The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1948. China

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25660, 24 November 1948, Page 4

The Press WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1948. China

llt is a pity that the cablegram ■ printed yesterday did not identify the “ special mission ” which has recommended to the United States Senate Appropriations Committee an “ all-out programme ” of aid for China. It is known that several American missions or agencies have been hard at assembling the data on which the United States Government may be expected to base a policy for China; and some will be more influential than others. The United States Economic Cooperation Administration has a mis-

sion in China; a services committee under Lieutenant-General Wedemeyer, United States Army Chief of Planning and former American commander in China, is reported to have been making a careful review of the military situation; and some weeks ago Mr William Bullitt, former American Ambassador to France and Russia, went to China to investigate on behalf of the Congressional foreign aid" “ watchdog ” committee. The report referred to in the cables is very much what was expected from the Bullitt mission, for Mr Bullitt has long been an immoderate pleader of the case for allout aid for China, even though he has not shut his eyes to the weaknesses of the Chinese Government and the inefficient use made by the Nationalist army of the limited American aid that has been given. The Bullitt mission wks dispatched by a Republican Congress in the expectation of its findings being use-, ful to a Republican Administration. When the election went against Republican calculations, the Republican Party had to content itself with the knowledge that the findings would be useful to the critics of Mr Truman’s and Mr Marshall’s policy. China was one of the few foreign policy questions on which Democrats and Republicans disagreed. When he was Ambassador to China Mr Marshall’s efforts were directed to bringing the Communists and the Kuomintang together. This was clearly his early policy as Secretary of State, although Mr Truman has since disavowed any such intention. He has given no indication of being willing to increase substantially his country’s aid to the Chinese Government. This has been, and still is, considerable. Up to last March, it was estimated, 2,800,000,000 dollars had been allotted to China. Another 463,000,000 dollars was voted in the Foreign Assistance Act. An American military and naval mission gives advice in Nanking and has trained some 50 divisions' of Nationalist troops on Formosa. The rapid deterioration of the Chinese Government’s position, however, will certainly call for a reconsideration of American policy toward China. Responsible observers emphasise that because American resources are not unlimited, the United States cannot accept responsibility for winning the civil war for Chiang Kai-shek and of containing Russia in Europe as well; and few of them agree with Mr Bullitt that Communist aggression in China is a greater threat to the United States than Russian expansion in Europe. No doubt the flow of American aid for China could be increased considerably; but the Chinese Government seems no nearer achieving those reforms which have been a condition of American aid and which now are clearly indispensable to the restoration of Nationalist morale. The United States Government is in a dilemma, as the “ Manchester Guardian ” recently pointed out:

Undoubtedly the Communist successes are gratifying and helpful to the Russians. Mr Marshall himself in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in February described how untenable a Communist advance to the Yangtse would make the American position in Korea, and how this would react on Japan. And as long as American policy favours the Kuomintang, with whatever reservations, the Communists are bound to play the Russian game. Mr Marshall is now in the unpleasant position of having to take a more positive line one way or the other, unless he is willing to risk having the worst of both worlds: Communist victory and Communist enmity. His dilemma is inevitable so long as the United States chooses to co-operate with shady allies whenever she fears that the better alternative may benefit the Russians. For not everything which hinders Russia is good, nor everything which helps her bad.

It is to be feared that not many Americans will see the problem this way. Mr Truman, in his new-found strength, may attempt to show it to them.