The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1952. Military Rule in Egypt

Press, Volume LXXXVIII, Issue 26832, 10 September 1952, Page 8

The Press WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1952. Military Rule in Egypt

General Naguib’s declared intention{ to keep the Egyptian Army out of i politics reads strangely now. But with General Naguib's assumption of the Prime Ministership the process that began when the Army displaced the King continues logically. The coup which culminated in the abdication of King Farouk profoundly changed political power; lit removed at a stroke what had l been the focal point in Egyptian politics. At first the leaders of the coup thought it would be enough if | the Army replaced the monarchy as a constitutional pivot, providing the i strong reserve powers formerly held iby the palace, though without the I distorting influence on politics of a royal faction. The Army leaders [constantly reiterated that government was the duty of the civil authorities; they believed that no direct intervention in politics would be necessary to bring about consti- i tvtional and social reforms, and that ' the political parties could be per- i suaded to purge and reconstruct 1 themselves. These expectations ( have proved sadly astray. Under t the civilian administration chosen d and backed by the Army, the im-i, petus of reform lost momentum; t politicians and others with powerful ‘ vested interests in the old state of j affairs sat tight, believing that time would restore their fortunes after * the reform movement had halted and disintegrated; some counteraction from politicians and parties * and their backers began to appear. £ It became clear that if the progress- ; ive movement begun by the Army ‘ was to continue, the Army must ( emerge as a political force; the Army itself must put something into ! the political vacuum it had created. < The Army issued its own programme < of social reform, but found its chosen j civilian government lukewarm. Aly < Maher’s policy was sound enough. It sought to maintain three things: ' first, a sound economic policy; t second, carefully graduated reforms: ' and third, the support of as wide a ' section of the population as possible, t But from the viewpoint of the re- j formers this policy was bogging ( down the reform movement and J was not giving enough expression to ! the wave of puritanical reaction sweeping Egypt. The Army leaders have now faced the fact that in a country where corruption and social privilege are deeply embedded, real reform will not be achieved by persons with ‘ interests in the old state of affairs, but only in the face of antagonism . from such interests. As the process , ii began has been tested step by step 1 by events, so the Army has been driven to recognise this antagonism ' and to fight it; and in the result Egypt has passed under a military dictatorship. It cannot be foreseen . at present whether the Army die- < tatorship will be complete and permanent, or whether it will prove a temporary phenomenon necessary i while the country recovers from the profound shock which it suffered with the disappearance of the monarchy as an active political force, j. Probably those who are making; policy do not see very clearly, orp very far ahead. But at least they are doing their best to insist that, before the dust settles, those who are interested in governing Egypt will experience a reorientation of ideas. The widespread arrests of political leaders of different parties and shades of opinion speak emphatically of the reformers’ impatience with old concepts of political thought. They are insistent that something new must emerge, and seem content to take the reins until it does. This may be no bad thing. It is natural for foreign interests who are concerned about Egypt’s future to approve the programme of gradual reform in Aly Maher’s policy. Certainly Egypt’s economic position is not one with which risks , can be taken. But just as certainly there are risks for everybody concerned in the fate of the reform > movement. If the nation were to become disillusioned or impatient because changes for the better were ’ too slow in coming, the present reform movement might be replaced by something much more extreme. The Cairo correspondent of the “ Economist ” said at the end of last month that the worst thing that i cculd happen to Egypt was the overthrow of the new movement by a ’ newer movement formed from conflicting, extreme groups which had • nothing in common but xenophobia , and ill-digested ideas of sweeping • reforms. Events have outrun part, i but confirmed the more important ; part of the correspondent’s conclusr ’ ion that “ the best thing that could ' “happen in Egypt is the rapid ex- • “ tension of radical reforms and of i “ the purge by the present moderate ■ “ Army and civil leaders, in order . “ to maintain the momentum of the > “ movement; in other words, a more ; “ logical acceptance of the respon- “ sibilities which the Army accepted l “ when it dethroned the King ”.