The Press THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1947. Italian Peace Treaty

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25304, 2 October 1947, Page 6

The Press THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1947. Italian Peace Treaty

If there is anything surprising about the request by eight Latin American countries that the United Nations General Assembly should discuss the Italian peace treaty terms, it is only its timing. It was made within a week after the treaty had come into force. It is almost certain that if this request had not been made, the treaty would have reached the United Nations later, if not through one of the Western allies, then through Italy herself. For while the central economic and political clauses were unsatisfactory to the Western Powers, as uneasy compromises between their views and those of Russia, they were bitterly opposed by the Italians themselves on the grounds that they were “dictated” and that they did not fairly take into account Italy’s aid to the Allies in the final stages of the war. At any time after being admitted to membership of the United Nations, Italy could take steps to obtain redress. She could ask for a hearing before the General Assembly under Article 14 of the Charter, which authorises the Assembly to recommend measures for “ the peaceful adjustment of any “ situation . . . which it deems likely “to impair the general welfare or “ friendly relations among nations Or, taking the ground that a specific provision of the settlement endangered international peace, Italy could submit a case to the * Security Council, under Articles 34 and 35. Since the &me courses would be open to Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which also launched a revisionist campaign as soon as the treaties were signed in Paris on February 10, the Latin American countries’ move on behalf of Italy may be only the first in the sort of campaign which the Allies tried to forestall when they allowed the former Axis satellites to offer their views at Paris. The danger is, of course, that a campaign to have the treaties re* vised would open up much wider controversial ground than their terms define. It would expose again the great difficulty of the 18 months of peace-making after Potsdam. If it was difficult for the Allies to arrange terms for the former enemy countries, it was just as difficult, or even more difficult, because of their conflicting concepts of their rights in Europe, to reach a solid feasis of agreement among themselves. Germany and Italy having been displaced as forces in the European system and Britain and France weakened, Russia and the United States assunied new and dominant roles in readjusting its balance. Under the Italian treaty, the readjustment has in some ways favoured the Western Powers, as when the Dodecanese at the southern approaches to the Dardanelles were ceded to Greece. In other ways U has favoured Russia, as when Italy ceded to Albania the island of Saseno, at the % point of the Strait of Otranto, and the Jugo-slav-Italian border was revised. In the Mediterranean it will not be complete, or clear, until the future of Italy’s African colonies is decided. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this kind of territorial adjustments will loom largest in any Assembly discussion of the Italian treaty, and that Sir Hartley Shawcross had them in mind when he said that, although Britain was not satisfied with the treaty terms, she “ doubted whether it would be “in the interests of Italy to discuss “ revisions now ”. The main clauses which Italy wants to beTrevised are those on Trieste, her former colonies, and the reparations bill of 360,000,000 dollars. But her chances of securing favourable revision would perhaps be less remote if she presented her claims herself when she becomes a member of the United Nations.