GERMANY PUTS PRESSURE ON JAPAN

Press, Volume LXXXVI, Issue 26055, 7 March 1950, Page 4

GERMANY PUTS PRESSURE ON JAPAN

“ THE GRAND ALLIANCE"

Rt. Hon.

[By the

WINSTON CHURCHILL]

XV.

Matsuoka set out on his mission on March 12. On the 25th, passing through Moscow, he had a two hours interview with Stalin and Molotov, and he assured the German Ambassador, Schulenberg, that he would repeat to Ribbentrop personally all details of the conversation. : The captured documents published by the American State Department throw a searching light on Matsuoka s mission and upon the whole German mood and mind. On March 27 the Japanese envoy was cordially w? 1 " corned in Berlin as a kindred spirit by Ribbentrop. , \ Matsuoka was received by Hitler. The Fuehrer dwelt in his own words upon German military triumphs. . . . Matsuoka listened to this harangue. He Expressed his thanks for the frankness with which he had been treated. He said that on the whole he agreed with the view of the Fuehrer. There were in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which only a powerful individual could hold firmly under control. Japan would take action in a decisive form if she had the feeling that otherwise she would lose a chance which could only occur once in a thousand years. He had explained to the two princes of the Japanese Imperial Family that preparation could not always be complete and perfect. Risks must be run. It was only a question of time when Japan would attack. The hesitant politicians in Japan would always delay, and act partly from a pro-Bntish or pro-American attitude. Personally, he wished the attack to come as soon as possible. Unfortunately, he did not control Japan, but had to bring those who were in control round to his point of view. He would certainly be successful some day, but at the present moment and under these circumstances, he could make no pledge on behalf of the Japanese Empire that it would take action. He would give his closest attention to these matters on his return. He could make no definite commitment, but he personally would do his utmost. These were considerable reservations. Further Conversations The conversations in Berlin were continued throughout March 28 and 29 without altering the essential features: first, the Germans strove hard to persuade Japan to attack the British Empire; secondly, they admitted that their relations with Russia were uncertain; and. thirdly, they made it plain that Hitler hoped earnestly to avoid a conflict with the United States.

To neither of the important questions whether Germany still intended, as before, to effect a landing in Britain and how German-Soviet relations were now viewed did Matsuoki obtain a clear answer. To his question as to whether, on his return journey through Moscow, he should touch on political questions lightly or go into them more deeply, Hitler answered through his interpreter: “You had better treat it as a mere formality.” Without, of course, knowing the substance or character of these secret Berlin parleys, but deeply impressed with their importance. I thought I would use the Japanese Ambassador, whom Matsuoka had summoned to meet him pn the Continent, to convey to his chief a few counter-considera-tions. Mr Shigemitsu, who. if he was hostile to Britain and the United States and working for war against us, must have been a very good deceiver, accepted with a courtly gesture the task of delivering my message. In the end he did not travel, and the letter was telegraphed to our Ambassador in Moscow to be given to Mr Matsuoka on his return journey by the Siberian Railway. Mr Churchill to M. Yosuka Matsuoka. 2 April, 1941. I venture to suggest a few questions which it seems to me deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and pedple. 1. Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer, or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves? 2. Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores, with Great Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes? 3. Did Japan’s accession to the Triple Pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war? 4. If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Birtain, and Japan ranged herself -with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to dispose of the Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united strength upon Japan? 5. Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be? 6. Will the British Air Force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941, and far stronger before the end of 1942? 7. Will the many countries which are being held down by the German Army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years ’pass by? 8. Is it true that the production of steel in the United States during 1941 will be 75,000,000 tons, and in Great Britain about 12,250,000, making a total of nearly 90,000,000 tons? If Germany should happen to be defeated. as she was last time, would not the 7,000,000 tons steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed war? From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe, and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and the two great sea-Powers of the West. I was rather pleased with this when I wrote it. and I don’t mind the look of it now. Matsuoka in Moscow Before his homeward journey bv the Trans-Siberian railway, Matsuoka tarried for a week in Moscow. He had several long conversations both with Stalin and Molotov. The only account we have of these is from the German Ambassador Schulenburg, who, of course, was only told what the Russians and Japanese wished him to know. It seemed that all the declarations, true or boastful, of 1 German might had bv no means convinced the

Japanese envoy. The guarded attitude of the German leaders towards a collision with the United States had made a dint in' Matsuoka’s mind. At the same time he was aware from Ribbentrop’s language of the menacing, widening gulf between Germdny and Russia. How much he told his new hosts about this we cannot tell. But certainly, surveying the scene with peculiar advantages, and after receiving from Sir Stafford Cripps the telegraphed version of my letter with its questions, it would appear that Matsuoka found himself closer to Molotov than to Ribbentrop. In this doombalance of mighty nations, Japan was asked by Germany to take the irrevocable step of declaring war on Britain, and potentially on the English-speak-ing world. By* Rqssia she was only asked to mark time, to wait and see. Evidently he did not believe that Britain was finished. He could not be sure what would happen between Germany and Russia. He was not inclined, or perhaps he had not the power, to commit his country to decisive action. He greatly preferred a Neutrality Pact, which at least gave time for unpredictable events to unfold, as they must do soon.

Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

Accordingly, when Matsuoka visited Schulenburg in Moscow on April 13 to make his farewell call he mentioned with incongruous preciseness that a Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact had been arranged at the last moment, and “in all likelihood would be signed this afternoon a’t 2 p.m. local time.” Both sides had made concessions about the disputed island of Sakhalin. This new agreement, he assured the German Ambassador, in no way affected the Three-Power Pact. He added that the American and English journalists who had reported that his journey to Moscow had been a complete failure would be compelled now to acknowledge that the Japanese policy had achieved a great success, which could not fail to have its ' effect on England and. America. Schulenburg has recorded the demonstration of unity and comradeship arranged by Stalin at the railway station on Matsuoka’s departure for Japan. The train was delayed for an hour for salutes and ceremonies, apparently unexpected by both the Japanese and Germans. Stalin and Molotov appeared and greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese in a remarkably friendly manner and wished them a pleasant journey. Then Stalin publicly asked for the German Ambassador. “And when he found me" said Schulenburg “he came up and threw his arm round my shoulder. “We must remain friends. You must now do everything to that end.” Later Stalin turned to the German Military Attache first having made sure that he had got the right man, and said to him, “We will remaip friends with you in any event.” “Stalin,” adds Schulenburg, “doubtless brought about this greeting of Colonel Krebs and myself intentionally, and thereby he consciously attracted the attention of the numerous persons who were present.” These embraces were a vain pretence. Stalin should surely have known from his own reports the enormoua deployment of German strength which now began to be visible to British Intelligence all along the Russian frontier. It was only 10 weeks before Hitler’s terrific onslaught on Russia began. It would have been only five weeks but for the delay, caused by the fighting in Greece and Jugoslavia.

' Matsuoka’s Return Matsuoka returned to Tokyo from his European visit aVthe end of April, He was met at the airport by the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, who informed him that on that very day the Japanese had been considering the possibilities of an understanding in the Pacific with the United States. - This was contrary to Matsuoka’a theme. Though beset by doubts, he was still on the whole a believer in ultimate German victory. Backed by the prestige of the Tripartite Pact and the Neutrality Treaty with Russia, he saw no special need, to conciliate the Americans, who, in his opinion, would never face simultaneous war in the Atlantic against Germany 1 and in the Pacific against Japam The Foreign Minister therefore found himself confronted with a mood in Government circles widely different from his own. In spite of his vehement protests the Japanese resolved to continue the negotiations at Washington, and also to conceal them from the Germans. On May 4 Matsuoka took it upon himself to acquaint the German Ambassador with the text of an American Note to Japan offering to reach a general Pacific settlement, beginning with American mediation between Japan and China. The main obstacle to this proposal was the American requirement that Japan should first evacuate China. While in Moscow Mr Matsuoka had received my message, and on his return journey in the drain across Siberia he wrote a barren reply, .which was dispatched on his arrival in Tokyo. Mr Matsuoka to Mr Winston Churchill 22 April, ’4l. Your Excellency, I have just come back from my .trip, and hasten to acknowledge the receipt of a paper handed to me at Moscow on the evening of the 12th instant by Sir Stafford Cripps with a remark that it was a copy in substaneb of a -letter addressed to me, dated London, the 2nd April, 1041, and forwarded to Tokyo. I wish to express my appreciation for the facilities with which your Government made efforts to provide our Ambassador when he wanted to meet me on the Continent. I was deeply disappointed when I learned that he could not come. Your Excellency may rest assured that the foreign policy of Japan is determined upon and after an unbiased examination of all the facts and a very careful weighing of the situation she confronts, always holding steadfastly in view the great racial » aim and ambition of finally bringing about th® conditions ehvisaged in what she calls Hakkoichfu, the Japanese conception of a universal peace under which there would be no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation of any and all peoples. And, once determined, I need hardly tell your Excellency that it will be carried out with resolution but with utmost circumspection, taking in every detail of changing circumstances. I am. believe me. Your Excellency’s obedient servant, YOSUKE MATSUOKA. A Compromise Policy Matsuoka and his colleagues in the Japanese Government were soon to confront a situation which required such an “unbiased examination.” On June 28, a week after Hitler’s invasion of Russia, a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet and officials of the Imperial Household was held. Matsuoka found his position immediately weakened. He had “lost face” because he had not known of Hitler’s intention to attack Russia. He spoke in favour of joining Germany, but the majority opinion was overwhelming against him. The Government decided to adopt a compromise policy. Armament preparations were to be augmented. Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact was invoked, which stated that the instrument was valid against Russia. Germany was to be informed confidentially that Japan would fight “Bolshevism in Asia,” and the Neutrality Treaty with Russia was cited to justify non-intervention in the German-Russian war? On th® other hand, it was agreed to go ahead in the Southern seas and to complete the occupation .of South Indo-China. These decisions were not agreeable to Matsuoka. In order to stir up agitation for entering the war on Germany’s side, he had one of his speeches printed as a pamphlet for wide distribution. The copies weje suppressed by the Japanese Government. On July 16 he disappeared from office. Thus we see as this world drama marches on how all these three coldlycalculating empires made at this moment mistakes disastrous alike to their ambition and their safety. Hitler was resolved on the war with Russia, which played a decisive part in his. ruin. Stalin remained, to Russia’s bitter cost, in ignorance of under-estimai tion of the blow about to fall on him. Janan certainly missed the best chance —for what it was ever worth —of realising her dreams. (To be continued) [Copyright 1950 in U.S.A, by the New York Times Company and Time. Inc. (publisher of Time and Life!; in the British Empire by the Daily Telegraph. Ltd.; elsewhere by International Co-operation Press Service. Inc. World rights reserved. Reproduction in full or in part in any language strictly prohibited.)