The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1953. The Republic of Egypt

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27073, 23 June 1953, Page 8

The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1953. The Republic of Egypt

News from Egypt, perhaps significantly sparse, gives no hint of why General Naguib has chosen to proclaim a republic at this stage, although it has long been plain that a republic was the goal of the military junta that has ruled Egypt for nearly a year. The abrogation of the constitution at the beginning of this year, and the “ provisional “charter” under which General Naguib’s regime took powers to govern by decree for three years, seemed to give the new dictator all the powers that he needed. That at least was the impression General Naguib gave at the time, an impression heightened by LieutenantColonel Amwar Sadat, another revolutionary leader, when he said, apropos of the pending revision of the constitution: “Whether mon- “ archy or republic, this shall be “ left to the people to decide through “a popular referendum”. He added that the people would also decide on the proposed new constitution by referendum. It is not yet clear whether the people, deprived of a voice on the question of the monarchy, are to be deprived also of any voice in the hew constitution. But whether this has yet been decided or not, the chances of a constitutional referendum do not seem good while General Naguib moves steadily along the path of military dictatorship. The work of the constitutional commission in its study of many forms of government will probably be of little use now. Possibly the chairman, Aly Maher, helped to speed the proclamation of the republic when he told the first meeting of the commission that the British constitutional monarchy was the strongest democratic system of government in the modern world. Reports commonly speak of General Naguib as growing in popularity as he becomes better known to Egyptians. If so, it is surprising that he has not chosen the opportunity of a referendum to demonstrate his public support. Leaving aside his personal appeal to the Egyptians, his position is not as strong as it might seem. Egypt has squandered the handsome postwar sterling balances, and is now suffering from acute exchange difficulties. The attempt to hold the price of cotton very high has contributed largely to a heavy reduction in British buying of Egypt’s main source of wealth. In attempting to satisfy the nationalist extremists, the regime has put itself into an almost impossible position over the Suez Canal base. Internally, there are signs that attempts to break the army’s only obvious rival—the Wafd—have failed and that there is in being a real alternative to the present government. On the credit side, agricultural and administrative reforms have had no time to work themselves out. In these circumstances General Naguib may feel that his grip is stronger when he acts for himself as president of a republic than when he acts; even though nominally, only as the chief minister of an infant king. The change probably has little significance for the outside world, except that it may cause some regret for the inability of a man who seized office as a reformer to rule Egypt without dictatorial authority.