The Press FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1948. Defence Policy

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25548, 16 July 1948, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1948. Defence Policy

The Minister of Defence is to be i thanked for his long and useful explanation of the Government’s planning and preparation for defence, jup to the present. In general, he (Outlined proposals (and some measI ures of advance towards them) which define a defence organisation ■ sufficiently well muscled for the primary purpose and not too ambitious to be efficiently maintained. Some questions are obviously raised; for example, whether a recruit training period of 14 weeks and three annual camps in territorial units, with occasional muster parades, will enable efficient territorial units to be built up and kept up, even with the help of regulars. Again, it has always seemed curious

that no New Zealand Government has studied the function of submarines in New Zealand coastal defence; and it remains curious that nothing is said about it now. One more question will do: whether Mr Jones has not here and there claimed greater actual progress than the f&cts warrant, most conspicuously, perhaps, in regard to the purchase of Mosquito aircraft. The 80 so far received, he said, had enabled the Government to "establish “ one fighter and two bomber squadrons that should meet New Zealand’s requirements for the next “ four or five years ”, Unless Mr Jones can tell the House that these squadrons are in regular service, and it may be doubted that he can, he has been topping off his case with a little intelligent anticipation. It is better to turn just now from specific questions of this sort to one or two wider issues. The first of these is revealed in the peculiar ambiguity of Mr Jones’s position as

Minister of Defence. Clearly the Government’s proposals as a whole stand or fall as it succeeds in filling the ranks of the services or fails. In Lord Montgomery’s opinion, invited by the Government, compulsory militarv training will be necessary. In Mr Jones’s opinion, given from his place in the House on this significant occasion, a national service system will be necessary. But, he went on at once, the Government has taken no decision. This clearly implies that, when it does decide, it may decide the other way. Now it is all very well to say that, in those circumstances, Mr Jones will accept the decision of his colleagues and loyally carry it out. But in those circumstances everybody will know that the Minister immediately responsible and best informed, holding the same opinion as the

Empire’s first soldier and—it is quite safe to say—the overwhelming majority of other persons competent to advise him, has been out-voted and obliged to give way. He will have been obliged to give way on a crucial issue; and it will take more able casuists than the Government can parade to convince the people that he has not been over-ruled, though in the right, because the Government, is afraid of losing some votes. Mr Jones may be sure that his colleagues will support him. It is to be hoped that he is sure, and that he is safely sure. But if so, it is astonishing. that at this stage he should choose, or be allowed, or be compelled to commit himself to a personal opinion, warning the House

and the public that the Government as yet has no opinion at all. It is more than astonishing; it is deplorable, since Mr Jones, who should speak the Government’s mind, looks like a carefully indiscreet backbencher, put up to test parliamentary and public and party reactions. This is not the way to attack problems of the kind or to lead the nation in its duty. A second important issue is defined in Mr Jones’s quotations from the reports of the Admiralty, Lord Montgomery, and Lord Tedder. They are, of course, to be regarded as confidential documents, from which it is. within the Government’s discretion to quote in open debate so much and no more. But it is also true that the House is handicapped in open debate by hearing part only of the reports. It is not accusing Mr Jones of bad faith to pay that, in quoting, he would consider not only the necessary restraints of security but the convenient restraints of political interest. After all, he was explaining and defending Government policy, and he was under no obligation to munition Opposition speakers—if there is any ammunition in the reports for them. One reference suggests that there may be: Lord Montgomery is “in “ general agreement ” with the Government’s proposals; and general agreement is not' total and detailed agreement. The question is in what respects there are differences. If there are any, especially if any is serious, the House should know what they are. If necessary, they should be explained and discussed in closed session or otherwise confidentially opened. The interests of the country make it a matter of first-class importance that Parliament should fully understand the issues put before it in the Government’s defence policy.