THE PEACE OFFENSIVE SOME THOUGHTS ON THE “OPEN MIND”

Press, Volume LXXXIX, Issue 27037, 12 May 1953, Page 8

THE PEACE OFFENSIVE SOME THOUGHTS ON THE “OPEN MIND”

(By WALTER LIPPMANN in th« “New York Herald Tribuns'*) | (Reprinted bv Arrangement)

I expect to be in Europe when this article is published, and, since this means that it has to be written several days in advance. I wish I had not promised it to the editor. There are many signs that big things are happening in the world, and every sensible man must want above all to wait ana to see, to keep his eyes open and his mouth shut. I must postpone the luxury of being that sensible until I finish this piece. It is, however, the fact that the human eye, and particularly the mind s eye, will not see everything at once, as a whole, and in its full significance, but rather it will see what it is trained to see in those places where it has chosen to look. And so, while it is most necessary to keep our minds open, we must do our best to know what they are open for. If not, if we do not keep clarifying and defining to ourselves what we are looking for, our open minds will have no defences against our wishes and our fears. In discussing the developments since Stalin’s death, we have all asked ourselves whether they reflect a tactical or a strategical turn. And that compels us to ask ourselves what concretely would be the difference between a tactical and a strategical change in the policy of the Soviet Union. Withdrawal of Annies _ My answer to that question is that every development must be considered as tactical as long as the military frontier between the Communist orbit and the non-Communist world is unaltered. Thus a Korean truce at the existing line of battle, desirable as it is, is in itself no more than a tactical development. So, too, would agreements to improve relations in and around Berlin be merely tactical if the basic military situation which leaves Berlin surrrounded is not altered. So, too, are the change of tone in the Soviet press, and the instances of accommodation. As long as the military frontier of the two armed coalitions remains where it now is, there has been no strategic change in the cold war. A strategic change, will be marked, I believe, by serious proposals of a kind that must be negotiated for a withdrawal of armies. Unless and until there are serious proposals of this kind, the prudent presumption is that everything is tactical because the power to reverse it is unchanged. The withdrawal of the Red Army from Germany, Austria, and Eastern Europe could not, however, be merely tactical. For, once the army was withdrawn, the Soviet Union would no longer exercise the same degree of power in Eastern Europe.

We do not know that the ■ Union has decided to bring about* strategic change. But it is not possible. It is by no means any lonS inconceivable. ‘ ' 6 ' r Since it might be corning, o ne questions we must ask ourselves ; what to watch, what to look for n should look, I believe, for eviriJ? bearing on whether a withdrawal Europe and a reduction of the total: tarian character of the regime are inseparably bound up the one the other. iJI Setting the Satellites Free If we look at the problem of th. withdrawal from Europe from fll. Soviet point of view, it must sur®i» be one of their greatest anxieties » to what would be the attitude of th. satellites if the captivity ended Would this mean counter-revoluSk ary governments, not only anti-C O n£ munist but also anti-Russiau, right ub to the highly vulnerable frontier m the Soviet Union? " Once the West had rearmed and if was impossible for the Soviet Union to reach the Atlantic without a ruin ous war, its position in the middle of Europe became a dangerous one fS the Soviet Union as well as for the western world. For the partition of Germany and Europe is a monstrous fact, intolerable, unstable, expiry. Sooner or later there was bound to be a showdown. On the western side the coalition has been held together with great difficulty. On the eastern side the satellite position wu obvi. ously unstable, as Tito had clwnrw. strated. Titoism in the Kremlin? The Soviet national interest would ?have been served by a withdrawal wifh all the effect that would have had on Germany and France, for the threat of a violent reaction in the released satellite nations against the cruelty and the exploitation of Stalinism. It is by no means impossible that Stalin’s successors, if they are liquidating Stalinism, would expect to find fa that very fact the solution of problem in the satellite countries. What, for example, would happen jf Titoism were to prevail in the Kre®. lin itself, and were to become, as Tito has always said it was, the true doetrine as distinguished from the Sttgfa. ist heresy? I don’t say this fa Sn, pening. But I think it could be IE pening, and it is worth thinking canfully about For the consequences on the whole diplomatic structure of lectern Europe would be enormous.’!