STRATEGY IN PACIFIC

Press, Volume LXXX, Issue 24366, 19 September 1944, Page 3

STRATEGY IN PACIFIC

COMMENT ON QUEBEC STATEMENT (Hec. 10.30 p.m.) ' NEW YORK, Sept. 18. “It is understood that Britain’s as-, signment in the war against Japan will be primarily a series of amphibious operations against Malaya and Sumatra,” says the Washington correspondent of the Associated Press. “This means that the Quebec Conference confirmed the division of the Pacific and Asiatic battlefront into four general sectors. (l). The British sector, south-west of the Philippines. (2) The New Guinea-Philippines sector, under General MacAtthur. (3) The central sector, embracing Formosa and Japan proper, under Admiral Nimitz. (4) The Kuriles, also under Admiral Nimitz, which will become of paramount importance if Russia enters the war.

"Britain’s assignment is based primarily on the location of bases and supply lines. Naval authorities maintain mat if the British put their Fleet in the Pacific, it would create a number of new supply problems and tax shipping facilities already strained to maintain General MacArthur’s and Admiral Nimitz’s forces. The British already have a big Fleet based on Ceylon, from which it will probably move to Singapore,’ building up bases and supply lines .en route." The “New York Times,” editorially, says: “The Quebec official communique not only serves notice on Japan, which is reported to be fishing for a compromise peace, that unconditional surrender is still the only way out of the war, but it throws down -with a thud all the disguised propaganda that Britain and America were urging a softer peace for Japan than for Germany. “The United States Navy and air forces are still reported to be confident of their ability to knock out Japan, principally by their own power, but the lessons from Germany suggest that in the East, as in Europe, the wars final stages must be fought out by ground forces. The transport and deployment of Allied armies strong enough to beat the Japanese army, estimated at 2.000,000, with copious reserves, are major jobs in themselves and would only be able to be made easier if Russia should join the war against Japan, or at least provide bases after Germany’s collapse. That, of course, is only a matter which can be decided by Moscow, but there are indications that, as a result of the Queb« Conference. Moscow may be sounded out regarding it. _