MIDDLE EAST DISPATCHES

Press, Volume LXXXIV, Issue 25394, 17 January 1948, Page 7

MIDDLE EAST DISPATCHES

German Tanks Praised

NOTES ON DESERT FIGHTING

(Special Correspondent N.ZP.AJ (Rec. 9 p.m.) LONDON, January 16. Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, in his dispatches, makes frequent references to the superiority of the German armour and to lessons, both in tank warfare and design, which this superiority imposed on the British forces during the desert fighting in November and December, 1941. Referring to the battles round Tobruk, he says. “Judging by results, it was obvious that not only were all our tanks outgunned by the German cruiser tanks; but that our tanks were mechanically inferior under battle conditions. Though American light tanks, as fighting machines, could not compare with our own or the German medium tanks, they were mechanically far more reliable than the British medium tanks. The inferior armament and mechanical unreliability of our tanks, were aggravated by our great shortage of anti-tank weapons, compared with the Germans.”

Leadership and Tactics pealing with British tank tactics at this stage in the war, Field-Marshal Auchinleck says: “It was also obvious that the standard of leadership and tactical handling of our armoured forces must be improved. Our tank tactics were inferior to those of the Germans because we failed to co-ordin-ate adequately the action of our tanks, infantry and artillery on the battlefield. The three arms must associate much more continuously and closely in U-aining and in battle.” Field-Marshal Auchinleck also pays a tribute to a section of the Italian armour. The Italian Mark XIII tanks which, as a result of experiences in the previous campaign “we had been inclined to dismiss as valueless, fought well and had an appreciable effect on the battle. There was little doubt that t x e «. Presence of German troops had stiffened Italian morale.” Summarising his impressions of this stage of desert warfare, Field-Marshal Auchinleck concludes: “In the open desert country of Cyrenaica, superiority in armour in my opinion, is essential to any offensive. To achieve this we needed at least half as many tanks agau l the enemy, taking into acl he - relative effici ency of German tanks and our own. Over and above S at needed a reserve-equal to at .cent, of the number deployed with the units.”

Bel Hamed and Sidi Rezegh .The recapture of Bel Hamed and 5? zeg u Pt ge by the Germans after they had been forced off these f w ° key positions by the New Zealand 4th and sth Brigades on November 25 and 26. 1941, was chiefly caused by the inability of the South African *?‘ : .J n J antr y Brigade, with supporting British armour, to arrive in time to reinforce the New Zealanders, accordmg to dispatches covering the period November 1. 1941, to August 15, 1942, now released for publication by the War Office. Field-Marshal Auchinleck pays several tributes to the New Zealanders’ fighting during these operations.

It had been hoped, Field-Marshal Auchinleck continues, that the South Africans would arrive on their objective on the morning of November 29. in time to release the British armour so that it could intervene at Sidi Rezegh. Unfortunately, because of the slow movement, and also a breakdown in wireless communications at the crucial time, the South Africans were still 3000 yards short of their objective at dawn on December 1. In the meantime, the German tanks, though twice beaten off by the New Zealand 6th Brigade, had succeeded in dislodging them from the Sidi Rezegh ridge. “This New Zealand Brigade,” states Field-Marshal Auchinleck, “was only

overwhelmed after a gallant resistance It had been reduced to barely one third of its fighting strength and with only two support tanks left, was assailed by 50 enemy tanks and large numbers of infantry.” While the South Africans were still trying to dislodge the Germans on December 1, enemy panzers and infantry attacked the 4th Brigade on Bel Hamed and again succeeded in overwhelming the New Zealanders by force of numbers.

“As the New Zealand Division had had extremely heavy casualties and was now in danger of becoming entirely cut off. General Norrie gave the order for them to withdraw,” continues Field-Marshal Auchinleck. “Having repulsed further attacks on Zafran during the day, they withdrew during the night with the survivors of the Ist Army Tank Brigade, the partners in their successes, and reached the Egyptian frontier in the early hours of the morning of December 2, exhausted but in good heart.” Field-Marshal Auchinleck throws little light on the collapse of Tobruk, when Rommels offensive was resumed. but he makes it clear that he had, throughout, instructed that a second investment of Tobruk must be avoided. Field-Marshal Auchinleck states that exact and reliable accounts of the fighting which led to the collapse of the South Africans in Tobruk are not obtainable.

Field-Marshal Auchinleck handed over his command to Field-Marshal Lord Alexander on August 15, 1942, and the victorious El Alamein offensive was opened by the Bth Army on November 2, 1942. The withdrawal of two Australian divisions from Syria and Palestine to the Pacific was one of the factors which affected Sir Claude Auchinleck’s strategy in the Middle East in 1941 and 1942. He states. “After the Australian divisions were withdrawn the situation became much worse.”