The Press FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1947. Mr Molotov Says No

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25227, 4 July 1947, Page 6

The Press FRIDAY, JULY 4, 1947. Mr Molotov Says No

The statement in which Mr Molotov rejected the Anglo-French proposals and, it appears, terminated the Three-Power discussions was quite explicit. That has the great advantage, that all who wish to judge fairly may satisfy themselves that Mr Bevin protested with excellent reason against Mr Molotov’s “ trav- “ esty ” of the facts. Wishing to judge fairly still, they may be perplexed by the very grossness of Mr Molotov’s errors of fact and argument. Could he really be so far astray without knowing it? And if he knew it, why should he choose to affront the representatives of Britain and France by deliberately hitting all the wrong nails on the head? The answer is one that past conferences—and Moscow notably—have made familiar. Once the Russian line is taken, the opportunity of the conference table is used, not to address the delegates opposite with reason that matches, if it does not meet, their reason, but to fix the Russian people, the satellite peoples, and the communist minorities outside the Russian orbit Li the appropriate defensive (or aggressive) propaganda attitude. Mr Molotov could have said No, giving some at least of the real reasons and stating some at least fully and frankly, and have made it a sufficiently rational No to command Mr Bevin’s and Mr Bidault’s thoughtful respect, though not their approval. Such a refusal need not have been provocative, though it would have had to be deplored; it could even have been framed so as to be, in the long run, hopefully constructive. Bvt this No is provocative, is damaging; it not only shuts the door against the really wide European co-operation that was needed and possible, it declares Russia’s hostility to the limited European co-oper-ation that is the alternative, and it threatens immediate mischief, wherever communist or communist-dom-inated governments are in power, or communist parties are manoeuvring for position, or communist mouthpieces are braying the doctrine.

It w’ould be an unprofitably long, repetitive task to take Mr Molotov’s statement to pieces and test it piece by piece. The method of illustration must serve and suffices. First, Mr Molotov maintained his objection to the proposed procedure of a survey of European requirements and resources, leading to the statement of a programme of aid required from America, though the single word “ joint ” in General Marshall’s proposals was enough to show that no other procedure could be approved—just as, indeed, no other procedure would work. But Mr Molotov abandoned the view that a different procedure might, after all, be acceptable to Washington and confined himself to arguing that this one would bind Europe to do America’s economic bidding and, whether alternatively or as well, set up Brxtain and France in a “predominant” position, controlling the smaller countries and restricting their economic independence. The answers are plain. Mr Molotov misses the whole point of the American offer—besides misunderstanding Mr Bidault’s use of the word “ decisive ”, in reference to American aid—which is that, if this offer were fulfilled, America would and must be using economic power less arbitrarily, less interferingly, and to less selfish ends than in any other conditions, present or prospective. Again, nothing either in the British and French proposals or in Mr Molotov’s review of them indicates how Britain and France aim to make themselves “ predom- ‘ “ inant Such sinister designs might, of course, be revealed while needs and resources were being surveyed and reciprocal plans of development discussed and worked out; but nothing in the proposals indicates that the smaller countries would be voiceless, would be overridden, and could not save themselves—not even with Russia beside them to intervene. The charge reduces itself, of course, to the barren Russian objection to a survey of resources that can be jointly used as well as of needs to be met, and to a number of hypothetical examples of demands that “might” be Imposed on small countries, to their hypothetical disadvantage. The charge ignores not only the prime condition of the American offer but the prime necessity of Europe—the speediest, fullest, and most efficient effort to restore Europe to economic health. The hypothetical cases are not worth arguing; for they are stated by a country which has made up its mind not to co-operate in preventing them or dealing with them if they arise. But so much is true, as the “ Observer ” said:

For their joint efficiency the countries within the scheme will have to exchange “ economic hostages they can do this only on the assumption that they will never again be at war with one another. In the last analysis, Russia is not prepared to make this assumption, or to see it made and acted on by the countries of her so-called strategic screen. Finally, Germany and reparations. Mr Molotov objects to the proposal, an essential one, that the German economy must be developed to take its proper part in European reconstruction, and objects because Russia’s reparations claims have been denied—which is not true—and because it would be “ at our expense ” that German resources would be directed to “ purposes other than “ reparations The fact is exactly opposite. The Marshall plan would make General Marshall’s own suggestion in Moscow rapidly and largely effective. If the German economy is restored—and the Rui manian, the Bulgarian, the Austrian, i and the Italian also—Russia can obi tain reparations deliveries; otherI wise, not. But Mr Molotov has told I the “ Daily Worker ” what to say.