are responsible for the world’s “Red” problem. Hindsight is a wonderful weapon in the hands of those who were not called upon to exercise foresight to prove that the other fellow was without foresight. On the basis of these documents, Mr Roosevelt can be made to appear, and assuredly will be, as the man so used to giving handouts that he unnecessarily gave handouts to Marshal Stalin. All this is wonderful election campaign material and it is a safe bet that Yalta will appear as a very dirty word when the election campaign gets into hizh gear next year. Thirty cr 40 years ago, this sort of tiling would have been of comparatively minor importance. Then, _ as now, domestic politics were pretty wild, •nd no—or at least few—holds were barred. But as the United States was then in the world but scarcely of. it, •nd without much world responsibility, such matters were passed off by the rest of the world as “American poli- ' Unhappily there is still a regrettable tendency for many people to believe thst they can “say what they damn well please” domestically and the rest w the world isn't supposed to pay

much attention until someone says, < ‘We are now talking for foreign con- 1 sumption.” ' “Heard Round the World” Americans still talk of the opening . of the Revolutionary War nearly two centuries ago as the shot heard round ■ the world, but many still find it difficult to realise that American words are heard round the world whether they be directed to the Opposition party or a foreign Power. It is reported that Sir Winston Churchill urged strongly and vainly that publicatidh of these documents be withheld. None would dare to say that he did this for personal reasons, and already some people here realise that publication may have an unhappy and undesirable repercussion on British and American relations, while as some have said the Kremlin must be chuckling aud Marshal Stalin writhing In his grave with uncontrollable lauehter. ~ . , _ What is being forgotten or at least is not mentioned much is that when Mr Roosevelt went to Yalta, he had been told by some of his high military authorities that the assistance of a large number of Russian divisions would be needed to defeat Japan. That those military authorities guessed wrong is not necessarily to their discredit, but tor domestic purposes the fact that Mr Roosevelt gave concessions to secure such help is discreditably viewed through the powerful glass of hindsight. It is agreed by the more reasonable observers I have spoken with that this publication will make it difficult for others to sneak freely and frankly about friends as well as foes in international negotiations where Americans ere present. Such observers find this highly regrettable. Tt is also felt by many that while this publication will not prevent the ratification of agreements to rearm Germany, it is not calculated to oil the ratification machinery. Perusal of these documents is comnletelv fascinating for any student of international affairs but they would have been just as fascinating 20 years hence, and much less likely to nkle the sand of irritation in the machinery of international diplomacy and friendship.