What The General Said

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26204, 30 August 1950, Page 7

What The General Said

General MacArthur said in his censored statement that if a potential enemy took Formosa, any future battle area would be shifted 5000 miles eastward to America’s own home coasts. “Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, that if we defend Formosa we alienate Continental Asia,” General MacArthur said. “To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy.*

General MacArthur said he had decided to outline his views on Formosa “in view of, the misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific.”

He said that Mr Truman’s decision to defend Formosa had “lighted into flame the lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly towards extinction.”

If Formosa fell, an enemy would use the island “to mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific Basin.”

Historically. Formosa had been used as a springboard for military aggression directed against areas to the south, said General MacArthur. If it fell it would be an enemy salient in the perimeter of the United States defence line of islands in the Pacific. “Formosa’s military potential would again be fully exploited as a means to breach or neutralise our Western Pacific defence system.” he said “The last war shifted the United

States’ strategic frontier to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.” Chain of Island Bases The United States, from the chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Msrianas, could dom* inate Asiatic ports from Vladivostok to Singapore. “Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort,” he said. “No amphibious force can be successful with our control of the sea bines and the air over these lines, in its-sve-nue of advance. “Our line of defence is a natural one and it can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and ex« pense. If we hold this line we may have peace. Lose it, and war is inevitable.” > Formosa mow had a concentration of air and naval bases which was potentially greater than any similar concentration on the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Straits of Malacca. The United States cou’d develop other bases in a relatively short time. “Any enemy force using those installations currently available could increase by 100 pqt cent, the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa, compared with operations based on jhe mainland,” said General MacArthur. “The enemy at the same time could direct damaging eir attacks with fighter aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of flghtera based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful. “Thus enemy use of Formosa may either counter-balance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front line position.”