ARMOUR THE ROLE OF TANKS IN MODERN WARFARE

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26409, 1 May 1951, Page 6

ARMOUR THE ROLE OF TANKS IN MODERN WARFARE

(By a Special Correspondent of “The Timm”) (Reprinted by Arrangement.)

The western Powers have to consider all possible means of exploiting their technical and educational superiority over a potential aggressor possessed, among other advantages, of larger organised masses of men, tanks, and aircraft. Whatever may be their chances of reversing this quantitative weakness during a long war, they have naturally to plan how to avoid annihilation in a short one. The war in Korea has underlined the strengths and the weaknesses of highly technical armies—operating in this case with air superiority—when pitted against more primitive masses. In the Second World War the arm of the ground forces which produced the most striking results in proportion to its numbers was the tank arm. At the beginning of the war tank warfare was still in an experimental stage. In the First World War tanks had been rudimentary, and while a great deal of constructive imagination was directed to producing new types between the wars, there was little solid experience to go on. The contrary is the case now. Six years of bitter fighting in desert, wood, and mountain tested the potentiality of the new weapon under every imaginable condition, and a number of fairly clear principles emerged as a result. The first and simplest principle that emerged was the necessity of having tank versus tank superiority in each class. In other, words, while an inferior type of tank may be able to exploit victory, only a superior one can gain it. Thus, a commander whose tanks are inferior to those of the enemy is driven to husbanding them for the break-out and has to try to win the local battle by other means, such as artillery and aircraft. That, roughly, is what happened in Normandy, but although it may be successful when made necessary by adverse conditions, it is a negation of the proper use of armour. Those who laud the use of Shermans in Normandy must ask themselves whether the effect of having a Panther-type tank would not have been, first, to secure an earlier break-out and, secondly, fo maintain the momentum of advance beyond the Maas and Rhine when the break-out occurred.

Three Classes Owing to the different characteristics of tanks of different weighty it is not really practical to produce one type of tank that can dominate all others. What is aimed at is decisive superiority within each of the three main classes. For this purpose tanks can be divided into light, cruiser, and heavy classes. This classification is made as much by role as by weight. Light tanks are principally used for reconnaissance or bv airborne Heavy tanks, too, have in the past been used rather as specialist weapons. The Gertnans intended to keep them in independent companies and hire them out” as occasion demanded. Their appearance was usually enough to dominate the battlefield locally, but their weight and slowness imposed restrictions on their use. They were the sort of weapon that was apt <o get left behind in a retreat. The Russians, however, are producing heavy tanks in great masses. They have moreover succeeded in making them lighter in tonnage by sacrificing size and convenience to armour and armamThe bulk of the tanks in an army are of medium weight, and it became a more or less accepted principle m the recent war that this class should be represented by a standard eruiser tank capable of a good performance both in the armoured melee —such as the British Army seldom saw away from the western desert—and in the multifarious roles which it was called upon to play in conjunction with other arms. This policy was adopted at the end of the war by the British, American, German, and Russian armies, and superseded the notion that some rate sort of a weapon was required for armoured battle on the one hand and infantry co-operation on the other. The achievement of superiority in any one class of tank may roughly be defined as the production of a tank which is a match for that of the enemy and capable of beating him through superior handling by crews and commanders. If the efficiency of the tank itself falls below this level thte crews lose the initiative When they meet enemy tanks of the same class, except under special conditions or through superlative effort. A second important lesson brought home in the war was the interdependence of tanks, infantry, and other arms. The British were slow to appreciate this, or at any rate to make a practice Of such co-operation, and suffered for this failing at Rommel's hands in the desert. Tanks are essentially weapons of speed and shock. They are unable to hold ground, are rather helpless at night, can be trapped in certain kinds of country, and, like air-

by their offensive action arms should be quick to’ t^ eir lr 1 ’ ne - h ?lp them wher the? ? checked, and consolidate theii *. I l *’ The invention of bazookas <*** devices, which ate from cover at close ranws.'?'' greatly increased this need M? , l * integration. This interdepended, fe a perhaps slightly exaggerated A®!* sion m the dictum that tanks aS** being legitimately employed they are fighting to put the inf?? into a position. ne ““Wily Finally, there is the dependent., tanks on an adequate system Ply. A tank is a robot rule and becomes inert unlearnSi* and maintained with inexorabu?? larity In the armoured self about two lorries are “• keep each tank in the field On?? to think of forces operating with mobility of Napoleon’s days and qm* ng supplies on the scale of the Hu *8 war to get a picture of administrative staff i s U p maintaining armoured forces Ths Desert Battle. Most of the big tank battle, af a. desert, such as the Cauldron aJdAh* Haifa, pivoted on this question <£? sunng or preventing supply. The * ply echelons of the British arJ? Paragons of resource ability, but even so there or two instances where tactical tions outran administrative caiSS ttas, with dire results. AdminiaSE considerations, above all, keep to some extent tied to the infaS fabric; the infantry perimeter parable to a naval base whew S? can return to repair damage aa d ? take on fuel and ammunition. ’ The possibilities of an armoured fnn. dispensing with normal supply TJ ‘living on the country" have ato? seemed attractive, but are outa&fc bounds of possibility except wlmnm organised resistance is approach, collapse. Food, it is true, problem (though water may) to tanks carry only enough ammunjt? for one good battle, and after their rs quirements in spares, especially aftaction, may be varied and heavy n has been held that they could sum>)» themselves with fuel from civilian# captured enemy dumps, but to hazards of relying on such a wura are tremendous, especially as tanh Z not run normally on commercial anim Some prolongation of range is pototo through devices such as saddle tank and trailers. Maintenance and the «n. ply of often heavy spare parts n another factor which must never# forgotten. Armoured formations in to last war often had to make exceptkni arrangements for supply especiafiya the phase immediately after an until landing, but they still did not % on the country.” There is the possibility of wpplyto them by air. Theoretically there bb be no limit to what air supply to do—provided always that there is plete air superiority. Even so, to routine tonnages required by atiMe are staggering if measured in of existing types of aircraft. Ab * moured column would, moreover, It most vulnerable during the pnawt recovering and loading supplies. Thj replacement of whole tanks would 11 most certainly be required at one tin or another, and aircraft are not capable of carrying a tank of nj significant size. Designer’s Dilemma It is with the principles stated stow constantly in mind that the design Mi tactical employment of tanks have ti be considered. The desire to achwt superiority over enemy tanks in class has faced designers with i dilemma which they have not jel solved. The competitive up-graainj d high-velocity tank guns hag M k ever-heavier tanks (because the bigp the gun the longer the recoil and th» fore the wider the turret-ring MH which the rest of the tank has to b built). The present British rnaid-of< work, the Centurion, with its » pounder gun, now weighs round I tons, and this has already raised pfkk , lems in Korea. The only way out f ; the dilemma is to devise a tank fit ; as lethal as the high-velocity » without being so big. The ideal tion might be the installation of MW . kind of rocket-gun. Battles have been won in the past W armies with inferior armour, but tW battles have been won in spite of w inferiority and -the victory has . an unnecessarily long and costly bl* . ness. The Western Powers havvH advantage of technical skill and sup* : ior steel resources. In framing a w policy, it is obviously to their advift age to exploit this superiority, not u hide it away. ' __