The Press WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1951. THE SECOND CHAMBER

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26393, 11 April 1951, Page 6

The Press WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1951. THE SECOND CHAMBER

H is a good sign that some thoughtfid citizens, especially students at constitutional law, have come forward to help the Joint Constitutional Reform Committee in its task of considering a successor body to the Legislative Council. Mr A. C. Brassington, lecturer In constitutional law at Canterbury University College, did Well to emphasise tha* the committee’s first and fundamental task is to decide whether a second chamber is desirable; and he did well, again, to plead for a historical approach to the subject. For it is unfortunately true that many things have occurred and others may still occur to militate against this fundamental question being decided on its intrinsic merits. The most potent of these things, of course, is the unfortunate record of the old Legislative Council, which did not often work well, and in recent years worked badly—and forfeited the respect of the country. There will be a strong temptation to believe that because the Legislative Council worked indifferently, no similar body can be made to work well. The temptation may be all the stronger because some members of the Government have openly declared this belief. It will not be easy, politically, to tell the Government that it had no need to search beyond this country for a form of, second chamber which could be made useful both as an instrument of government and as a guardian of democratic rights—given a membership of ability, high integrity, and independence of mind. Abolition of the Legislative Council became, perversely, a kind of touchstone of the Government’s good faith; and the Government may tend, consciously or imeenarinusfr, to resist anything that seems like restoration. Signs of such resistance are to be seen. One of than, perhaps, was the At-torney-General, Mr Webb, going out of his way at the annual conference of the New Zealand Law Society to pour cold water on the idea of a reformed Upper House. The Leeosn of Htotory But the Constitutional Reform

Committee should not reach its primary Conclusion on the experience of New Zealand atone—end New Zealand’s experience of a second chamber has not always been unhappy, Still less should the committee allow itself to be influenced by such political considerations as party prestige Or the saving of “face”. It will, if it sees its duty dearly, take the “historical ap-

* proach”. It will study the development of parliamentary government; It will see that every democratic country of any standing in the World holds firmly to the bicameral parliamentary system, although it works better in some than to and it will find that virtually all the foremost authorities on political theory and Constitutional lew reject the unicameral system. And as the committee, following its historical approach, looks for the reasons why the second chamber it championed in theory and supported iff practice to ail democratic countries of any importance, ft wfll find a very simple «• planation. The whole history of government throughout the world a warning against the concentrattofi qf power into too few hands. The powers and functions of government have grown so vastly, lit recent years that it is more djOteah than ever before to reconcile the state with the individual, the law with liberty. There is greater danger than ever before of power being removed item where it Should reside—in the hands of tho people. Even in damocMtio eeunteteo governments have arisen which have been despotic ,in character. The time may corrie in New Zealand when it will be vitally important that there should be some body, of lesa . authority than the House of Representatives but at least as respected, to ask of a government’s legislation, “Is this wise? Is it not "a gross curtailment of the funda- " mental democratic rights of the “people? Has the Government a “ mandate for it?” Some may say that an opposition in Parliament can perform just as well this traditional function at the second chamber of diawing public attention to bad legislation and of delaying it and calling tor second thoughts upon it. The answer to the objection, of course, is that an opposition’s motives are always politically suspect; the public is too ready to jump to the conclusion that an opposition is opposing merely for party advantage. A Well-constituted second chamber would not be under this disability, for its members would be above party politics, respected throughout the community for their judgment, integrity, and impartiality. \ Method of Appointment If the Constitutional Reform Committee reaches the conclusion, as it must, that a second chamber so constituted would be of value to share the legislative burden of government, to act as a revisory body, and to remain as a useful check upon arbitrary government, it will then face the second, and perhaps a more difficult, part of its task—to recommend how the second chamber should be constituted anc manned. There is little doubt that the simplest answer to this question will be the best For the very good reasons offered by the AttorneyGenefal at the lew Society’s conference, the committee Will be wise to dismiss the idea of functional representation. It should not consider a form of election, direct or indirect, because any second chamber with a measure of popular support might be tempted to set itself

‘ Be ” XV riv 4!° the Wmue ot Reptesentatives. The committee may well come to the conclusion, then, that the second chamber must be an appointive chamber and that the government of the day should make the appointments. It will then be of the utmost importance to ensure, as far as possible, that appointments are not made for political purposes or as political rewards. The sole criterion should be capacity to serve the country—the whole country. Once the conception of w non-poWai chamber is accepted, there should be no difficulty in working out an arrangement under which appointments are made by consultation between the Government and the Opposition. This will brihg the Constitutional Reform Committee to its last and perhaps crucial problem—how to secure general support for its findings. It will not be enough to convince the present Government that a second chamber is desirable or necessary; it will have to convince the general public, and especially the very considerable section of the public which looks .to the leaders of the Labour Party for guidance. There can be no assurance of permanence for a second chamber

‘ imposed” by one party without the consent of the other. It would be swept away at the first change of Government—for the precedent for one-sided constitutional change has now been set. The structure of the chamber must be freely consented to by both sides, and its membership must always have the .approval of both. In spite of the boycotting of the Constitutional Reform. Committee by the Labour members of the House of Representatives, it should not be difficult to obtain this consent. There are Labour men of sound judgment and of high party standing on the ‘committee. If they are convinced, after a close and careful study of the problem, that a second chamber can be devised which will perform all the useful functions of second chambers without serving the purposes of any political group, they will surely be able to convince their colleagues and their followers. The ultimate value of a second chamber must lie in the part it plays, with the other inter-related institutions of parliamentary government, in protecting and preserving the fundamental rights of the citiaens of the democratic State. NoOtte group in the community has a greater interest than the others in Securing these bird-won rights against the possibly legislative, assaults of extremist government*