The Preś THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1947. Future of U.N.

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25364, 11 December 1947, Page 6

The Preś THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1947. Future of U.N.

Back in Australia from the United Nations flssembly, Dr. Evatt has spoken as cheerfully of the United Nations, according to a report yesterday, as in San Francisco before he left. There he said that the Assembly’s success had been “ a terM rible blow to professional ghouls It had started off badly but surmounted its worst crisis, and would “ continue to function, not only as a **world Parliament” —an exaggeration, unfortunately—but as “ the “ world’s conscience Dr. Evatt’s confidence will probably surprise some readers, who had gathered the impression that, the decision on Palestine apart, the Assembly had produced nothing but proofs of the hopeless difference between the Russian bloc and the majority and left in doubt only the number of scenes still to be played before the tragi-comedy ends. The Palestine decision, of course, would be a remarkable and encouraging exception in a record of failure, even if the record were otherwise unredeemed; and it is not surprising that Dr. Evatt pointed to this, first and foremost. But it is first and foremost, not first and only. Read now, when “ war-mongering ” speeches and deadlocks fall into place and proportion more easily than in current reports, the record shows a good deal more to justify a patient hope. For example, although the crude fact is that Mr Vyshinsky and his regular supporters were time and again outvoted by 40 or so, 10 or 12 abstaining, and although the crude fact seems to mean that the United States, Britain, and France, with their regular supporters, voted bloc against bloc, the crude fact is misleading. The much more significant fact was that the u middle ” and small nations—hence Dr. Evatt’s cheerful faith in ' the growing child’s future—exerted themselves with notable effect, working American proposals to a shape not only more to their minds but in fact better. Such American proposals as those to establish the Balkans Commission and the permanent committee of the Assembly would not have been carried by the required majority in their original form; but the middle and small nations insisted on amending them —the first, by eliminating the superfluous and contentious charges against certain States; the second, by bringing the powers of the committee clearly within the authority of the Charter—and carried 'them, then, in their wiser and more workable form. Again, the United States would have been content to smash Mr Vyshinsky’s impossibly worded and aimed “ war-monger ” resolution; the middle and small nations, perhaps achieving no more than a moral gesture, but certainly achieving a timely one, brought forward and carried their own, condemning inflammatory propaganda ; everywhere. Mr Vyshinsky, so often

voted down, protested that he was beiryj beaten by the obedient satellites of the State Department and the Foreign Office. Mr R. H. S. Crossman. M.P., echoed this opinion —with particular reference to the South American States—in an impetuous “New Statesman” article. But the evidence is overwhelming that, wherever and however the State Department may use its pressure, the Assembly is not its creature. Indeed, Mr Vyshinsky, who as often seems to be imperfectly informed as to judge his information badly and to overplay his hand, must first blame himself for the size of the majorities against him. This is not to say that the Assembly did not fail deplorably at times. It can hardly be forgiven, for instance, for refusing to reaffirm its own resolution on Spain—though this refusal, of course, does not expunge or reverse the resolution—and American leadership, which was responsible, can hardly be forgiven the stupidity of posing so conveniently, for Mr Vyshinsky’s purposes, as the champion of any regime that will beat down Communism. But more disturbing than this or any other failure was the Russian reaction to- certain decisions—on the Korean and Balkans commissions and on the interim Assembly committee—the reaction of a boycott. Mr Vyshinsky was unmoved by the small nations’ amendments. The imperialists and the war-mongers were scheming against Russia and “ true demo- “ cracy ”, that was all, and Russia would not budge. He did not merely refuse to co-operate; he threatened to block financial supply for the commissions and the committee. k Such a precedent could not be set without showing every nation, great and small, how to use a veto without any of the restrictions that hedge the Great Powers’ veto in the Security Council; and it could paralyse the Assembly. If Russia wants to preserve both the Assembly and an influence within it which is greater than appearances suggest, Mr Vyshinsky will not fulfil his threat. He will, instead, consider that the Charter binds member States to accept decisions taken in accordance with it; that it authorises the Assembly to seek the advice of the International Court of Justice if the legality of a decision is questioned; and that he takes an impossible position when he raises such a question and refuses to have it put to the Court, as he has done.