SUGGESTED POLICY FOR DEALING WITH RUSSIA

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25954, 7 November 1949, Page 6

SUGGESTED POLICY FOR DEALING WITH RUSSIA

IBV Lord VANSITTARTi

THIS IS YOUR WORLD

The second German war resulted in substituting Communist tyranny for Nazi tyranny. The two may seek to unite again. , . . . I Hence British policy must try (1) to prevent any Russo-German coalition, and therefore (2) to deny armed force to Germany; (3) to check tne Communist empire and thereby to loosen its hold jpn the enslaved satelThus alone can peace be preserved; and none of these objectives is unattainable if we use our available means. When the Russians first broke into Germany there was a world-record of rape and looting. Moreover, the Russians have apparently caused the death of more than 2,000,000 German prisoners. . Furthermore, the Russians, not tne Allies, insisted on partitioning Germany. They seized the food supplies of Eastern Germany and tried to starve Western Germany. They skinned their zone bare. What the Allies have taken as reparations is a fleabite compared with Soviet extortions. Finally. Russia alone is responsiole for incorporating much of Eastern Germany in Poland. She stole half Poland, and pushed Poland deep into Germany by way of “compensation. This was not only bad but mad. It made a certainty of an unpeaceful Germany. East Prussia should certainly go to Poland, which otherwise could never be defended. (Stalin stole most of it.) To force the Poles as far west as the Oder-Neisse frontier was asking for trouble. These frontiers have still to be confirmed bv a peace treaty. We cannot undo them, and should not attempt to do so. They must remain. The German inhabitants have been expelled and their places have been taken by Poles exnelled from the Poland grabbed by Russia. These poor people have nowhere else to go. Beware of Bad Treaties

We should, however, refuse to be tarred by any treaty embodying a deal which we all know to be less defensible than the Treaty of Versailles. The Russians made the mess by their stupid greed. Let them bear full responsibility. They contemplate ousting the Poles to curry favour with the Germans. Let us- be no party to that dirt either, unless the Russians restore East Poland to Poland. That might be the first step toward getting the invaders behind their former borders. It may be objected that such a stand will prevent the conclusion of a treaty with Russia about Germany. It will—for the time being; and this will healthily transform our whole outlook. The scales will drop from our eyes, and we shall see the fallacy of making dangerous concessions for a 'treaty which cannot possibly work for many reasons, including the Russian determination to dominate all Germany. One is always stronger if one does not want something. This is the new diplomacy. It is far better to have no treaty than a bad one—a treaty known in advance to be bad. We made bad treaties with the Soviet satellites. We have since had cause to regret our unwisdom. We show signs of letting Russia badger us into making a bad treaty on Austria, We shall regret that too. We should cease to run after political treaties with Russia. If ever Russia proposes a good one. with proper guarantees of observance, we will amine it. Atomic control is another matter. There is a practical test: the complete efficacy of inter-nation supervision. If the efficacy should be anything less than complete, we shall be better off without a treaty in this field also. Hitherto, whenever we have

attempted a settlement, the Russia,, have swindled us—witness the iai» mee ?^u in 4 They P ro mpt£ evaded the ostensible agreement aboM Berlin; they have, indeed, never keSt any agreement about anything. Pl When you know that someone it bent both on doing you and doing vm! in, whyNpretend that he is a reliab'. partner? We shammed peace wiS Hitler, and what came of it? UntH the Soviet attitude changes—however long that may be—let us cease thes* Big Four meetings and get back tn the ordinary machinery of diplomacy We all have Ambassadors. Thei special conclaves have led to much iniquity, such as the fifth partition of Poland, and the betrayal of Eastern Europe to Communism. We once thought the Russians in. terested in peace and justice. Now that we know them to hate both, and all democracies too, there is no excuse for continuing a silly and sinister game. A Great Advantage We start with a great advantage. The attraction of Western for Eastern Germany is much greater than vice versa. Only Communists want to live in wretched Soviet Germany, and some of them are bolting too. Their masters have dealt us a goodish hand, if we can bring ourselves to play it It is a mistake to suppose that Stalin and his henchmen are clever. They are ruthlessly unintelligent. Let us take every advantage of their defects The outstanding example is SUlin’i treatment of Tito. Mutton-fisted Joe could have had 50 per cent, or even 75 per cent, subservience from Jugoslavia, but he insisted on 100 per cant. So Tito kicked. Others have tried to do the same elsewhere. We have wide openings for increasing this tendency We are bolstering up Tito for hii nuisance-value. He has no other. We should give him just the sympathy deserved by one tyrant for resisting a worse one, no more. 4 There arc other opportunities of discrediting Communism, as a prelimin. ary to liberating the oppressed.

ary to Europe cannot live half slave, half free. Nor can Asia. Nor can you found peace on totalitarian force and fraud. Moscow bites off more than it can chew. It cannot supply its overworked satellites. So the satellites must look west for machinery and raw materials; else Communist economy will break down. We must not help it out of its troubles. We should not increase our trade with tyrannies, which have violated human rights, and incidentally confiscated our enterprises. We want little or nothing from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania. They want much from ui We hold the trumps. If we do not bolster up these persecuting regimes, too, they may break down. Communism is shaky in Eastern Europe. Let us shake it further. Germans do not like backing losers. This involves treating Communism as a hostile power? What else is it? Why else have we sought to protect ourselves by Western and Atlantic Union? It involves learning to fight a cold war properly. At present we nave no idea how to fight one at all. By sych a course we can (a) hope to liberate and unite Europe, (b) avert war by weakening the war-planner, (c) handle a resurgent Germany. Mr Dean Acheson was recently asked whether we should go ahead without Russia if she obstructed a peace treaty with Japan. Of course we must, if need be, and in the United Nations, too. But Mr Acheson replied that nobody had yet thought that out. In other words, we have not yet got a real policy. Here is part of one.