RUSSIAN AMBITIONS GROW WITH SUCCESSES

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27191, 7 November 1953, Page 6

RUSSIAN AMBITIONS GROW WITH SUCCESSES

“TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY”

[By the Rt. Hon. Sir WINSTON CHURCHILL) XIII

The arrangements which I had made with the President in the summer [of 1944] to divide our responsibilities for looking after particular countries affected by the movements of the armies had tided us over the three months for which our agreement ran. But as the autumn drew on everything in Eastern Europe became more intense. I felt the need of another Fersonal meeting with Stalin, whom had not seen since Teheran, and with whom, in spite of the Warsaw tragedy, I felt new links since the successful opening of Overlord. The Russian armies were now pressing heavily upon the Balkan scene, and Rumania and Bulgaria were in their power. As the victory of the Grand Alliance became only a matter of time it was natural that Russian ambitions should grow. Communism raised its head behind the thundering Russian battle-front. Russia was the Deliverer, and communism the gospel she brought. I had never felt that our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifices from us. But the fate of Poland and Greece struck us keenly. For Poland we had entered the war; for Greece we had made painful efforts. Both their Governments had taken refuge in London, and we considered ourselves responsible for their restoration to their own country, if that was what their peoples really wished.

Upsurge of Communism In the main these feelings were shared by the United States, but they were very slow in realising the upsurge of Communist influence, which slid on before, as well as followed, the onward march of the mighty armies directed from the Kremlin. I hoped to take advantage of the better relations with the Soviets to reach satisfactory solutions of these new Problems opening between East and West. I telegraphed to Stalin: Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin Sept. 27, ’44. •‘ ... I have just returned from long talks with the President, and I can Assure you of our intense conviction that on the agreement of our -three nations, Britain. United States of America, and U.S.S.R., stands the hopes of the world. ... “Most Private. The President intends to visit England, and thereafter France and the Low Countries, immediately after the election, win or lose. My information leads me to believe that he will win. “I most earnestly desire, anq so, I know, does the President, the intervention of Soviet Russia in the Japanese war, as promised by you at Teheran as soon as the German Army was beaten and destroyed. “The opening of a Russian military front against Japan would force them to bum and bleed, especially in the air, in a manner which would vastly accelerate their defeat. From all I have learnt about the internal state of Japan, and the sense of hopelessness weighing on their people, I believe it might well be that once the Nazis are shattered a triple summons to Japan to surrender, coming from our three Great Powers, might be de“Of course, we must go into all these plans together. I will gladly come to Moscow in October if I can get away from here. If I cannot, Eden will be very ready to take my place. Meanwhile I send you and Molotov my most sincere good wishes.” Invitation to Moscow The President liked our plan of going to Moscow. Stalin now sent me a cordial invitation. Marshal Stalin to Prime Minister 30 Sept ’44.

“I have received your message of September 27. “I share your conviction that firm agreement between the three leading Powers constitutes a true guarantee of future peace and answers to the best hopes of all peace-loving peoples The continuation of our Government .in such a policy in the post-war period as we have achieved it during this great war will, it seems to me, have a decisive influence. “Of course I have a great desire to meet with you and the President. I attach great importance to it from the point of view of the interests in our common business. But, as far as I am concerned I must make one reservation. The doctors advise me not to undertake long journeys. For a certain period I must take account of this. “I warmly welcome your wish to come to Moscow in October. . . *

Eden and I, with Brooke and Ismay, started in two planes on the night of [October] sth. At Naples we had four hours’ discussion with Generals Wilson and Alexander. We alighted at Moscow on the afternoon of October 9. and were received very heartily and with full ceremonial by Molotov and many high Russian personages. This time we were lodged in Moscow itself, with every care and comfort. I had one small, perfectly appointed house, and Anthony another nearby. We were glad to dine alone together and rest. At 10 o’clock that night we held our first important meeting in the Kremlin. There were only Stalin, Molotov, Eden, and I, with Major Birse and Pavlov as interpreters. It was agreed to invite the Polish Prime Minister, M. Romer, the Foreign Minister, and Mr Grabski, a grey-bearded and aged academician of much charm and quality, to Moscow at once. Sharing Influence in Balkans I telegraphed' accordingly to M. Mikolajczyk that we were expecting him and his friends for discussions with the Soviet Government and ourselves, as well as with the Lublin Polish Committee. I made it clear that refusal to come to take part in the conversations would amount to a definite rejection of our advice and would relieve us from further responsibility towards the London Polish Government.

The moment was apt for business, so I said, “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests. missions and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have 90 per cent, predominance in Rumania, for us to have 90 per cent, of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Jugoslavia?”

While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper: _ pc - Rumania — Russia .. .. ..90 The others .. .. .. 10 Greece— Great Britain .. ..90 (in accord with U.S.A.) Russia .. .. .. 10 Jugoslavia— .. .. 50-50 Hungary— .. .. 50-50

Bulgaria— Russia .. .. .. 75 The others .. .. .. 25 I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.

Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won.

After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said. ‘'Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us bum the paper.” “No, you keep it,” said Stalin. Rival Polish Delegations

At 5 o’clock on the evening of October 13 we had our meeting' at the Soviet Government Hospitality House, known as Spiridonozka, to hear Mikolajczyk and his colleagues put their case.

These talks were held as a preparation for a further meeting at which the British and American delegations would meet the Lublin Poles. I pressed Mikolajczyk hard to consider two things, namely, de facto acceptance of the Curzon Line, with interchange of population and a friendly discussion with the Lublin Polish Committee so that a united Poland might be established.

I Changes, I said, would take place, but it would be best if unity were established now. at this closing period of the war, and I asked the Poles to consider the matter carefully that night. At 10 o'clock the same evening met the so-called Polish National Committee. It was soon plain that the Lublin Poles were mere pawns of Russia. They had learned and rehearsed their part so carefully that even their masters evidently felt they were over* doing it. For instance, Mr Bierut, the leader spoke in these terms: “We are here to demand on behalf of Poland that Lwow shall belong to Russia. This is the will of the Polish people.” When this had been translated from Polish into English and Russian I looked at Stalin and saw an understanding twinkle in his expressive eyes, as much as to say, "What about that for our Soviet teaching?” The lengthy contribution of another Lublin leader Osobka-Morawski, was equally depressing. Mr Eden formed the worst opinion of the three Lublin Poles. The whole conference lasted over six hours, but the achievement was small. Russia and Japan On the 14th there was a Command Performance at the Bolshoi Theatrefirst a ballet, then opera, and finally some splendid dancing and singing by the Red Army choir. Stalin and I occupied the Royal Box, and we had a rapturous ovation from the entire audience.

After, the theatre we had a most interesting and successful military discussion at the Kremlin. Stalin had with him Molotov and General Antonov. Harriman brought General Deane. I had Brooke, Ismay, and General Burrows, head of our Military Mission in Moscow. There was no doubt whatever that the Soviets intended to enter the war against Japan as soon after the defeat of Germany as they could collect the necessary forces and supplies in the Far East. Stalin would not commit himself definitely to a date. The Russians agreed to an immediate start in building up stocks of food and fuel in their Far Eastern oilfields, and to let the Americans use the airfields and other facilities in the maritime provinces which they needed for their Strategical Air Force. Stalin did not seem anxious about the effect of these preparation® on the Japanese. In fact, he hoped they would make a “premature attack,” as this would encourage the Russians to fight their best. “The Russians,” he remarked, “would have to know what they were fighting for.” On the 15th I had a high temperature and could not attend the second military meeting. Stalin first of all agreed that we should concert our war plans, He asked for United States help in building up a two to three months’ reserve of fuel, food, and transport in the Far East, and said that if this could be done and the political issues could be clarified the U.S.S.R. would be ready to attack Japan about three months after Germany had been defeated.

As the days passed only slight improvement was made with the festering sore of Soviet-Polish affairs. The Poles were filling to accept the Curzon Line “as a line of demarcation between Russia and Poland.” The Russians insisted on the words “as a basis cf frontier between Russia and Poland.” Neither side would give way.

“Behind the Horseman” In other directions considerable advantages had been gained. There is no doubt that in our narrow circle we talked with an ease, freedom, and cordiality never before attained between our two countries. Stalin made several expressions of personal regard which I felt sure were sincere. But I became even more convinced that he was by no means alone. As I said to my colleagues at home, “Behind the horseman sits black care.” While flying home I gave the President further details of our talks. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt: 29 Oct 44 “On our last day at Moscow Mikolajczyk saw Bierut, who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his nfen had been shot in the last month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. “Approaching winter conditions behind the front would be very hard as the Russian Army moved forward, using all transport. “He insisted, however, that if Mikolajczyk were Premier he (Bierut) must have 75 per cent, of the Cabinet Mikolajczyk proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he having four out of the five of their best men. whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin. “2. Later, at my request Stalin saw Mikolajczyk and had an hour and a half’s very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him, and Mikolajciyk promised to form and conduct a Government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan, but Stalin made it clear that the Lublia Poles must have the majority. “3. After the Kremlin dinner we But it bluntly to Stalin that unless Hkolajczyk had fifty-fifty plus himself the Western World would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish Government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with fiftyfifty, but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. ... “4. Apart from the above, Mikolajczyk is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Cursor Line, including Lwow, for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we get a settlement. . . . Trial of War Criminals “5. On major war criminals UJ. took an unexpected ultra-respectable line. There must be no executfoni without trial; otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in international law, but he replied if there were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. “6. We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. UJ. wants Poland. Czecho., and Hungary to form a realm of independent, antiNazi. pro-Russian States, the first two of which might join together. “Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of the federation of South German States, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden.

“As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me. though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U.J. is strongly opposed. “7. As to Prussia, U.J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and P™ out of action and probably under international control, and a separate State formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalistion of the Kiel Canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. HoW* ever, you may be sure that we caint to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting. ...” (To be continued) (Coypright 1953 in U.S.A, by the the New York Times Company ana Time Inc. (publishers of Time and Life); in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph Ltd.; elsewhere hy International Co-operation Press Service Inc. World right reserved. Re* production in whole, or in part, in any language strictly prohibited).