The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1953. The Exchange of Notes

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27192, 9 November 1953, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1953. The Exchange of Notes

The Russian Note of September 28 damped Western hopes that the new Russian Government desired to make substantial changes in the foreign policy of Stalin. The latest Russian Note (replying to a Western Note of October 18) quenches, for the time being at least, any hopes that may have survived this disillusionment. In the earlier Note, ■ the Russians laid down preliminary Conditions that gave the appearance, las the “ Economist ” put it, that the ‘Russians were tying so many cans lon the dog’s tail that they hoped inert simply to wag the poor beast, I but to paralyse it. The latest Russian Note makes the intention ’brutally clear; it precludes all : chance of movement on the Western (side by demanding, as a condition |of Russian participation in a fouri Power conference, the virtual abandonment of the European Army plan. This plan, in the Western view, is a fundamental of European security policy; it is intended to guard against aggression not only by Russia but by a resurgent Germany. In comment on the latest Russian Note, Mr Eden has said that the Western nations are prepared to discuss Germany and Austria with Russia at any time, and at any place, and without any prior conditions. Here is an open door through which the Russians have only to walk if ever they conceive genuine desire to discuss out-

standing problems. But for 'the present, the Russians seem to have demonstrated beyond question that they do not want to go to a conference table.

The West can only conjecture as to the reasons for the hardening of the attitude of the new regime after its apparent conciliatoriness in the first weeks after Stalin’s death. Possibly, there was never any real intention ts> depart from the Stalinist international policies. It seems

probable, however, that both the first attitude and the changed attitude have their roots in internal affairs in Russia, and particularly in the struggle for power, of which dismissals and promotions in the

higher ranks of the hierarchy have given the world plenty of evidence. But it is now depressingly evident that the new regime has settled its foreign policy and it remains —as in Stalin’s day—based on implacable hostility to all but practising Communists whose only loyalty is to Moscow. Peoples in the West will regret this as they will regret the sterile end to the series of diplomatic exchanges that at first raised many hopes. Nevertheless, the test of the intentions of the new Russian regime was worth while, even though the peace doves that flew from the Kremlin for a

i month of two caused some'difficul- ! and tension among Western > peoples and governments. One j profitable result was to send West- ' em statesmen exploring for new s ideas and new proposals that might break the deadlock in international i relations. Though there have been . no results from them, the Western ’ probings should at least have served ! the purpose of showing the peoples . of the democracies that their statesmen are beyond any question anxious to find a basis for accommodation with Russia. The air has been cleared—an enervating air

that endangered Western unity and security—and it has been cleared by < the Russians. Public opinion in the West now has no alternative but to reconcile itself to the facts. There are no easy ways of lessening the international tension; and there are limits to what statesmanship can do in the face of implacable - obduracy. Perhaps no-one will be more disappointed than Sir Winston Churchill who in the face of a good deal of criticism, has held out high hopes of a conference of Western heads of States with Mr Malenkov. While still maintaining that such a conference might “serve a useful purpose", he has been forced to the reluctant conclusion that it could result in a

deadlock “ still worse than at “present”. It is a timely warning against wishful thinking.