INVASION PLANS

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25290, 16 September 1947, Page 7

INVASION PLANS

German Documents Made Public

DISPUTE BETWEEN COMMANDS (Special Correspondent N.Z.P.A.) (Ree. 8 p.m.) LONDON, September 15. Secret German naval documents published by the Admiralty reveal that although the German Naval Staff drew up tentative plans for an invasion of Britain as far back as November, 1939, Grand-Admiral Roeder regarded the operation, when it was finally ordered by Hitler, with the greatest misgivings. A long dispute developed between Raeder and the German Army Command over the form of the invasion, and finally had to be settled by Hitler’s direct intervention. Raeder, conscious of Germany’s naval inferiority, argued that adequate naval protection could be given only if a German invasion fleet crossed the Channel by day on a narrpw front. The Army Command demanded a night Crossing on a broad front between Folkestone and Selsey Bill, with a feint in the direction of Newcastle on the north-east coast. Eventually, after a complete deadlock, a compromise was reached; But in the meantime exaggerated German intelligence estimates of the strength of the British defences, the losses inflicted on the LUf v .waffe by the Royal Air Force, and the successful British air and naval attacks oh the Channel invasion ports apparently reinforced Hitler’s growing conviction that an in-, vaston. would prove too cosily. . « The invasion was not immediately called off, but ostensible preparations were continued for some time in an attempt to hoodwink the British and apparently with the intention oi making an attempt if favourable conditions presented themselves. By this time* however, Hitler had decided to attack Russia, and gradually the German invasion forces were redistributed in preparation for the eastern campaign. September 15, 1940 D-t)ay for the German invasion armies was to have been September 15, 1940. Landings were to have taken place in four main areas—between Folkestone and Dungeness, Dungeness and Cliffs End, BeXhill and Beachy Head, ahd Brighton and Selsey Bill— With the object of establishing a line front Southampton to the mouth of the Thames. A force of 13 divisions (260,000 meh) was to be landed, with sufficient artillery for their protection. The dropping of parachute troops was also discussed. The dispute between the German Army and Navy leaders was still proceeding when the Luftwaffe launched its softening attack on Britain early in August. Colonel-General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, declared at one meeting .that he ‘‘might as well f>ut the troops through a sausage machine’' as land them on a narrow front, and Admiral Schneiwind* Chief of the Naval Staff, retorted that if the Army demanded naval protection over a Wide front it would be “suicidal.’* The inadequacy of the German intelligence reports plainly had an important bearing on the invasion plans. One German agent in Britain repotted early in September that vety strong disguised defences existed between Tunbridge Wells and Beachey Head and in the area of Hastings, while other German intelligence reports assessed the number of divisions available for defence at 39, of which 20 were believed to be fully operational. Both estimates were much exaggerated, and they confirm that the German Secret Service was largely hoaxed by Various British Subterfuges. Failure of Luftwaffe Raeder, in several notes on his Conversations with Hitler during September, complained that in spite of the Luftwaffe’s claims to have established air superiority over the British fighters, Royal Air Force bombers were inflicting heavy damage’on barge concentrations. Raeder emphasised that a prerequisite for success from the naval point Of view was that all British ait interference with the invasion fleet should be eliminated; and he pointed out with some acerbity that this had not been done. Raeder further pointed out that Germany could not afford to fail in an invasion attempt once it was launched. Not only would losses.be very great, but the gain in British prestige would more than offset any losses inflicted on the defenders. He urged that the attacks on the Civilian population of London should be intensified, as he considered that this might “induce an attitude in the enemy which would make invasion unnecessary.” Hitler, however, refused to agree to this and reserved his decision about such attacks as “a, final means of pressure and reprisal.” On September 19. with German air losses still mounting, the Royal Air Force still unsubdued, and the German invasion ports still subject to constant attack by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, Hitter ordered part of the invasion fleet to disperse to _ reduce losses. From this , time no serious attempt was made to revive the German plans for invasi&fi.