BALANCE OF EVILS

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 25061, 18 December 1946, Page 6

BALANCE OF EVILS

BIG FOUR, ARMS, AND

GERMANY

Tins leading article from the New Statesman of December 7i, w. printed because it .presents, with admirable lucidity, views on thi disarmament negotiation and on the Anglo-American bi-zonal agree? ment which must be reckoned, w ith, even if they are rejected.

It is now sadly clear that the British delegations which have been negotiating and debating in the U.S.A, will return home with their luggage -in the shape of embarrassingly heavy British political and economic commitments—little the lighter {or their journey. In the Assembly of the United Nations the discussions which arose from the original Russian request that there should be a show-down of all armed forces stationed abroad have lea to a debating success for the British and American teams. When Sir Hartley Shawcross, with the backing of Senator Connally, took up the position that any disarmament plan would be numbug” if international control and inspection were carried out by agencies subject to the exercise of the veto by a permanent member of the Security Council, Mr Vyshinsky had no effective reply. But if there were any real Anglo-American will to disarm, British and American spokesmen would realise that, with an American press daily threatening atomic warfare, the Russians cannot be expected to disclose the location of their carefully hidden munition works, and thus have them pin-pointed as targets, unless and until production of atomic bombs is ended, and present stocks are rendered innocuous. Given agreed disarmament, Mr Molotov said on Wednesday, the veto power in the Security Council would not be used by Russia to block effective international inspection. But, as Sir Hartley well knew, the United States is in no mood to relinquish its present advantage in atomic, or even more terrible, weapons. It is the first step in disarmament which counts; and no one has yet offered to take that step. Thus, though agreement' on peace treaties with ex-satellites of the Axis may result next year in some slight withdrawal of British forces from Italy, there is little prospect of an early alleviation of a burden of armaments which are crippling Britain s industrial recovery, are eating heavily into the dollar loan, and whose maintenance and expansion, at need, are now based bn a standardisation of AngloAmerican military equipment which makes nonsense of any assertion that Britain retains complete independence in foreign policy. Yet, as if these heavy general commitments were not enough, another has been added. Last Monday, Mr Bevin and Mr Byrnes signed an agreement, foreshadowed m our columns last week, whereby unification of the British and American zones of Germany is to become effective on January 1, and the pooled cost of the zones, augmented by a “rehabilitation” investment of one billion dollars, is to be borne on a fifty-fifty basis by Britain and the U.S.A. We recognise fully that, in entering into this agreement, the British Government was constrained by weighty considerations, both practical and humanitarian: the case, which Mr Victor Gollancz has argued cogently in this and other journals, for endeavouring to salvage the portion or Germany, for which we are responsible from its present misery is very strong. It could be argued, therefore, that there should be no delay m concluding with our American allies a pact which at any rate means that our Zone will get the immediate benefit of more dollar-purchased imports than we could perhaps unilaterally supply. Indeed, it is clear that more of the billion dollars in the Rehabilitation Fund will have to be spent m the

heavily industrialised and British sector than in the Ami ■ sector of the fused zone. Nevmhfi the agreement is open to the ur Objections. era ’ In the first place, it is extren doubtful whether the sum whichA be provided for priming the ism of Western Germany will be sufficient to provide the additi foodstuffs, raw materials and ery which are necessary if i, succeed, within the next three vl in securing a balance of imports » exports. We would go further, say that it is questionable whet this truncated rump of the Reich ever stand economically on its J feet; for the success of the Aim American scheme would involv? artificial stimulation of qJL manufactured exports on a scaled competing export industries in Brft and the United States would find tolerable. What we are now doin* to give the stricken patient a bn infusion, with every chance of hav to repeat the dose within a nan limit of time. In the next place, the new A which we have now to make on < dollar loan adds to the probabfl that in 1948, when that loan jj , hausted, we are likely to be fa with having to make a double pudiation. Only a fraction of the k will have been available for its n re . productive purposes—the acquisffi of new machinery for British indust Thus, even if we manage somehow circumvent the immediate difficult arising from American anfi-Sack conceptions of the political struct and economic organisation appropri for the truncated Reich, we may the end be forced to default on < undertakings bo’th to the United Sh and Germany. Is it worth while courting | eventual outcome in order to tak»< short cut to procuring ultimately inadequate, easement “our” Germans, by a plan execution may tend to solidify | Chinese Wall between Eastern i Western Germany? And has the I objective in the Foreign Secret® mind been disclosed? The publie Britain and the United States is i being adequately informed of the | that, as we pointed out last vb agreement between the Big Th from which France would find ifg cult to dissent, could be secured sm unification of Germany—and ecom unification would clearly have ’til elude planned exchanges of pM across the Oder line —provided Brib and America were prepared to ata the French and Russian proprai that Germany must pay reparatw kind out of current production. 7! Labour Government so intent on B venting the Reich becoming a ME cow for the production of for Russia’, while rehabilitation | ceeds at British and Ameyicin < pensc, that it prefers to see the aiut cut irretrievably in half? The balance of evils is extras even; but we fear that for the s of alleviating the immediate crisis Western Germany, the Governs has accepted a plan which will be I practicable if unity of the Reich is: achieved. Yet, by antagonising Fra and Russia, it goes far to prejudice chances of such unity. Even for German people its long-term danj outweigh its short-term benefits I