FRANCE APPROACHES A SEPARATE PEACE

Press, Volume LXXXV, Issue 25736, 23 February 1949, Page 4

FRANCE APPROACHES A SEPARATE PEACE

CHURCHILL MEMOIRS:

BOOK II

[By the Rt. Hon. WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, M.P.]

XVI

Future generations may deem it noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the war Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter of course by theje men of all parties in the State, and we were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal, academic issues. We were united also in viewing the new phase with good confidence. It was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts I was invited to send a message in the same sense to President Roosevelt, and also to sustain the determination of th® French Government and assure them of our utmost support. FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 12. vi .40. I spent last night and this morning at the French GQG, where the situation was explained to me in the gravest terms by Generals Weygand and Georges. You have no doubt received full particulars from Mr Bullitt. The practical point is what will happen when and if the French front breaks. Paris is taken, and General Weygand reports formally to his Government that France can no longer continue what he calls “co-ordinatea war." The aged Marshal Petain, who was none too good in April and J.uly, 1918, is. I fear, ready to lend his name and prestige to a treaty of peace for France. Reynaud, on the other hand, is for fighting on, and he has a young General de Gaulle, who believes much can be done. Admiral Darlan declares he will send the French Fleet to Canada. It would be disastrous if the two big modern ships fell into bad hands. It seems to me that there must be many elements in France who will wish to continue the struggle either in France or in the French colonies or in both. This therefore is the moment for you to strengthen Reynaud the utmost you can, and try to tip tne balance in favour of the best and longest possible French resistance. I venture to put this point before you, although I know you must understand it as well as I do. TRIBUTE TP A PATRIOT On June 13 I made my last visit to France for four years almost to a day. The French Government had now withdrawn to Tours, and tension had mounted steadily. I took Edward Halifax and General Ismay with me, ana Max Beaverbrook volunteered to come too. In trouble he is always buoyant. This time the weather was cloudless, and we sailed over in the midst oi our Hurricane squadron, making however a rather wider sweep to the southward than before. Arrived over Tours, we found the airport had been heavily bombed the night before; but we and all our escort landed smoothly in spite of the craters. Immediately one sensed the increasing degeneration of affairs. No one came to meet us or seemed to expect us. We borrowed a service car from the Station Commander and motored into the city, .making for the Prefecture, where it was said the French Government had their headquarters. No one of consequence was there, but Reynaud was reported to be motoring in from the country, and Mandel was also to arrive soon. It being already nearly 2 o clock, I insisted upon luncheon, and after some parleyings we drove through streets crowded with refugees’ cars, most of them with a mattress on top and crammed with luggage. We found a cafe, which was closed, but after explanations we obtained a meal. We then returned to the Prefecture, where Mandel, Minister of the Interior, awaited us. This faithful former secretary of Clemenceau, and a bearer forward of his life’s message, seemed in the best of spirits. He was energy and defiance personified. His luncheon, an attractive chicken, was uneaten on the tray before him. He was a ray of sunshine. He had a telephone in each hand through which he was constantly giving orders and decisions. His ideas were simple: fight on to the end in France, m order to cover the largest possible movement into Africa. This was the last time I

saw this valiant Frenchman. The restored French Republic rightly shot to death the hirelings who murdered him. His memory is honoured by his countrymen and their Allies. A SOLEMN PLEDGE Presently M. Reynaud arrived. At first he seemed depressed. General Weygand had reported to him that the French'armies were exhausted. The line Was pierced in many places; refugees were pouring along all the roads through the country; and many of the troops were in disorder. The Generalissimo felt it was necessary to ask for an ai mistice while there were still enough French troops to keep order until peace could be made. Such was the military advice. He would send that day a further message to Mr Roosevelt saying that the last hour had come and that the fate of the Allied cause lay in America’s hand. Hence arose the alternative of armistice and peace. M. Reynaud proceeded to say that the Council of Ministers had on the previous day instructed him to inquire what would be Britain’s attitude should the worst come. He himself was well aware of the solemn pledge that no separate peace would be entered into by either ally. General Weygand and others pointed out that France had already sacrificed everything in the common cause. She had nothing left; but she had succeeded in greatly weakening the common foe. It would in those circumstances be a shock if Britain failed to concede that France was physically unable to carry on. if France was still expected to fight on and thus deliver up her people to the certainty of corruption and evil transformation at the hands of ruthless specialists in the art of bringing conquered peoples to heel. That then was the question which he had to put. Wculd Great Britain realise the hard facts with which France was faced? I thought the issue raised at this point was so serious that I asked to withdraw with my colleagues before answering it. So Lords Halifax and Beaverbrook and the rest of our party went out into a dripping but sunlit garden and talked things over for half an hour. On our return I stated our position. We could not agree to a separate peace, however it might come. Our war aim remained the total defeat of Hitler, and we felt that we could still bring this about. We were therefore not in a position to release France from her obligation. Whatever happened, we would level no reproaches against France; but that was a different matter from consenting to release her from her pledge. I urged that the French should now send a new appeal tb President Roosevelt, which we would support from London. M. Reynaud agreed to do this, and promised that the French would hold on until the result of this final appeal was known. 7

PARTINGS IN TOURS Before leaving I made one particular request to M. Reynaud. Over 400 German pilots, the bulk of whom had been shot down by the R.A.F.. were prisoners in France. Having regard to the situation, they should be handed over to our custody. M. Reynaud willingly gave this promise, but soon he had no power to keep it. These German pilots all became available for the Battle of Britain, and we had to shoot them down a second time.

At the end of our talk M. Revnai.j took us into the adjoining room, whaJ! MM. Herriot and Jeanneney. the KJ sidents of the Chamber and Senate t* spectively, were seated. Both French patriots spoke with passinnTz emotion about fighting on to the death As we went down the crowded mwi* into the courtyard I saw Generali Gfiulle standing stolid and less at the dorway. Greeting him ? said in a low tone, in French 1 “L’homme du destin.” He remaiS impassive. In the courtyard there have been more than a hundred lead ing Frenchmen in frightful misery Clemenceau’s son was brought up me. I wrung his hand. The Hurricanes were already in the air, and I slent sound on our swift and uneventfoi i journey home. This w’as wise fS there was a long way to go be fore'bed time. After our departure from Tour* at about half past five, M. Revnaud m!t his Cabinet again at Cangey. The decision was taken to move the French Government to Bordeaux and Renaud sent off his telegram £ Roosevelt with its desperate appeal for the entry on the scene at least of S American Fleet. REPLY TO REYNAUD’S APPEM At 10.15 p.m. I made my new i*. port to the Cabinet. My account was endorsed by my two companion While we were still sitting Ambassador Kennedy arrived with President Room, velt’s reply to Reynaud’s appeal nf June 10. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO M REV NAUD. W Your message of June 10 has move?£ very deeply. As I have already stated to you and to Mr Churchill, this Govern, ment is doing everything in its power ta make available to the Allied Govern, ments the material they so urgently quire, and our efforts to do stiU more are being redoubled. This is so becaw«a of our faith in and our support of the ideals for which the Allies are fighting The magnificent resistance of ft. French and British Armies has p*ni foundly impressed the American people I am, personally, particularly impreMM by your declaration that France will cant tinue to fight on behalf of Democracy even if it means slow withdrawal, even tS North Africa and the Atlantic. It is mp 3 important to remember that the French and British Fleets continue [in] master of the Atlantic and other oceans-eK to remember that vital materials from the outside world are necessary to frjH. tain all armies. I am also greatly heartened by wW Prime Minister Churchill said a few days ago about the continued resistance of the British Empire, and that determination would seem to apply equally to the Great French Empire all over the world. Naval s»ower5 »ower in world affairs still carries tbo essons of history, as Admiral Darlan well knows. We all thought the President had gone a very long way. He had author, ised Reynaud to publish his message of June 10, with all that that implied, and now he had sent this formidable an. swer. If upon this, France decided to endure the further torture of the war, the United States would oe deeply committed to enter it. At any rate, it contained two points which were tantamount to belligerence: first; a promise of all material aid. which implied active assistance; secondly a call to go on fighting even if the Government was driven right out of France. I sent our thanks to the President immediately, and I also sought to commend the President's message to fieynaud in the most favourable ten& Finally, in accordance with e the Cabinet’s wishes, I sent a formal message of good cheer to the French Government in which the note of an indissoluble union between our two countries was struck for the first time. All these three messages were drafted by me before I went to bed after midnight on the 13th. They were written actually in the small hours of the 14th.. NO COMMITMENT The next day arrived a telegram from the President explaining that he could not agree to the publication of his message to Reynaud. He himself, according'to Mr Kennedy, had wisned to do so, but the State Department, while in full sympathy with .him, saw the gravest dangers. He renewed the assurances about furnishing all possible material and supplies; but he then said he had told Ambassador Kennedy to inform me that his message on the 14th was in no sense intended to commit and did not commit the Government of the United States to military participation. There was no authority under the American Constitution except Congress which could make any commitment of that nature. This was a disappointing telegram. Around our table we all fully understood the risks the President ran of being charged with exceeding his constitutional authority,-and consequently of being defeated on this issue at the approaching election, on which opr fate, and much more, depended. I was convinced that he would give up life itself, to say nothing of public office, for the cause of world freedom now in such awful peril. But what would have been the good of that? Across the Atlantic I could feel his suffering. In the White House the torment was of * different character from that of Bordeaux or London. But the degree « personal stress was not unequal. In my reply I tried to arm the President with some arguments which he could use to others about th® danger to the United States if Europe fell and Britain failed. This was no matter of sentiment, but of life death. FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRBSIDENT ROOSEVELT. , a .. 14-15.vi.40. Although the present Government and I personally would never fall to send the Fleet across the Atlantic if resistance wss beaten down here, a point may be reached in the struggle where the present Ministers no longer have control of affairs end when very easy terms could be obtained for the British Island by their becoming 4 vassal state of the Hitler Empire. A German Government would certainly called into being to make peace, an® might present to a shattered or a starving nation an almost irresistible case for entire submission to the Nazi will. TM fate of the British Fleet, as I have already mentioned to you, would be decisive on the future of the United States, because if it were joined to the Fleets of Japan, France, and Italy and the great resource* of German industry overwhelming power would be in Hitler’s hands. might of course use it with a rnerc . if rl moderation. On the other hand, he niignt not. This revolution in sea power mignt happen very quickly, and certainly’ long before the United States would be able w prepare against it. If we go down yojl may have a United States of Europe under the Nazi command far more numerous far stronger, far better armed than tne New World. I know well. Mr President, that youf eye will already have searched these depths, but I feel I have the right to place on record the vital manner ® which American interests are at stake in our battlC and that of France. (To be continued) Copyright 1949 in U.S.A, by The New York Times Company and Time, inc. (publisher of Time and Life); in tne British Empire by the Daily Telegraph Ltd.; elsewhere by ntern3^ona AjAu operation Press Service. Inc. rights reserved. Reproduction in or in part in any language strictly pr°' hibited.