"THE HINGE OF FATE" INTEREST OF U.S. IN CONTROL OF INDIA

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26261, 4 November 1950, Page 6

"THE HINGE OF FATE" INTEREST OF U.S. IN CONTROL OF INDIA

IBy the

Rt. Hon.

WINSTON CHURCHILL!

XIX.

World War » ri ?d through t H he n Xggto T on toe 'shoulders of our, Sm ß a ritish Government officials in Indm “^s&s^ben c to;: enfireb ' F-* at exSavXt rates, and | were convertofl 1 into so-caneVsterHng ; balances” at the pre-war late of pd , change Thus enormous so-caliea "sterling balances”-in other word British debts to India - were pi ed iP, I Without sufficient scrutiny o .iceount we were being charged nt ~<r»y * million pounds a day for defending India from the misenes ‘" v3S e^o l which so many other countries er , dured. We finished the war. from, all the worst severities of which h< I were spared, owing them a otbt, almost as large as that on which wc , defaulted to the United States after the , previous struggle. I oeciared tnat these questions must remain open lor revision, and that we leserve right to set off against this so-called debt, a counter-claim tor the d o {<? n< ( of India, and so I informed the Viceroy.

Interest of United States The United States had shown an increasingly direct interest m Indwn affairs as the Japanese advance into Asia spread westwards. _ The of the Americans with lhe stiategy ot a world war was bringing them ui"> touch with political issues on which thev had strong opinions and little experience. Before Pearl H arbour India had been regarded as a .amentable example of British Imperialism, but as an exclusive British responsibilitv Now that the Japanese were advancing towards its frontiers the United Slates Government began to express views and offer counsel on Indian affairs. In countries where there is only one race, broad and lofty views are taken of the colour question. Similarly, States which have no oversea colonies or possessions are capable of rising to mooas of great elevation and detachment about the affairs of those who have. The President had first discussed the Indian problem with me, on the usual American lines, during my visit to Washington in December 1941. I reacted so strongly and at such length that he never raised it verbally again. Later, at the end of February 1942. he instructed Averell Harriman to sound me on the possibilities of a settlement between the* British Government and the Indian political leaders. The Americans were familiar with the Hindu attitude. I thought it right to let them see the Moslem side of the picture. Accordingly. I sent the President full statements of the Indian position from Indian sources. The President sent me his private views on India. On March i the Japanese Army had entered Rangoon. If the effective defence of India was to be organised it seemed to most of my colleagues important to make every effort to break the political deadlock. Indian affairs were discussed at length by the War Cabinet. The British Government’s reactions to the British-Indian Government’s proposals were embodied in a draft declaration, and it was decided to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India to direct discussions on the spot with the leaders of all Indian parties and communities. Sir Stafford arrived in Delhi on March 22, and upon the basis of the draft declaration approved by the British Cabinet he conducted lengthy discussions. The essence of the British proposal was that the British Government undertook solemnly to grant full independence to India if demanded by a Constituent Assembly after the war. Space docs not allow a detailed account of these negotiations to oe recorded here. The result cannot be better stated than in Sir Stafford Cripps’s telegram. Lord Privy Seal (Delhi) io Prime Minister. T , A . H April, 42. I have to-night received long letter from Congress President staling that Congress is unable to accept proposals: Rejection on widest grounds and not solely on Defence issue. Main ground of rejection is however that in the view of Congress there should be immediately a National Government and thAt without Constitutional changes there should be “definite assurances in conventions which would indicate that the new Government would function as a free Government whose members would act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional Government.” 2. There is clearly no hope of agreement, and I shall start home on Svnaay. In the intensity of the struggle for life from day to day. and with four hundred million helpless people to defend from the horrors of Japanese conquest, I was able to bear this news which I had thought probable from the beginning, with philosophy At once I forwarded to President Roosevelt the texts of Cripps’s telcTF. am 11 an d of my reply, The was dismayed at the breakdown, and urged nie to postpone the departure of Cripps in the hope that a final effort could be made. PreS don) fc t 0 Harry Hopkins (Lonv U April. 42. Kindly give the following message immediately to the Former Naval Person Every effort must be made by us m prevent a breakdown I hope most earnestly that vou may be able to postpone the departure from India of Cripps until one mol . c effort has finally been made to prevent a breakdown of, the negotiations. I regret to say that I am unable to agree with the point of view contained m your message to me. that public opinion in the United Slates believes that negotiations have broken down on general broad

' he , ~'.'' n : ra v' T, W’»lor. is held air,...’ ;.i Um 1 ?;. ’ ." ’ , c:.n p’jlioi i o ’ understand why if I.H’H ■ i... n the pan ~f lhe :..,( , •. ’■••oi.rt to p„ not tin ~ J. di J Empire it'' ' ' them dur , 5 mourn U- ■■<■!. : ■ ' : • I f.*e’ tha. i >;■ '-oinpelled to jil.iuc i) f i ■ issue frankly and 1 ki . ■■ y, v . ,n V ' ■' ’ “ n,n k Un,. .(.I ■•■..’« t ■ ' I-ise n , tb| isbur’i •• nu cl r tne p C opi e «f /Vinci n.I. .. . -. . <! ln.ua fluently be mv.im d successfully fey Japan w, I. lUcnda. ts, ,, 01is de J . le.il. ■>. .. n. naval charac. ter for oiir side .’ would he hard tt.» overestimate the Drejudicia] r®. action on American public opinion. As I (♦xpressed to you in an carllap message. I still fe<-i that if the com. ponent croups in India could be given now the opportunity to set upa Nationalist Government’in essence similar to our <nvn form of goy. pj-nment under the Articles of £ on . federation. w:lh the undcrstandini that fol low int>. the Un-nination of < period o’ trial and they would be enabled then to determine upoa their own n>rm u! eonstitution and to determine, as you have pro . mised them already, their future lationship w:Hi the li: tish Empire, probably a solutum could be founj Responsibility for India I was thankful tii.it events had already made such an act of madnew impossible. The human race cannot make progress without idealism, hit idealism at. other people's expense and without regard to the consequencei of ruin and slaughter which fall upeg millions of humble homes cannot be considered as its highest or nobhart form. The President’s mind was back hi the American War of Independence, and he thought of the Indian problem in terms of 13 colonies lighting George 111 at the end of the 18th century. on the other hand, was responaibte for preserving the peace and safety of the Indian continent, sheltering nearly a fifth of lhe population the globe. Our resources were slender and strained to the full. Our anniet had surri nden d or were recoiling ba* fore the devastating stiokes of Japan, Our Navy had been driven out of the Bay of Bengal, and indeed out of most of the Indian Ocean. We had beta apparently mitmatched in the air. Stffl there was the hope and the chaMt that all could be repaired and that vt should not fail in our duty to pr> serve from hideous and violent destruction the vast ancient Indian M> ciety over which we had presided te nearly 200 years. Without the integrity of executive mil.tary control aat the power to govern in the war am, hope and chance aiikc would This was not time for a constitUttoMU experiment with a “period of trial error" to determine the “future NS> tionship” of India to the British w®pi re. Nor was the issue one ujiai which the satisfying of public opmfor in the United States could be a determining factor. We could not dead the Indian peoples by abandoafij our responsibility and leaving Uwn to anarchy or subjugation. That wrt at least a policy, but a policy < shame. It was our bounden duty W send all possible aid to Indian and if this were so we should haw betrayed not only the Indian but our own soldiers by allowing uter base of operations and the dian Army fighting at their sidt 11 disintegrate into a welter of chatter* ing politics and bloody ruin. Happily I had all. my principal ogF leagues who had studied the Intftjjl problem in agreement with me. Blit this not been so, I would not htW hesitated to lay down my persoail burden, which at times seemed nwtt than a man could bear. The greatest comfort on such occasions is to hIW no doubts. Nor as will be seen Mthß account proceeds, were my consto* tions and those of the War CfcbkMl without their vindication. I sent the following reply to fIW President: Former Nava! Person (Cheqweff) to President Roosevelt. 12 April, ’« About 3 o'clock this morning, 12th. when, contrary to your ito structions I about Hopkins's Harry and F were still talking, text of your message to me aboQt India earne through. 1 could not dto uide such a matter without convening the Cabinet, which was not physically possible till Monday. Mewwhile Cripps had already left and ail the explanations have beet published by both sides. In thm circumstances, Harry undertook to telephone 1o you explaining tot position, but owing to atmospheric he could not get through. He B going to telephone you this »ftab noon, and also cable you a report You know lhe weight which I attach to everything you say to tot but I did n-»t feel 1 could take sponsibility for the defence of Indto if everything had again to be throws into the melting-pot at this critittj juncture. That. I am sure, would be the view of Cabinet and of PlT* liament. As your telegram was iddressed to Farmer Naval Person. I am keeping it as purely private, and I do not propose to bring it befort lhe Cabinet officially unless you toU me you wish this done. Anyttfial like a serious difference betwee® you and me would break my heart and would surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of thu terrible struggle. <To be continued 1 IC,Wright 1950 in U.S A. by tb» New York Times Companv and Timee Inc. (publishers or Time and Ute'. 1» ’.he Britidi Emp r.- :>■. the Daily Telegraph, l.in : elsewhere to IniernationU Co-one rat ion Press Service. Inc. 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