PRIME MINISTERS’ MEETING A MEASURE OF UNITY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27591, 23 February 1955, Page 12

PRIME MINISTERS’ MEETING A MEASURE OF UNITY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(By

RICHARD DENMAN,

of the “Economist”J

London, February 9.—Formosa dominated the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference which has just ended in London. The implications of American intervention in the dispute between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists so overshadowed the proceedings that trade and financial questions were relegated to the background, and the news of Pakistan’s intention to become a republic caused scarcely a murmur. The most striking aspect of the conference was the unexpectedly cooperative attitude of the Indian Prime Minister. Mr Nehru, who showed himself much closer to the British viewpoint on Formosa than might have been thought from his statements intended for Asian consumption. There was general recognition of the need for a progressive neutralisation of Formosa, and neither Mr Nehru nor his adviser on international affairs, Mr Krishna Menon, showed any desire to add fuel to the fire by canvassing the exclusive claims of Peking. The feeling of the conference was that the evacuation of the Nationalist troops from the Tachen islands by the American Seventh Fleet was the decisive test. Communist reluctance to intervene was thought likely to pave the way for an evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu, originally regarded as the stepping-stones for a Nationalist return to the mainland. The Prime Ministers seemed disposed to accept the view that the Russians had faithfully relayed British representations to Peking and that they had exerted a restraining hand upon their Chinese allies. This would be consistent with the interview given by the Russian Foreign Minister. Mr Molotov, in which he suggested that the Chinese would not interfere with the peaceful evacuation of the Tachens. It is equally consistent with Russia’s presumed reluctance to become involved in a major war over Formosa; and since China is still entirely dependent upon the Soviet bloc for military supplies, it is clear that Moscow’s influence, in the final analysis, is decisive. Towards a Cease Fire Reports from Washington have suggested that President Eisenhower’s Administration has been awaiting the recommendations of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. This suggestion, however, misinterprets the nature of the conference; it would be out of the question for the Ministers to make a joint recommendation. Britain, however, may be expected to convey the views of the other Prime Ministers as well as that of Sir Winston Churchill. These views add up to a suggestion that the evacuation of the Tachens be followed by an evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu as a preliminary to a cease fire. The refusal of the Chinese Communists to attend a meeting of the Security Council on Formosa appears to have taken some of

the Prime Ministers by surprise. There was no disposition among them, however, to fall in with the apparent Communist aim of a “Geneva” tyn e of conference, in which the United States would be in danger of beinp isolated. a

Other aspects of the international scene took up a good deal of the Prime Ministers’ time. These included, i n particular, the general issue of nuclear weapons, both as a world problem and in relation to the tactical needs of the North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationMiddle East defence in the light of the evacuation of the Suez Canal and of the projected Iraq-Turkey pact; and a preview of the problems to be solved at the forthcoming meeting of the South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organisation. N.A.T.O. and the Middle East were dealt with at an early meeting, which the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon did not attend. The problems facing 5.E.A.T.0., however, have implications that override India’s dissociation from the Manila Pact. For one thing, the Indians are members of the Interna tional Supervisory Commission in Indo-China, the area which comes most closely under the protective mantip nf the S.E.A.T.O. Powers. Realities in Indo-China Although the other Prime Ministers made no attempt to talk Mr Nehru out of his fundamental neutralism, they did take pains to make him face the realities of the situation in Indo-China and to persuade him to instruct the Indian chairman on the commission to assert his authority in the face of violations of the Geneva agreement by the Viet Minh. This point of view is believed to have been forcefully put by Mr Lester Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister, and Sir Anthony Eden at a three-power talk on IndoChina. Specific instances were cited such as Viet Minh measures to prevent anti-communists from leaving the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam and the recent attack on Royal Laotian troops by the Communistcontrolled Pathet Lao forces. Although there was a good deal of solidarity between the Canadians and the Indians on various issues, it cannot be said that in this Instance the Canadians —as co-members of the truce commission—made much headway. The Indians’ attitude to violations of the truce agreement appears to be conditioned by their general pessimism regarding the future of Indo-China They appear, in particular, to have written off Vietnam as irrevocably lost to the Communists. Despite this one divergence of view it is true to say that the Commonwealth conference achieved a greater measure of unity than had been thought possible at the outset. Even the potentially disturbing presence of South Africa caused no tension. Indeed, the South African representative, Mr Swart, seemed determined to emphasise his country’s complete solidarity with the Commonwealth on matters of finance and defence.