WHAT NEXT IN KOREA?

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27191, 7 November 1953, Page 9

WHAT NEXT IN KOREA?

“Armistice Agreement” Held To Be Misnomer JAPAN’S PART IN BALANCE OF POWER tßy WILLIAM COURTENAY, 0.8. E., MM.I cou ? tries W j th Pacific seaboards, all affected by the Japanese' T h ■ ub ?e q “ ent events in Korea, are anxious to read the signs ®J ld tS m J hat wa^" to 5 n la nd now that October 27 has passed and behind us mOnths P rovided for the initiation of armistice talks are . '^ tb °A Ugh l he document signed at Panmunjon on July 27 last is Agceeaaent,” this is really a misnomer. All that has been achieved solar after talks which commenced on July 10 1951 is ” Army “ m ° re to it only a

The preamble itself states that the •‘Commanders-in-Chief with the object of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities until a final peaceful settlement is achieved—agree to be bound by the conditions of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs.”

So that really we are seeking the “establishment of an armistice” still—to be followed by the peaceful settlement. Article IV, paragxaph 60, simply states that to “insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the commanders of both sides will recommend to their governments that within three months a political conference at higher level be held to solve the Korean question.” There is no guarantee that the Governments concerned will accept the recommendations of their commanders; the three months ran from July 27 to October 27. What next then, now that these 90 days have expired without the conference being convened? The Chinese and North are still prevaricating over the agenda and priority of topics to be discussed.

If by January 27 at the close of another three months the conference has | not met or has not decided the issues, { South Korea reserves the right to take fwhat action it pleases. It cannot do {.much earlier as winter has set in and • the campaigning season is over until r'March.

All of us who have been In Korea frfor some years, and who have closely the two years of protracted [talks at Panmunjom. which led to the , ‘cease fire.” are under no illusions as Ito Chinese 'Communist and Russian [;aims. They raised, equipped, trained : end armed in secret a North Korean Army 200,000 strong behind the "Bamboo Curtain” at the 38th Parallel between 1945 and 1950 with one object •—to steal South Korea by a lightning *-attack. This was launched with 400 I Russian tanks against all but defence- ‘ less South Korea on June 25, 1950. The • plot aimed at reaching Pusan, the vital :port in the south-east, by August 15, *1950 —the second anniversary of South f Korea's independence.

It miscarried thanks to the decisive Tole of United States air power, aided gby 77 Squadron Royal Australian Air ‘Korce, and by the pilots from British, and American carriers. * "When, because of this checkmate, plus T-the absence of air support, the Com[munists supplicated for the armistice kin June, 1951, they had only changed *tactics—the aim and target are still in view. South Korea is to be stolen by ■“hook or by crook.” Deflected in the ■field by the gallantry of the United Nations infantry, whose line held firm ■for 2J years, and decimated, from the air they are turning to the tortuous path of politics to try to outsmart us all politically where they could not outgeneral us in the field. This is what we have to watch so .carefully from this time forward. They Tiave suggested throughout the truce "talk*—and will return to the theme in any coming talks—that the best plan is for “both sides to withdraw, leaving the North and South Koreans to settle the affair between themselves.” This plea sounds so reasonable and sensible at first look. Yet it is highly dangerous because it is plausible. This was precisely what the United Nations endeavoured to achieve in January, 1948. I was in Korea then -when the United Nations Commission arrived at Seoul to sound all opinions; to form a Government; to unite North and I South. They were welcomed to Seoul ,by Lieutenant-General John Hodge, the

f United States Commander. A Government was set up by the South •» Koreans themselves under President >Sygnman Rhee after a fair general | -election in which all parties took part with secrecy of the ballot. “Bamboo Curtain” This Parliament comprised 300 seats ef which 100 were kept—and still are—’for delegates from North Korea. But i Russia would not allow the United I Nations Commission into North Korea beyond the “Bamboo Curtain” she had ; dropped so effectively on entering the f country in September, 1945. It suits the Communists to forget this event of January, 1948, because then they were counting on the North- Korean Army to steal South Korea by a trick.' We have only to’ ask ourselves this simple question to explode the plausibility in the suggestion today. If we are to withdraw, thfen to where shall the 21 nations who have troops in Korea withdraw them? Obviously, they will desire to go home and indeed there is no sense in withdrawal other-

wise. But to where will the millionstrong Chinese Army withdraw? They have only to move a mile or two from North Korea into “neutral” Manchuria and they are technically out of the country. it will take the 21 participants in the United Nations up to 21 years to agree to return to Korea. only need 21 days or less for the Communist hordes to sweep into South Korea and “take it by crook” from within.

The United Nations therefore have no option but to remain in Korea for many years to come; if necessary for a decade; if need be to the close of the century, it has become essential for them, in face of this renewed prevarication by the Communists at Panmunjon—a stalling which many of us have, long predicted as a deliberate policy—to take long views. All must be ready to take those same long wise sagacious views which have always characterised Britain’s foreign policy. These were the views which kept us on the frontiers of India for 250 years, giving the peoples of Hindustan a peace they had not known for 2000 years. England regarded two and a half centuries as but a short period of a . nation’s history. If we all take the short view and seek any excuse for withdrawal from Korea, the Communists will have triumphed Ultimately. They will seize the South; the electric effect of their victory will stimulate the small but raucous Communist party in Japan; it Will have its profound effect on all loyal populations of Indo-China, Singapore, Malay, and Hong Kong. They will feel deserted and that they must throw in their lot with the Communists in the firm belief that the rest of the century belongs to these new masters of Asia.

Rearming of Japan But if we will take the long sagacious view we will “sweat it out” at the present battle line; turn the task into a comfortable garrison job; use every subtle art of propaganda to separate China from Russia; and while striving to unite North and South Korea, rearm Japan and raise her to the dignity of a really independent country able to defend herself and play her part in the balance of power we must create in the Pacific. I find much apprehension in Australia and New Zealand concerning this policy. But if we do not rearm Japan we must carry her as a passenger; the cost of protecting her 80,000,000 people will fall on America and the British Empire lands of the Pacific.

If we all walk out of japan and leave her unarmed then she becomes a tempting morsel to predatory powers. Where there is a power vacuum there soineone must rush in. That is the law of nature. If we rearm her, are we taking a risk of a resurgent aggressive Japan in years to come? That is Australia’s and New Zealand’s fear. The answer is that.there is no such risk—even if there were the desire, which may be doubted—for the next 25 years, countries still require navies to carry war and invasion from one land to another separated by hundreds of miles.

It may not be so after 1975 or so, but we cannot look beyond 25 years and would be foolish to attempt to estimate what the situation is likely to be anywhere in the closing years of the century. It is folly to try to legislate for conditions, the seeds of which may not even yet be sown. Let us be content with looking 25 years ahead, because with the right policy we can predict that immediate future and therefore control it. Russia, China, and Japan With a rearmed Japan, neither China nor Russia will measure itself against her as easily as both were prepared to do from 1945 to 1950. With that base behind us strong and friendly, Russia and China are more likely to cry “quits” in Korea. By skilful, subtle propaganda we can detach China from Russia and perhaps orientate her towards the West—whether she remains Communist or not—and all' the time we are growing stronger in the West. With a firm line there; with the line held in Korea; with the Communist war on the decline in Malaya; with a strong Japan as a base behind us—these are the ingredients which alone' might bring peace and unity ultimately to Korea. Any policy of scuttle will invite disaster. I plead therefore in relation to Japan snd this problem the old Christian doctrine “Treat with your enemy while he is in the gate.” We may not find such a favourable opportunity 20 years hence. No Christian leader or state dpre turn his eye away from that sagacious Christian precept. It works. It is the only precept which will work.