The Press SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1953. Four-Power Talks

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27094, 18 July 1953, Page 6

The Press SATURDAY, JULY 18, 1953. Four-Power Talks

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, the United States, France, and Russia to discuss a limited agenda will, if it occurs, be a pale shadow of the meeting of the heads of four States which, had Sir Winston Churchill’s plan matured, would have occurred about the same time. First the inability of France to find a Prime Minister, and then Sir Winston Churchill’s indisposition, caused the Bermuda conference to be postponed, and with it the development of the plan for a- meeting of the heads of States. The postponement of the Bermuda conference left a hiatus in international affairs. Contrary to some expectations, the Russians did not take this opportunity to assume the initiative, probably because of their preoccupation with the home front and the troubles in. the satellite countries. The West filled the gap as best it could with a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and the United States in Washington. From this meeting has come the proposal for a four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers. When the Note inviting Russia to meet the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers is compared with Sir Winston Churchill’s proposals for the meeting of the heads of States, some significant differences are apparent. Though the possibility of discussing other subjects is not ruled out, the present Western idea is to limit the programme for the Foreign Ministers’ meeting to a few subjects. The Note states that “ while “recognising the fact that enduring “peace can only be ultimately as- “ sured when certain basic prob- “ lems such as controlled disarma- “ ment can be dealt with, the gov- “ ernments desire to dispose now of “those problems which are capable “of early solution”. Subjects listed for discussion in this category are the organisation of free elections in all Germany, conditions for the establishment of a free all-German government and final agreement on an Austrian peace treaty. Sir Winston Churchill spoke in the House of Commons of a four-Power conference which “should not be over- “ hung by a ponderous or rigid “ agenda, or led into mazes of techni- “ cal details, zealously contested by “ hordes of experts drawn up in “ vast, cumbrous array ”.

The American Administration and some in Britain and other countries doubted the wisdom of Sir Winston Churchill’s proposal. But events determined that its wisdom should not be put to the test, for the time being, at any rate. But while it is clearly not a fulfilment of the Churchill proposals, the Foreign Ministers’ conference may still be a useful test of the sincerity of Russia’s post-Stalin “ peace offensive ”. By and large, the Note proposes that the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers should take up the German problem where Mr Bevin, Mr Acheson, Mr Schuman, and Mr Vyshinsky left it after a long meeting in Paris in May and June, 1949. After that, the last of a series of largely abortive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers established during the war-time alliance, the respective sides went their own ways. Vast changes in both Eastern and Western Germany since early in 1949 have to be taken into account by both sides, the most striking, of course, being the attitude of the North Atlantic community towards Western Germany. But basically the problems are the same as those which defied solution by the Foreign Ministers at meetings between 1945 and 1949. Reexamination of the problems at this stage should, therefore, show whether accommodation is possible. If a conference with limited objectives proved successful it might clear the way for a further conference embracing all the fundamental problems which stand in the way of a real and lasting improvement in relations between East and West. So far the Russians have not spoken. Russia could still make some dramatic move to try to break Western Germany’s attachment to the Atlantic community. Mr Grotewohl’s invitation to Western Germany to join an All-German Council to discuss free elections hints at something of the sort. Assuming that Mr Grotewohl would not speak without instructions from Moscow, his direct approach to Western Germany implies a plan to by-pass the fourPower conference proposed by the West. Mr Grotewohl’s invitation has been quickly and firmly rejected in Western Germany, where it is held that the first steps to German unity are four-Power talks. The danger remains that the Western proposal may become a political issue in the forthcoming elections in Western Germany. The need is for a genuine effort by all parties to find a basis for accommodation.