The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1851, General. MacArthur’s Dismissal

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26394, 12 April 1951, Page 6

The Press THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1851, General. MacArthur’s Dismissal

The principal reaction of most thoughtful persons to President Truman’s decision to relieve General MacArthur of all his commands will be regret that General MacArthur could not restrain himself from persistently and blatantly intruding in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy. Had he done so there would have been no reason for an action which, mainly because of it» effects on American politics, may be more unsettling than settling, nations governments, and peoples which have been concerned at General MacArthur’s disposition to formulate policy rather than follow it may feel that President Truman’s decision settles vital issues about the formulation and direction of American international policy. But if there is some reason for a sense of relief on this score, there is none in the prospect which is opened in the United States. Two points stand out immediately as relevant to the dismissal o f General MacArthur. First, the bipartisan policy on foreign affairs, from which Democrat Administrations during the recent war and since have gained strength from the support of an influential section of the Republican Party, may well be shattered. This would be of less moment if the Administration had stronger control of Congress. President Truman’s party theoretically has a majority now; but the real control is in a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans. Since many members of Congress have tended to side with General MacArthur recently, the dismissal could well precipitate a new and more serious conflict between the Administration and Congress. Second, the foreign policy of any democratic nation must be based on popular approval and consent, Since the circumstances of General MacArthur’s dismissal may make him a martyr ip the eyes of a large section of the American people, his own particular conception of Far Eastern policy may gain new support, particularly among those whose interest in foreign affair? is perfunctory end shallow; and thus the popular basis of the Administration’s policy could writ be shaken. No doubt, President Truman is conscious of all these things and has taken this major decision, not in petulance or haste, but after long and careful consideration and because he judged he had no alternative. The President may have had assurances that strengthened him. But until the air clears—and it may take a long time—the potentialities for political trouble in the MacArthur dismissal must givi# cause for deep concern tq all who appreciate that politics in the United States are of much more than academic interest to the democratic natiens. It is impossible to say what effect the removal of General MacArthur will have upon the United Nations action ip Korea. Possibly it will encourage the Communist Chinese to be less intransigent towards United Nations mediation offers. Certainly some, if not most, United Nations politicians will be relieved to be rid of a Commander-in- Chief whom they felt to be above them and beyond their control. But the politicians and the interested governments are not relieved of responsibility to do better for his successor than they did for General MacArthur. As “The Times” has pqt it, it was the “strange caution, or ” dilatorinasa ”, on the part of Government* that gave General MacArthur the opportunity to make known the personal views which caused trouble. The United Nations must do better for, presumably. General Ridgway, than it did for General MacArthur, who had to Mfr, “ almost plaintively ”, to be told what to do. Most importantly, the United Natans will b< required to make it clear that the removal of General MacArthur does not abdication of the principles and purposes op Which the United Nations took its Stand in Korea. General MacArthur’s dismissal will have a profound effect in Japan, where he has symbolised the occupation by Japan’s victors. Possibly, however, as the proposals for a peace treaty imply, policy and method in Japan are sufficiently settled for the change to be made without any great disturbance. Though General MacArthur's career ends, or breaks, as the case may be, through acts of his own, it would be ungenerous not to recognise its greatness. It is generally conceded that he was the principal architect and builder of victory for the Allies in the Pacific. Nobody in New Zealand or Australia should need to be reminded of the confidence and comfort which came from the presence of-General MacArthur in the South Pacific in the very dark days of 1942. His administration of the occupation of Japan is to hi* credit; his prestige and presence—sometimes flamboyant and often derided—undoubtedly helped to secure not only the compliance but the co-operation of a defeated but disciplined people. These things should be remembered at this time, not only in tribute to General MacArthur, but because those who remember them will be less inclined toward unhelpful criticisms. Recriminations would exacerbate the feelings of that large soction of Americans who will rally to General MacArthur in any case; and they may be further aggravated by intemperate criticism from outside,