THE IMPORTANCE OF TITOISM

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26515, 1 September 1951, Page 3

T HE IMPORTANCE OF TITOISM

[Reviewed by A.R.] md Goliath. By Hamilton Fish 5 Armstrong- Gr llancx. «pto and Goliath” deals with Marj. Tito and with, what is more imrtant, Titoism, that heresy or ideodisease which the Kremlin Ljjgnunists are coming to fear so [t is an extremely useful book ® fjjgt jt treats so authoritatively of a 'Leiopment which is much more imoortaD t historically than most people Lgide Europe realise. The author, H. r Armstrong, is well known as the editor of "Foreign Affairs,” the quarpublication of the American roiincil on Foreign delations, one of h. e most valuable publications of its r"(i in the world to-day. Armstrong further qualified to write on this mbiect by nis many visits to Jugoslavia in the interwar period and the four visits he has paid to Eastern r uro pe during the last four years. In addition to his journalistic and rejeerch qualifications, he has held official positions in American embassies: for example, he was Special Assistant to the American Ambassador in London with the rank of Minister in 1944. Now he has written a book which is yerv readable and as authoritative as we are likely to have until Communist archives are very much more accessible to outside observers than they are to-day. In the first half of his book Mr Armstrong gives an account of the rise of Tito <"born Josip Broz on May 25. 1892”) mid the Partisan movement in Nazi-occupied Jugoslavia; he traces the course of Tito’s relations with the Moscow rulers and explains how “the split became a chasm, across which the Soviet Union and its satellites shouted imprecations at their former comrades, first calling them heretics and then traitors, enemies and agents of the enemies of all true Communists.” The author’s view is that dogmatic faiths breed heresies, that because the tough Jugoslav Partisans had done so much to build up their own strength and secure the liberation of their country before the arrival of the Soviet troops they were lacking in a "proper” sense of gratitude, that Tito and his colleagues soon learned what Soviet dictation meant and that Soviet planning to which they were expected to conform had "one single end, the strengthening of Russia and the perpetuation of her predominance.” Tito’s agarian policy, his reluctance to contribute his country’s mineral wealth to Russia in return for used machinery and war material, and his independent interpretation of the teachings of Marx and Lenin, combined with the national spirit and self-reliant outlook of the Jugoslavs to produce a complete breakdown in relations with Stalin. Heresies are Contagious But heresies are contagious and the book goes on to explain the effect Titoism has had upon the Communist leaders of the countries of Eastern Europe and upon the- non-Communist masses over whom they have established their rule. The author shows that Tito’s rebellion has wakened both great hopes and serious anxieties in the lands behind the Iron’Curtain. In Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary—and possibly in Rumania where Soviet domination is most complete—Titoism has become a problem to the Soviet leaders. By the middle of 1949, “the Cominform acknowledged that Titoism was not peculiar to Jugoslavia but was an infectious disease menacing the whole Stalinist empire.” Of course, there have been trials and executions: most of the Czech and Polish leaders who have been inspired by nationalist sympathies or by the example of Tito to depart from the Soviet line have. in spite of their eminence and long past histories as Communists, paid the price for their failure to recognise the complete supremacy of the Soviet Government and “the omniscience of Stalin living as against Leniu dead.” That the problem continues may be seen from the cable pages of our own papers. Within the last, few weeks we have heard of Mr Molotov’s address in Warsaw warning the Poles against following the example of the Jugoslavs, of the four Polish generals charged with trying to set up a “Titoist regime” '‘The Press,” August 15) and of the threat of a third world war arising from a Russian attack on Jugoslavia (The Press.” August 13). The two most important chapters in this book. “Stalin on the Defensive” and “If Stalin takes the Offensive," come last They show clearly how definitely the Kremlin hope of dominating all Europe has been weakened by Tito's defection. They also show that, in the event of a war between “e Western Allies and the Soviet, what an important accession of strength Tito's forces could be to the west. For Jugoslavia is strategically important in relation to all southern Europe and especially so far as Italy is concerned. Armstrong adds that we must not think in terms of the last war, but should realise that “the Jugoslav Army is the only presently effective European fighting force outside the Sonet bloc” and is “the largest land E]i rope after the Soviet Army now h as under arms -ome 30 to 35 highly trained divisions lO,OOO men each, as wen as considerable reserves, the majority of whom have had training in guernlla operations. As a Communist . n °.t qualify for full Marshlal ,j Ut ?t is certain that if he is at- “ either openly by the Soviet ot ’ 35 m South Korea, by a te Power, he will receive strong support. The Jugof£ aVs themselves see in Mao’s China u . Communist State strong ao H g “ to take a line as independent own “ opposition to Stalin. ,uY nns £ ro , nß does not idealise Tito, Jn„° URil he shows that Tito has beof a hero with many who tend to forget he is a communist in their enthusiasm for him «a nationalist opponent of Soviet imperialism and exnloitation. The dantv* c 2 n ®Jete domination of Eurasia »n ~ e Soviet Union which appeared .great m 1948. and early 1949, has tK?w? s ? ened Partly by the efforts of Allies and partly by the A? Z lto 1138 been so successful. states: “The malaise s', J? erV3 . < ? ing eve ry Communist Party PaH? V ? r . w °rld. from Warsaw to b-7%,- to Peking, has been aggravated bv 4? 0s - Propaganda and above all to Vl~ s - mp e ac t of his continuing , ahve after s talm had “»rked him for destruction.”