MOSCOW AGREEMENTS

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24763, 2 January 1946, Page 5

MOSCOW AGREEMENTS

Explanation By Byrnes

In Broadcast

AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN POLICIES (N2. Press Association— Copyright) ee - 8 p m ) WASHINGTON, December 31. itcordaiwe with ° f S he Ministers in gttordance with the Yalta understanding, he knew there was °k : ‘ nOther . lm Passe such as had occurred in London but though discuss.ons might not ultimately lead to agreements they contributed to the reconciliation of differences This was made by the United States Secretary if State (Mr James Bjrnes) in a broadcast.

j. iJ V Soviet took the stand in London that the peace treaties iould be made only by the principal Powers which signed the respective armistices.” he said. “The other delegations held the view that all States actively participating in the war should ffiPgreluy towards the’w the London discussions that helped greatly towards the Moscow agreement on peace machinery. That agreement meets our insistence that all States shall participate in the peace, and recognises the responsible role of the larger Powers in the peace-making ” P

Mr Byrnes described the machinery ip-eed upon for drawing up treaties “not ideal, but a departure from the ideal standard more in form than in jubstance.” He said: “The proposals of the larger Powers are subjected to the judgment and public criticism of all the participating nations. These nations must formally and publicly make their recommendations, and although the larger Powers are not bound by .hese recommendations, they must agree in rder to draw up the treaties. The United States would not agree to a final teat?’ which arbitrarily rejected such Kcommendations.” The test of a successful peace was not fc tne form of its making but in whether it commended itself to the Btions concerned by its justice and lisdom, and also commanded the support of those nations w’hose unity was cential to the preservation of peace, pie method agreed upon in Moscow ive ample scope for the achievement [these essentials. Balkan Governments Discussing the former German satelje States, Mr Byrnes said: “Since the andon conference we Jiave found it BBible to recognise ' Austria and mgary. where free elections have -ocrred. There is still wide divergence our points of view on the Rumanian nd Bulgarian Governments. In those nntries democratic institutions have ut functioned according to the tradions familiar to us. The Soviet con-

ods that the governments of those entries are satisfactory and that condons do uot warrant concerted action »der the Yalta understanding. ConBrted action is possible only by comnon agreement. “Until now America’s objections to » exclusion of important democratic roups from those governments, and to le oppressive way in which governnent powers are exercised, have been ittle heeded by those governments or the Soviet. It must be recognised at the Soviet has a very real interst in the character of the governments ' these States, which are neighbours [ the Soviet and were involved in the rar against the Soviet. It was there»re to be expected that the withrawal of Soviet troops from these nuntries may depend on the Soviet’s onfidence in the peaceful character of hese governments. “I urged on Mr Stalin and Mr Moloov that it was in their interest, as well ■ ours, that the peoples and governments of these countries should be peacefully disposed to the Soviet. I tressed our desire to work with the Soviet and not against it, in making hese governments representative, and cr the first time since Yalta the Soviet as agreed to co-operate with us to this Commission to Rnmaefo “A tripartite commission is proceeding immediately to Rumania to advise he King on the broadening of repreHitation in the Rumanian Governlent We sought this in London, but me unable to secure agreement. The British and American Governments ave agreed that they will recognise se Rumanian Government as soon as hey are satisfied that the Government las been broadened to include two roly representative members of two nportant political parties now unreresented, and assurances have been iven regarding free elections and 'eedom of speech, press, religion, and ■sociation. “The Bulgarian situation is compliited by the fact that the Soviet re"ds Bulgaria’s election as a free elecon and America does not: but the wiet has undertaken to advise the fllgarian Government to include two embers representative of two imrtant political parties now excluded, be British and American Govem[ents will recognise the Bulgarian ievernment as soon as this is done. The agreements on Rumania and igaria do not go as far as I should e. but I am hopeful that they will Pit in a substantial improvement of democratic character of these govfcients. Far East America has worked for conditions tile Far East that will make for a ting peace. Co-operation with our fes is an essential part of that licy. Although the United States stained the major burden of crush- ! Japanese military power, we ally s considered the war against Japan part of the war against the Axis, om the outset we planned to make & control of Japan an Allied responility.

'As early as August 20. 1945, America ited the Soviet, Britain, and China join in carrying out the objectives the Potsdam declaration and the

render terms for Japan. The Far rtern Advisory Commission was eslished in October, but Britain had ervations regarding the control chinery in Tokyo before joining in i work of the Advisory Commission, e three governments at Moscow, th China’s concurrence, agreed on a Eastern Commission consisting of Soviet. Britain. China. France, lia, the United States, the Netherds East Indies, Australia, New Zea1, Canada, and the Philippines, to pulate principles governing the rol of Japan. The three govern- > also agreed, with the concur■►of China, on the establishment KE? Allied Council for Japan com■Tof representatives of the Soviet, ■British Commonwealth. China, and FUnited States under the chairmanBP of the Supreme Commander, fich will advise and consult with p in carrying out the surrender [ns. If disagreement arises in the |ncil or. the implementation of the I Eastern Commission’s decisions on liters' affecting the control of Japan I set out in the surrender terms. Idamental changes in constitutional keture, or the Japanese Govern■t as a whole, the Supreme Com■der will withhold action pending fccation by the Far Eastern ComK>n. S MacArthur’s Authority -roposals offered by America K .g Japan made it clear that we ■J,; to co-operate with our Allies. L xpect their co-operation, but at L ame time our agreement safe-

[ ' the efficient administration esr ?d in Japan under General Macrr. It assures that General [Arthur’s authority will not be obfted by the inability of the Far fern Commission to agree on kies or by the inability of the led council to agree upon methods farrying them out. [he administration of Korea has P a trying problem since the Jappe surrender The continuation of [Keographical divisions for the purp of the military occupation of Pa is unsatisfactory. Under the fow agreement the two military pnands will form a joint Soviet-

American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems, and will make recommendations for the formation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The commission will also make proposals for a four-Power trusteeship to prepare Korea for independence within five years. “It was agreed in Moscow that cessation of civil strife and broad participation throughout the National Government by democratic elements was necessary to a unified, peaceful, democratic China, and the three Governments reaffirmed their adherence to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. “At the request of the Soviet, a British and American proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a commission on atomic energy and related matters was placed at the end of the agenda. Discussions were limited to this proposal. We did not discuss technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet about the new weapon.”