Suez Canal Dispute

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27405, 19 July 1954, Page 8

Suez Canal Dispute

Sir Winston Churchill’s remarks to a committee of the Conservative ' Party suggested that the Prime Minister was preparing the party (which is sharply divided on the subject) for an announcement that agreement had at last been reached between Britain and Egypt about the future operation and protection of the Suez Canal base. During. the subsequent debate in the House of Commons, Government speakers discouraged expectations of an imminent agreement; but the debate made it clear that the Government is prepared for an agreement which would require the withdrawal of British troops, and that the views of the party’s “rebels” on this point will not i prevail. Negotiations between Britain and Egypt were resumed recently. They were suspended at the time of the political upsets in Egypt in February and March, which were followed by a renewal of terrorism in the Canal Zone. From Britain’s viewpoint there could not be much advantage in ' negotiating with a government that might be overthrown at any time, ' or with a military junta that had

either to acknowledge that terrorism and murder of British soldiers continued with the junta’s consent or to confess that the junta was without complete authority in a country on whose behalf it sought to negotiate. In the last few months the Council of the Revolution, led by Colonel Nasser, seems to have greatly strengthened its hold upon Egypt, although there is still unrest and .tension. While the council’s representatives fill almost every important public office, it is virtually impossible for a counterrevolutionary movement to escape detection. There are reasons for believing that some of the more serious recent incidents in the Canal Zone have been instigated by elements of the old political parties to make an Anglo-Egyptian settlement as difficult as possible. Certainly there is evidence that the Government has been trying to tighten its control over the gangs operating in the Canal Zone. 'The atmosphere has become a little more propitious for the negotiations. When the negotiations were interrupted the gap between the two sides had become very small. The chief differences were whether the technicians remaining

behind after the military forces had been withdrawn should wear uniform, and in what circumstances Britain should have the right to re-enter the base. After long resistance the Egyptians intimated that they would agree that if Turkey were at war its allies could at once use the base. Turkey’s adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had been one of the Egyptians’ reasons for excluding Turkey from the list of countries on w’hose behalf the base could be “ re-activated ”. On uniforms, the lines of a compromise had become clear. Thus, if the Egyptians have an active wish to come to terms there is little standing in the way now that the British Government has accepted the principle of a quick withdrawal. This principle is strongly resisted by many influential people in Britain; and in politics the resistance is expressed by a “ rebel ” group in the Conservative Party, some members of which want to make a last ditch stand against withdrawal. They argue on the grounds of strategy, commerce, and prestige; they point to Egypt’s lack of respect for world opinion and international agreements, and to Egyptian bad faith in the Sudan in the last few months. These objectors to the principle of withdrawal contend that agreement on that basis would gamble too heavily on Egyptian goodwill. These considerations make an impressive case. The British Government believes a stronger case can be made for the contrary policy. The case against retaining the base in the face of Egyptian opposition was stated in the House of Commons by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, when he said it was not practical to leave forces in a hostile country; the value of the Canal Zone base depends essentially upon the service a large native labour force is prepared to give. The principal strategic argument is that at a time when concepts of war are changing quickly because of new mass-destruction weapons, ’ the need for a mobile reserve is imperative. Britain cannot find , such a reserve when some 80,000 troops, including many of the commandos and paratroops, are tied . dojvn in the Canal Zone. The British Government declares that every - relevant co:

has been taken into account, and no doubt United States policy in the Middle East (which has taken new and interesting turns recently) is among the considerations. On balance, the course offering most advantage, the Government has decided, is to get the best possible agreement with Egypt on the principle of withdrawal of British troops. As Sir Winston Churchill told the committee of the Conservative Party, that is “ the only realistic thing “ now ”,