The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1951. Cominform Troubles

Press, Volume LXXXVII, Issue 26363, 6 March 1951, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 1951. Cominform Troubles

'The trouble the Cominform is having with two satellite Communist : parties is an interesting developIment in recent European politics. 'ln Czechoslovakia the Communist party has undergone an extensive purge. Dr. Clementis, the former ; Czech Foreign Minister, is one of three members expelled from the party’s central committee. A report published in Prague shows that as a result of a “ screening ” of 1,846,957 members and candidate members carried out in the last six months of 1950, 143,590 were struck off the membership lists and 25,954 expelled from the party. In Italy there have been important defections from the Communist Party. The return of the Italian Communist leader, Mr Togliatti, from Moscow, where he has been convalescing, gives evidence that the flow of dissidents has become strong enough to cause serious concern. The difference of the Czech and Italian Communist parties in the respective countries is, of course, the difference between a Communist party in a Communist State and a Communist party in a democratic State. But there is a common point in the two examples of Communist party trouble to the Cominform. To a degree the Communist Party purge in Czechoslovakia can be attributed to the party method of systematic purges to keep the core of the party hard and flrm. But this does not entirely explain the latest purge—the third party purge in Czechoslovakia since the war. President Gottwald’s insistence that “Czecho- “ Slovakia will not become another “Jugoslavia”, and that “deviation “is in process of liquidation” is more explanatory. It is a reasonable inference that in part at least the purge counters and warns against the slightest deviation from full agreement with Russian policy. The leading Czech “ deviationists ” appear to be, in fact, successors to the Communist leaders Kostov in Bulgaria and Rajk in Hungary, who objected to open economic exploitation of their countries by Russia. They were Communists, but they did not fully submit to Moscow because they had nationalist feelings, and nationalist sentiment is, of course, a grave danger to Communist imperialism. The Italian dissidents, who are differently placed from the purged Czechs in being able to give reasons for defection, clearly indicate nationalist sentiment as a main cause for breaking with the party. “It is the “ duty of Italian Communists to “ defend Italy if its frontiers should “ be attacked from any side whatso- , “ ever ”, is one statement which is clearly affiliated with Titoist deviation, which is a form of nationalism. Though it would be foolish to draw too much eomfort from off-notes in the Cominform chorus, some satisfaction may be taken from the evident fact that Moscow’s Communism is far from satisfying to substantial Communists with experience of it; and from the democratic viewpoint it is particularly satisfying when Communist dissatisfaction is caused essentially by international Communism’s conflict with principles of independence.