The Press TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1951. THE END OF THE STRIKE

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26475, 17 July 1951, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1951. THE END OF THE STRIKE

When Greymouth watersiders return to work to-day, New Zealand's longest and most costly industrial dispute will have ended. It will end, as was inevitable from the beginning, in the defeat of sectional defiance of the community, and of its freely elected Government. For that was what the strike amounted to, as at least one of the former watersiders’ leaders admitted. When the watersiders rejected their employers’ offer of a wage increase o 4 ! 15 per cent., their attitude suggested that they were more interested in maintaining the power that they had assumed to dictate waterfront conditions to the last Government than in wage claims. They bluntly rel fused to accept any form of | arbitration until they realised that the Government was determined to uphold those principles of industrial bargaining that have served trade unions so well. It wasjhen too late to save the face of the old union; but, even so, nearly all members could have had their jobs back if it had not been for the obstinacy of their leaders. After that, the dispute dragged through weary weeks to its obvious end. Satisfaction that sectional dictation' has been defeated will be tempered by the thought of the cost, in money and goods, in inconvenience to all, in hardship to many, and in suffering to some. The hard- 1 ships were felt most, perhaps, “by the families of those* unionists, watersiders and others, who were encouraged into a hopeless struggle < by leaders with exaggerated ideas of their power. But the result of | the dispute should be worth the cost , imthe long run if its obvious lessons, are remembered—that one section cannot hold the community to ransom and that industrial law-break-ing does not pay. No one has a ; bigger stake in industrial law and order than the average unionist.

The cost need not have been so great if some other unions with mistaken ideas of trade-union loyalty had not supported the watersiders—and if the political Labour Party had shown the responsibility that the people had a right to expect from members of Parliament. “Neither for Nor Against”

The Labour Party, which in office had suffered enough from the waterfront leaders and in defeat had given them a large share of the blame, has come badly out of the dispute. It tried to retain the support of the old watersiders (estranging some other unionists in the process), and tried to make political capital out of the Government’s difficulties. This put the Leader of the Opposition (Mr Nash) in the anomalous position of asserting that he was " neither for nor “against*’. His actions encouraged Messrs H. Barnes and T. Hill while his own convictions must have been in favour of industrial discipline. Early in April a settlement seemed probable—until a statement by Mr Nash, after a Labour caucus, apparently fortified the watersiders in their attitude. It ji possibly not without significance that the dispute was kept going until Parliament met, though what happened then could not have been foreseen by Mr Nash or by Messrs Barnes and Hill. Only two of the mistakes in detail made by the Labour Party need to be recalled at this stage. One was in harping on a compulsory conference. This ignored the facts that a conference was held and that the watersiders there refused arbitration. The second was the party’s apparent acceptance of the watersiders' contention that the wage increase they were offered was something different from the wage increase awarded by the Court of Arbitration to other workers. The watersiders’ use of this fiction, coloured by irrelevant references to hours, was possibly one of the reasons they received so little industrial support. Federation of Labour

Unlike the political wing, whose attitude made nonsense of many statements by Messrs Fraser, McLagan, and Semple, the Federation of Labour saw clearly where the real interests of the Labour movement lay—not because of any love for the National Party but because of the plain logic of the facts. The federation realised that the political advances that have so benefited trade unions are only possible under democratic processes. The federation itself was dissatisfied with the Court’s wage order; But was sensible enough to refrain from direct action, which might have wrecked the whole arbitration system and endangered Parliamentary democracy. Incidentally, it is worth remembering that the federation objected to the order because it gave most to highly-paid workers, such as seamep and miners, and least to the lowerpajd workers. Watersiders are among the highly-paid group the 15 per cent, in their case amounting to something like £1 15s for a week of 46 hours.

In spite of rebuffs and insults from the strikers, the federation did everything it could to get a settlement, and, if it had had the co-operation of the strikers, could probably have arranged a good one. The best efforts of the federation, which included keeping most unions at work, were not able to avoid the weakening of industrial Labour. The ultimate weapon of the unions has always been the strike, and its spearhead militancy. That weapon has been blunted now because a few leaders wished to test its temper on the Government and people of (New Zealand. Perhaps an even more useful weapon was the word “ scab Its usefulness may be questioned to-day, because of the

reckless circulation it was given by the strikers. Not surprisingly, this weapon was turned against the strikers by some of those who supported the great majority of lawabiding unionists. The strikers’ display of unity was admirable in its way; but the only effect was to dissipate enthusiasm that might have been put to better account. Secret Ballots

Thinking over the unhappy events of the last few months, leaders of the Federation of Labour may be disposed to regret that their organisation prevailed on the previous Minister of Labour (Mr McLagan) to withdraw the penal provisions of the law providing for secret ballots on strike' decisions. Secret ballots kept some unions oiit of the strike; and the lack of secret ballots took some unions into it. After vigorous speeches by militant leaders, and under the eyefi of their comrades, many men are unwilling to vote openly fpr moderation. Unionists should now appreciate the protection the ballot box gives them against intimidation and the fear of victimisation. There is no reason why they should not be assured of that protection by an amendment of the law along the lines proposed by Mr McLagan. At the same time, secret ballots or not, union members should realise their own responsibilities. They get the leaders they deserve. That, above all, is the lesson they should have ’ learned, at great cost, from the strike.