The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 3, 1955. NEW YEAR OF HOPE

Press, Volume XCI, Issue 27547, 3 January 1955, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, JANUARY 3, 1955. NEW YEAR OF HOPE

The year’s end is traditionally and properly a time for taking stock of the state of the world— and for counting blessings. Not many will pretend that this has been a rewarding or comforting exercise in recent years. The setbacks seem in retrospect to have outweighed the achievements, the deepening fears of the world’s peoples to mock their frail hopes. Yet only the irredeemable pessimists will insist that 1954 —especially the latter half of 1954 —has been without solid achievement in the struggle towards peace and security. Neither Sir Winston Churchill nor Mr Eisenhower is given to easy optimism; yet the President recently described the prospects for peace as “ more “ promising than at any time in “recent years”, and the Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech, ventured the hope that “we might “ find ourselves in a few years “moving along a broad, smooth “ causeway of peace and plenty, “ instead of roaming and peering “ around the rim of hell ”,

The premise for the hopes of these statesmen, as the “Manchester “Guardian” remarked at the time, was that the strengthening of Western Europe and of the whole alliance should continue. And that, of course, remained in doubt until the last days of the year. The final votes in the French Assembly approving the participation of a rearmed Germany in Western European defence provided a dramatic climax to four months of truly historic events in Europe. Who would have thought in August, when the same Assembly almost contemptuously rejected the European Defence Community project—which was primarily the concept of French statesmen—that four months later the future of Western defence would be more firmly assured than at any time in the previous five years of strenuous exploration, negotiation, and detailed planning? In August there was not merely the prospect that the Western alliance would have to choose between France and Germany; the whole North Atlantic Treaty organisation was in danger of foundering. This was the time when the United States, compelled towards an “ agonising reappraisal ” of its foreign policy, as Mr Dulles described it, might have been driven by disappointment and disillusionment to an isolation more complete than between the wars; for the distrust of “ entangling alliances ” is still deep and .strong among Americans. Four Decisive Months

The change in four short months ' is striking and heartening. It can net be attributed to any one country or ■to any one statesman. But in the . hour of need France found a Prime ; Minister of real courage and the best Government it has had for years. Britain played a decisive part by taking, at last, the step over which it had long hesitated—the long-term commitment of British forces to the Continent—and Mr Eden’s skill in negotiation and conciliation was a major factor in the quick formulation and acceptance of the Paris agreements. Through all these uncertainties and rebuffs, Dr. Adenauer and his West German Government showed exemplary patience. But the decisive influence in transforming the European scene may well have been the changed emphasis of Americafl foreign policy during this period. The change has been described by. Americans as the substitution of a concept of partnership for the idea of leadership. France may finally have confirmed the belief, slow to find acceptance in the United States, that other countries cannot be bought or bullied or cajoled, even for. their own good. When Europeans describe the new American attitude as more responsible it is clear enough what they mean. The fear of being led into war; or into actions which might precipitate war, is as deep and strong in European countries as the fear of “ entangling “alliances” in America. Europeans have wanted to be assured that they , will have as much say as the United States in any great decisions which affect their common interests. It has : been suggested that Sir Winston : Churchill conveyed this feeling , very strongly, to President Eisen- , Aower when he visited him in

Washington; but already there were clear signs of the changing emphasis in American foreign policy. The idea of “ containment ” of aggressive communism had been dropped; but this seemed likely to give place to something even more alarming to America’s partners—the policy of “ peripheral strategy ”, backed by the threat of “ massive-retaliation ”. There were some hot-heads in

Washington who would have liked to apply this policy in Indo-China -—atomic bombs and all. The world was probably nearer then to a world atomic war than at any time since 1946. But wiser counsels prevailed; and the danger gave place to the hopes of Geneva and the great relief of an armistice and the end of an eight-year struggle that had grievously weakened the will and the ability of France to play ife full part as a major world Power. “No Alternative to Peace” The rapid evolution of American foreign policy since then has been very satisfying to America's allies. Over and over again President Eisenhower has emphasised the

need for restraint and circumspection. The American Government has done much to reduce local points of friction which could lead to major disputes. It has restrained both Chiang Kai-shek and Mr Rhee from lheir ill-advised military ambitions. In the face of a good deal of provocation from China, it has acted sensibly and moderately. It has encouraged the resumption of trade with the East. Most important of all, it has shown a new and unaccustomed willingness to treat with the enemy—or -at least to examine proposals from the Communist . side dispassionately and upon their merits. The policy or theory of coexistence, as it has been called, is not acceptable to all Americans. It may be suspect there for no stronger reason than that it was first propounded by Mr Stalin. But it is common sense. In the long run the only alternative to it is war, and atomic war at that. “ There is “no alternative to peace ”, said President Eisenhower; and that is the , deepest conviction of the countries and the peoples who are America’s allies. As the “ Man-

“ Chester Guardian ” remarked, they want the United States to be armed, strong, and vigilant; but they want that strength to be used witli care, caution, and a recognition that the world’s problems are too complex to be solved in a flash. The Tasks Ahead This assurance America’s' allies have in greater measure than ever before; and it is the most comforting assurance they can carry into a new year which offers sober hopes of continued progress. The year may bring the meeting of the heads of the Great States upon which many persons in the world, without a great deal of rational justification, seem to pin their faith. If this meeting does come about, its chances of achieving something useful will be enhanced by the new strength and unity of the West. It is, in any case, more likely that the world’s problems will be solved piecemeal, and only after long and . painstaking application' to each in turn, rather than in one sweeping settlement at the highest level. Trieste, the Saar, Persia, Egypt, and Indo-China—all of them festering sores on the face of an unhealthy world—have been healed in the last year by this process.

The tasks of the new year will require the same patience, unremitting hard work, and willingness on the part of the fiations to make concessions and even sacrifices. This is as tru? of the new international effort to harness atomic power for the peaceful development of backward countries as of the renewed endeavours now« being made at Geneva to free the channels of the world’s trade. Increasing attention must be given to Asia; and “The “ Times ” has emphasised the folly cf thinking onlj* in terms of formal arrangements or pacts, such as S.E.A.T.O. “ What is needed ”, said “ The Times ”, “ is an intensification “ of economic help to the most needy “ countries and a development of “patient, frank explanation of “ motives and intentions. It “ a continuous effort, with little hopa “of spectacular or speedy results, “ but only the maintenance of under- “ standing ”, The great need of 1955 may well be a new unity among the Western Powers for the discharge of the great and responsible tasks that face them outside Europe.