The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1947. Persian Elections

Press, Volume LXXXIII, Issue 25082, 14 January 1947, Page 6

The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1947. Persian Elections

The Persian Government has within a month twice demonstrated its strength. A few days ago the-post-poned general elections were held; few votes were cast, the polling booths being “ almost deserted ” ex-r cept for police and armed guards. The busloads of students who toured Teheran shouting “ Down with Sul- “ taneh! ” will not have brought hhn down. A month earlier, troops from the centre pushed into Azerbaijan and, with very little difficulty, expelled Jaff ar Pishevari’s provincial government; and Russia, which had taken no little trouble to see it set UP, stood aside and let it fall. The antecedents of this December event are worth recalling. It is only a matter of months since the Persian Government, though Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Washington Ambassador did not always speak in unison, was protesting to the Security Council against the continued presence of Russian troops in Persia. There is no question that one of Russia’s objects was to establish a satellite regime in Azerbaijan; and it was an object so resolutely pursued that military action against Teheran seemed no unreal threat. It was otherwise. achieved, however; but the resultant situation was so unstable that, during the labour unrest in the southern oilfields, the British Government is credibly reported to have considered that there might be no alternative to the partition of Persia. But Ghavam Sultaneh moved to an alternative. He dismissed Prince Firouz and other Russian sympathisers from his Cabinet and prepared the ground for his recent action in Azerbaijan. The Kremlin reacted: its Ambassador in Teheran—which reported a “ friendly admonition ” —actually spoke to Ghavam Sultaneh in the harshest language of rebuke and warning. But he was unshaken; and Russian Embassy officials advised Pishevari in Tabriz that he must not expect military support against the central government. He received none; and his government collapsed.

There is an obvious inference to be drawn. The Soviet remained passive, while the first of the many governments established with ♦ its favour and under the wing of its armies, since the war, was overthrown. It can be supposed to have done so, nqt happily, but only in accordance with some new general principle; and that, clearly, is the principle of co-operation and concession pf which Mr Stalin gave some indications in his interview with Hugh Baillie, and of which concrete evidences have followed, in New York, at Lake Success, in Austria, in Germany. The total of evidence is persuasive and encouraging. But it is quite certain that Russia will experimentally follow this new principle only as long as, and as far as, it seems to be leading to positive results. This must mean, it seems, that Mr Bevin and General Marshall will in their turn have to use every opportunity to advance to.them and assure them. If that is applied to Persia, the inference is fairly clear. The proof of Ghavam Sqltaneh’g firm grip on policy and people can hardly be regarded with pure relief. Russia’s readiness to see it close again on Azerbaijan can hardly be regarded as evidence that the problem of spheres of influence in the Middle East has become easier and less anxious. On the contrary, the time is one, rather, to develop constructive policies in Persia particularly and in the near and middle Rast generally. Russia is a patient who should not be allowed to relapse into a fear psychosis.