TO-DAY’S TRENDS IN JAPAN

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25271, 25 August 1947, Page 7

TO-DAY’S TRENDS IN JAPAN

PREOCCUPATION WITH WORLD STRATEGY

FEARS OF COMMUNISM AND RUSSIA

[From DENIS WARNER, A.A.P.-Reuter Correspondent.]

(Rec. 8 p.m.) TOKYO, August 23. A newcomer to Tokyo cannot fail to be impressed with two overwhelming currents of opinion, common alike to many Allied occupation and Japanese officials. The first is the acceptance of the inevitability of another war; and the second, a preoccupation with Japan’s position in world strategy. A member of the House of Commons who visited Japan some weeks ago described the Russophobia of Allied occupation officials as “near hysteria.” That may be an exaggeration, but certainly no consideration is shown by the Allied occupation authorities for members of the Soviet delegation to Japan. On the Allied Council, Lieutenant-General Derevyanko was either denied information by Mr George Atcheson, the chairman of the council, or made the target of his attacks.

In his interviews with foreign journalists, even General MacArthur nimself makes no secret of his fears of post-treaty Russian intervention in Japan. The 38th’ parallel, which divides Korea into its American and Soviet zones, is regarded as the only ’•eally important frontier in the world. Guarded on either side by armed Russian and American troops, it has many dangerous possibilities, but in the world picture it is probably subsidiary to Hungary, Turkey, or Persia. Desire for Armed Forces These beliefs, however, largely account for the emphasis placed on various aspects of the Japanese situation to-day. They are responsible for the Japanese Foreign Office’s lack of inhibition in openly lobbying for an army of 100,000 men, an air force and a coastguard service, and for articles now appearing frequently in the Japanese press, deploring the confinement of the Japanese people to their four home islands.

zipart from their humanitarian idea, they are perhaps the principal reasons behind General MacArthur’s determination to put Japan on its economic zeet as soon as possible. They are interpreted even oy many people as a basic factor in General MacArthur’s acceptance of the faint democratic stirrings among the Japanese people as ihe signs of a spiritual regeneration. They govern the major approach by the Allied authorities to the* occupation. They are responsible for the tear of the growth of Communism and the determination to avoid creating conditions that would make Japan vulnerable physically or morally after the withdrawal of the occupation forces.

Emperor System Many competent observers who have watched the occupation -since its first days believe that the decision to retain the Emperor system and the ready acceptance of Hirohito’s war innocence are directly attributable to this fundamental distrust of Russia by the Supreme Command. Disapproval of Those , who would bring Hirohito to trial is so marked to-day that it is C, ven an offence now to refer to the ,N S w ar-time name of f* 1 ?. Charlie. « From his biological studies m his little laboratory in the wooded moat surrounding the Imperial Palace, Hirohito now makes periodical tours of remote urban and rural areas. In its enthusiasm over one visit, the Osaka Shimbun” wrote- “Because we see more of Him now. it seems worthwhile to have lost the

Each day, the evidence accumulates pointing to Hirohito’s direct guilt in ordering the war to be begun, but action is unlikely. His arrest inevitablv would lead to chaos. There would be uprisings, shootings, and general cigoraer. The scaled-down occupation 4.orce might easily find the situation beyond its control. The whole structure bufit up so painstakingly since ? nd ° T f the , war would probably topple. Japan s economic recovery i would be set back years. When the people go dow,i on their ■ knees in the Imperial Plaza to bow in I the direction of the Son of Heaven,

when thousands weep hysterically or shout “Banzai," you nave little doubt that to-day’s constitutional monarch is still very much the source of inspiration. the ultimate and most influential authority in the land.

Anti-Soviet Cue The Japanese programme of cooperation with the occupation forces has produced such excellent results—a completely peaceful administration, little interference with normal Japanese life and the promise of an early peace treaty—that the politicians and leading industrialists who survived the [ urge were not slow to follow the anti-Soviet cue.

To-day, the Prime Minister, Christian, inefficient Tetsu Katayama, and the Liberal Party (Conservative) reader. Shigeru Yoshida, both speak with fear of Russia externally and fear of Communism internally. It is anybody’s guess what the external dangers may be. The internal assessment is a good deal easier. Trade development* with the Soviet and Soviet-dominated countries of East Asia may one day cause a change, but for the next two or Uiree years. Communistic influence in -Japan is likely to be very slight. The -apanese do not like the Communists. For one thing, the Communist* are eager to have the Emperor’s head; for another, the major political parties are pronouncedly anti-Communist And for a third, most other Japanese have only the vaguest idea what it is all about.