WILL DUMBARTON OAKS CURB THE AGGRESSOR?

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24368, 21 September 1944, Page 4

WILL DUMBARTON OAKS CURB THE AGGRESSOR?

SECURITY

[By A. D. ROTHMAN, Staff Correspondent of the "Sydney Morning Herald" | *■ * Washington,]

(Published by Arrangement.) . . Mr Rothman’s article appeared in the "Herald’s” issue of Saturday, . pnntainpd also the “New York Times” report that the Dum- • ibarton Oaks delegates had submitted to Mr Churchill. Mr Roosevelt, • ’ and Mr Stalin “tentative proposals for an international security • organisation.

The discussion at Dumbarton Oaks between British, American, and Russian experts for the creation of machinery for the maintenance of world peace will immediately be followed by a similar conference between the United States, Britain, and China. While there has not been any official announcement of the decisions reached at Dumbarton Oaks to date, there is fairly full knowledge of the agreements ■ reached and the points still at issue. The three Powers early agreed upon the framework for a peace organisation. There would be a council with four permanent members, Britain, America, Russia, and China, and six or seven other Powers periodically elected. There would also be an assembly consisting of all adhering nations. The council would decide the all-important question of determining aggression or aggressive intent, and whether force should be' employed to prevent it. Issues which, immediately arose were whether veto by one permanent member of the council could present the use of force against aggression, and whether temporary members of the council voting together could veto any unanimous l decision by the Big_ Four calling for action against aggression. The fundamental problem of sovereignty is involved in both issues, namely whether, if the council should declare by a majority vote °ne of the Big Four an aggressor, would that nation be prepared to accept such a decision and submit to punishment? On this none of the Big Three would surrender its right of self-defence, so to speak, although the Chinese draft plan is said to have offered a formula on the question—any nation on the council charged as an aggressor and against whom the council is weighing the necessity of using force, should automatically be deprived of the right to vote on the question, International Force The Dumbarton Conference ’is said to be still divided on the problem of the composition of the military forces, which will be the servant of the peace organisation in putting down aggression. Russia asked for, the creationof an international police air force. The United States objects to this on three grounds: one,, it cannot accept the idea of the surrender of the command of American military units of any kind to an international commander; two, while allegiance to an international military body of national air units is likely to be more successful than in case of land or naval forces, such allegiance might be of doubtful character in all the circumstances; three, as aggression usually takes the form of one nation taking another’s territory or property, air power can only,destroy. Only foot troops can repossess. America and Britain are believed to advocate the direction of existing national military forces, as needed, at the behest of the international peace organisation, but the immediate national command of these forces would be maintained. It is believed that Russia will accept this concept, if she has not already done so. It is believed that the conference has approved a world Court, with the proviso that a nation involved in a dispute must certify its willingness to submit such dispute to the Court. Before adjudication by this body can occur, the Court will serve as machinery to delay the necessity for drastic action by the council, that is, sanctions • : ■ ' ' ■

The Dumbarton Conference has aiK-V patently accepted the principle of r*/i : gionalism. One of the reasons for th« - failure of the old League was that dis&Tputes everywhere were in its imme*? 1 ‘ diate province. Thus, for instance. the-”‘-League’s Manchurian Commission haobl£ Italian and German who, because of the lack of ian and German Far Eastern fix/;:, terests, knew little about and hadJS, 1 ' no vital concern with the terrain/} in question. It is believed that/ three . regional areas have been/ determined—Europe and Africa, Asia, 1 - and the western hemisphere. Those <3*-■ : the Big Four whose chief interests lie * 1 in any given region would be the lead-i ing agent in that regional council, anflT an effort would be made to settle te* gional disputes before they developed./, into something so large that only the ' - parent council, could handle them.' - J .. American isolationism as a force act- ( ting on the Dumbarton Oaks decision! ? cannot be dismissed. Senator La Fol- ' lette’s blast that the Dumbarton Oala „ Conference was “hurried,” and that ; a peace organisation should have beat left until after the signing of a peac* * treaty with the Axis may enlist som* t of the isolationist sentiment in the Sen-”-? ate, but it is not expected to be an Im*; portant factor. The concern of the Re* publican Presidential candidate, Mj,: Dewey, about little nations becoming „ pawns appears to have been only part of the game of domestic politics in tba Presidential election year. It is gen-,; erally agreed that the safety and rights ' of small nations can only be assured ‘ ’ if the Big Three or the Big Four act ’ in unanimity and co-operatively, and', ' that underlying any peace formula ’. must be equitable international • eco*. nomic relations. / If the Big Four have not the will to ' peace there will be no peace, and . formula devised at Dumbarton could preserve the weaker natiopiVL . from the stronger. ~ ..'J., Consent of Congress /-li/ . The British are said to be very mudu concerned over the provision which’/Congress is certain to insist upon—// that its consent would' be necessary!/;} before an American representative on// the peace organisation council couJd£f> commit the United States to the uMte’J of force against a specific aggressors-/; It is understood that the American deiil; legates at Dumbarton Oaks have altogether dissipated these fears, whlchfe are also shared by the. Russian^!> Americans -point out that as far : iCpf Germany and Japan are concerned**}? now and until peace is restored. President needs no Congressional proval to use force. In a case in the future it is explained thitfft while" an American the peace organisation council , woidasg vote for the use of force against 'anas?,' aggressor, as the President directedapll the President would approve the ulraf-l of force if he felt American publlup.l opinion approved. No American Kemipl dent ever appeared before Congreo|||| and asked for a declaration of 'tfwSsl without getting it immediately; •• I The Russians particularly are - lieved to be unconvinced that I would not either delay or limit, I council’s effectiveness in the case of au|:'j emergency. It is thought;.that suclfial a reservatioii by the Senate would the Russians to make other ressiyigaig] tions. dooming the council’s value firenpSgi the start.. The President may, thermal fore, insist, in the interests of •mariaß&,| mum efficiency for the council.; Congress should not' be consulted .Brail action against aggression. If he then the Senate may give the DunibahqMj ton Oaks formula a rough time. r ~ >Bl