The Press MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1953. Korea

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27072, 22 June 1953, Page 8

The Press MONDAY, JUNE 22, 1953. Korea

The release of thousands of North Korean anti-Communist prisoners-of-war by South Koreans on the orders of President Syngman Rhee is certain to complicate and hinder the efforts to conclude a military truce in Korea. That, of course, is President Rhee’s aim. After the truce negotiators had reached agreement on the prisoners-of-war issue, bringing a truce within sight, President Rhee and members of his Government vehemently objected to a truce that would leave Korea divided. There was no doubting the capacity of President Rhee and the South Korean Government to make real difficulties; but it was hoped that their first threats and their wild talk of “ going it alone ” were prompted by unreasoning emotion, and that on reflection they would agree that it was impossible for the United Nations to put the South Koreans’ special aims ahead of the general interest of the nations represented by the organisation, or, indeed, ahead of the purpose of the United Nations’ military action in Korea, which was to stop aggression. The United Nations have long had the unification of Korea as a political objective; and that is still an objective. But the United Nations have never promised to try to unify Korea by force of arms, which is what President Rhee and his associates want it to do. The South Korean Government, in fact, is trying to force the United Nations into action beyond the mandate given by the Security Council when it authorised military action to check aggression in Korea. There is little doubt that had the North Korean aggression gone unchecked by nations outside Korea, one effect would have been the elimination of President Rhee and his associates. If South Korea now possesses considerable military strength that is solely because South Korean forces have been trained, equipped, and supplied by members of the United Nations—chiefly the United States. Moreover, it would not have been possible to build a South Korean Army at all had not time been bought by outside nations at heavy cost in lives and material. These are things for which the South Koreans might be expected to show Some appreciation. Even so, it is possible to sympathise with the fear’of the South Koreans that their interests might not be sufficiently safeguarded in the truce and the political discussions to follow it. But it is hard to sympathise with political leaders who knowingly and deliberately sabotage the prospects of peace. The United Nations command and the political heads of the countries involved are now faced, because of the obduracy of President Rhee and his Government, with new and formidable problems. It is impossible to foresee the consequences of the South Koreans’ action in releasing thousands of prisoners who were to come under the supervision of the armistice commission. Much will depend upon the attitude of the Communists. If their reasons for negotiating a truce are stronger than their desire to make mischief, they may be accommodating. But

■ however anxious the Communists may be to conclude a truce, they ( will want to know, and they are entitled to assurance, that the 1 United Nations command can guari antee that the terms of the truce 1 will be fulfilled. For President Rhee has not only released some 26,000 prisoners; he has also challenged the authority of the United Nations command. That, of course, injects an entirely new - element into the truce negotiations; 5 and until the authority of the United Nations command is restored it 5 seems impossible to hope for the early completion of the truce i arrangements.