The Press TUESDAY. SEPTEMBER 19, 1950. Korea

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26221, 19 September 1950, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY. SEPTEMBER 19, 1950. Korea

The campaign in Korea has swiftly , changed in character. As recently as | 10 days ago the United Nations forces were seemingly hard pressed to hold the lines of the perimeter protecting the port of Fusan. A week ago the North Koreans’ fourday offensive, which in its course had developed ominous threats, showed signs of petering out; it seemed apparent that the aggres- ■ sors lacked the capacity to exploit a break-through. The commander of the United Nations forces in Korea (Lieutenant-General Walton Walker) felt “the worst” was over. He conceded that the enemy had the initiative and was capable of hitting anywhere on the 125-mile perimeter; but, he said, “ I am now “ sure we can stop him It then appeared that the United Nations forces could claim to have consolidated victory in the defensive fight they had waged ever since the aggressors crossed the 38th parallel on June 25. The United Nations campaign was changed from defence to attack last Friday by landings in force from the sea at Inchon, the port of Seoul, and some 120 miles north-west of the perimeter lines. It was expected that General MacArthur would exploit his superiority in seapower when the time was ripe; that would be continuing the pattern of his brilliant wartime campaign in the South Pacific. Accounts of the landings at Inchon confirm them to have been organised and mounted with the efficiency typical of the later Pacific war years preliminary bombardments preparing the way for landing craft and amphibious tanks; steel pontoons towed in to make jetties; bulldozers quickly at work clearing and levelling. The second phase of an amphibious landing building up supplies and reinforcements for the shock troops—appears to be going well; that is to be inferred from news that the 7th American Infantry Division has begun landing to reinforce the United States Marines. The purpose of the Inchon landings has been lucidly explained by General MacArthur. The enemy has committed “ a great mass ” of his forces in Southern Korea; he depends on North Korea for replenishments of men and supplies; all these resources passing from north to south channel through one particular area—Seoul and Inchon; Seoul is a “great distribution point”; the United Nations forces are trying to seize that distribution point so that it will be impossible for the North Koreans on the southern fronts to get more than a trickle of men and supplies. This summarises the hazard the operation represents to the enemy. Obviously it has hazards for the United Nations forces also—all military operations have, bold ones particularly. In the first instance everything would appear to depend upon the accuracy of military intelligence. General MacArthur’s assessment is that the enemy has enough forces to fight on the perimeter, or he has enough to turn and fight to the north; he has not enough to fight both ways. This assessment remains to be proved correct. If it were far astray the forces landed at Inchon could be as far “out on *’ the end of a limb ”, as General MacArthur says the North Koreans on the perimeter front are. A second unknown factor in the situation is the reaction of Russia and China to the new and serious threat to the campaign of Communist military aggression m South Korea. Both are interested, and both, or either, may take a hand. Their interest could be expressed by active or political intervention. There are as yet no signs of the former, but there are hints of the latter. It is suggested that the Russians and Chinese are ready to talk peace on the basis of the situation existing before the invasion—Korea divided into Northern and Southern States at the 38th parallel. Obviously this would be a return to the very situation in which trouble began tn the first place. Further, the United Nations is committed to and has consistently worked for a unified country and an independent Korea. Something more than restoring the status quo would, therefore, seem an essential political objective of the United Nations and this, of course, involves the question of stopping at or crossing the 38th parallel. It may be premature at the first signs of attack to sight the end; there may be much hard grinding, tough fighting and disappointments before the end comes. On the other hand, and unless there is intervention from outside on their behalf (which would again transform the situation) the North Korean army, volatile in success, might collapse and disintegrate in defeat. In the face of either contingency it is not a moment too soon for the United Nations to begin clarifying thoughts and making decisions about the future in Korea.