THE ASIAN SCENE—II THE HARD REALITIES OF S.E.A.T.O. DEFENCE

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27614, 22 March 1955, Page 12

THE ASIAN SCENE—II THE HARD REALITIES OF S.E.A.T.O. DEFENCE

(By

GUY HARRIOTT

i* the “Sydney Morning Herald”]

[Reprinted by Arranymmtl

The fiction that in the event of war in Asia, Thailand and Indo-China would be vigorously defended and Burma saved despite herself is sUU maintained in the councils of f* l6 Sea-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty signatories. It is no more than a fiction. The protection of the northern parts of South-East Asia, as the American Secretary of State. Mr Dulles, made perfectly clear at the Bangkok meeting of the S E.A.T.O. Council last month, rests solely on the American threat of “massive retaliation” against China, at times and places of America’s choosing. Mr Dulles's message at Bangkok was that the United States is not interested in hO »ffrel«tS madefy the. American threat, and move the armies now reported to be gathered in southern ihn invadpn:

Yunnan southwards, the invaders would encounter no serious resistance on the ground north of the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. That is the decision that has been reached by the Western military planners. It is dictated by the hard realities of the situation. The facts are that America will not commit ground or air forces to South-east Asia; that Laos. Cambodia, and South Vietnam are strategically indefensible; that no reliance could be placed in a crisis on the Thai Army or the Thai Government; and that the only battleground where relatively small forces could successfully oppose the Chinese masses, and where command of the sea and the air could be decisive, is the narrow neck of land leading down into the Malayan Peninsula. “Token” Resistance by Thailand The armies of the three free States of Indo-China cannot be considered a serious military factor in terms of a major attack. Thailand’s armed forces are relatively strong and efficient, thanks to generous American help with equipment and training. But no one—least of all the Thais with whom I have talked—believes that they would put up more than a token resistance against China. The Thais are the last people in Asia to sacrifice themselves uselessly or to die for a cause. There is no; doubt that within 24 hours of a i Chinese attack the Bangkok Government—saving face, perhaps, by a staged coup in best Thai style—would make the same sort of terms with Peking as it made with Tokyo in 1942.

Indeed, the happy and amiable ward bosses, joyfully draining the milch cow of United States aid, with their rule of alternating oligarchic factions backed by army or police bayonets and their muzzled “Parliament,” are a bad joke as exponents or defenders of democracy. So long as China does not intervene. Thailand can be relied on to defend itself vigorously and successfully against subversion or rebel attack. Communism as such makes no appeal in Thailand. If the people have no say in the rule of their country, they show no signs of caring—democracy is an altogether meaningless term to the Asian masses. Bangkok is a vulgarly wealthy city jammed with large American cars, and the Thai peasantry is the most prosperous and probably the most contented in all Asia. The Thai rice farmer, almost alone in Asia, has never known foreign rule, and never known what it is to be hungry. Regularly bountiful rice harvests do not make converts to communism. The politics of the rice bowl are still the politics that count most in this part of the world.

If China Marches ■But if China moved, if Chinese armies marched. Thailand would have to be written off. Consequently, S.E.A.T.O.’s role, in fact if not in theory, has come to be limited to the combating of subversion, the countering of “minor aggressions,” and the co-ordination of economic and technical aid to threatened areas. Aid now on * 1 learned in Bangkok, win be channelled in directions where it will do most to support local security programmes. Plans for the active defence of• South-east Asia have now narrowed down to the defence of the Malayan peninsula, with air arid naval operations ranging north of it. It is proposed that the ground forces to man the Kra Isthmus line should be drawn from the British Commonwealth. There is already the nucleus of a useful Commonwealth Army in Malaya, made up of an under-strength British National Service division with which is brigaded the Fijian battalion, eight battalions of Gurkhas, eight battalions of the Malay Regiment, and the “all-races” Federation Regiment which is being slowly built up. besides large local auxiliary and police forces.

rrApPl o ';? l has been given by the United Kingdom Treasury for the expenditure of £2.000,000 (Australian) «>r the development of military airfields in Malaya. The three existing

airfields immediately affected are Alep Star, Kuantan, and Gong Kedah. At each the runways are to be length and strengthened sufficiently to take ail types ot tactical aircraft such as the Canberra aircraft and all jet fightwaircraft. Other work on these airfields includes the provision of fuel storage tanks for jet aircraft. The work at Alor Star, where th* runway built by the Japanese will be improved at a cost of more than £600.000, is expected to be completed by August. The improvements to the Gong Kedah airfield, situated near Kota Bahru, which was begun by the British early in the war and by the Japanese in 1942, should be finished by September. Those at Kuantan, on the east coast of Pahmjfr will be completed in October or November. There are also tactical and strategical air bases at Butterworth and Kuala Lumpur and on Singapore Island. A squadron of Canberra B 6 twin-jet bombers is now based in Malaya undergoing a three-month trial in tropical conditions. In the event of an emergency in Thailand or Indo-China, Canberras based on Alor Star or Gong Kedah could be on the spot within an hour and could remain for three hours over target areas. A Communjft army advancing on Malaya could be subjected to a heavy weight of air and naval bombardment. * Anzac Responsibility? The British and American conception is that the ground defence <rf the Kra Isthmus battle zone should be primarily the responsibility of Australia and New Zealand in the event of war, although the stroqg Malay and Gurkha regiments would, of course, be committed there. But there are various difficulties which will have to be ironed out before any final defence programme is fixed. First and foremost, there is the qu«- : tion of British and American assurances of aid to an Anzac Australia with all-too-vivid memorfes of 1942 and the fate of the Bth Division A.1.F., will want firm guarantees that her forces will not be left with their backs to the sea facing overwhelming odds. The United States may be prepared to give a general assurance of air and naval support, but in view of what.Mr Dulles said at last month s S.EA.TA meeting it seems unlikely that it will definitelv commit any of its forces to the defence of a specific area. Britain’s attitude can hardly be regarded as satisfactory by Australia. Even some senior British officials in Malaya and Singapore admit that Britain is still preoccupied with Europe and regards the Far East as a "sideshow.” Certainly there is no sign of any shift of British strategic interest from Europe to Asia. The prospects of any substantial '■ British reinforcements reaching Malaya in the event of war are regarded as poor. Whether Britain is prepared to allocate a strong air force to Malaya remains to be seen, but again it is considered unlikely. The question of command then arises. Britain contends that Malaya should have a British command. Australia. on the other hand, again with memories of 1942. and ineffectual British leadership then, may very well argue that an Australian officer should be Commander-in-Chief in Malaya. Communications Problems A practical military problem also arises in the Malayan “emergency” The communications of a force holding the Kra Isthmus would plainly be endangered not only by the 5000 armed Communist guerrillas in the jungles of Malaya but also by the socalled “Betong salient,” which is a segment of Thai territory jutting into Perak. The Chinese Communists from Malava have virtually undisputed control of the Betong salient, which lies astride the road and rail communications between Malaya ard the Kra Isthmus. They even run their own bus services. Communist jungle fighters from Malaya use it as a rest-camp, and the Secretary-General of the {Malayan Communist Party is believed ‘to have his headquarters there. ‘ The Thai Government has agreed in principle to co-oner ate in clearing oat the salient, and Thailand’s strong man, General Phao Siriyancn, head of the police, who, it is generally believed, will shortly succeed Pibul Songgram, now not much more than a figurehead, had talks to this end with Malaya’s Director of Operations, Lieu-tenant-General Sir Geoffrey Bourne. But the rivalry between General Phao and General Sirikit, who controls the Thai Army, is such that neither is inclined to move an adequate force to deal with the problem for fear of upsetting the balance of armed power in Bangkok between army and police, and thereby giving his rival an advantage. Yet until the problem of , Communist, forces in southern Thailand and northern Malaya is solved no force defending the Kra Isthmus . could feel secure. [ <To be continued!