HOW SICILY WAS WON: LESSONS OF CAMPAIGN

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 24076, 12 October 1943, Page 4

HOW SICILY WAS WON: LESSONS OF CAMPAIGN

EXPERIMENT IN INVASION

The dominating lesson of the Sicilian operations was that the bombers, particularly the Fortresses, can blot out an entire enemy air force before the first landing is made. At the same time the campaign gave more evidence that the Luftwaffe is weakening rapidly. Arguments that it is reserving its strength for the most favourable moment to use it will not hold water. No bombers could have had more favourable targets than our invasion fleet, or our transport on numerous occasions when the roads were congested with it, but the Germans did not bomb them. The only possible conclusion is that they could not. The enemy suffered a net loss in 38 days of Sicilian warfare of more than 1.400 aeroplanes, after the deduction of those we lost ourselves. That cannot be anything but a severe blow to him at this time. There was also clear evidence of weakening morale and diminished resolution among his pilots who did appear over Sicily. German ground troops, on the other hand, showed few signs of a lessened fighting spirit. They were not the troops of 1940. or even of 1942. The 15th Panzer Division and the Hermann Goering Division bear great names, but the soldiers who had made them great were lost in Africa, and their successors are not quite of that quality. Their seaborne reinforcements were chiefly fortress battalions not good enough for this type of warfare, and consisting partly of Alsatians and other disaffected men—a significant commentary of Germany’s manpower position to-day. Nevertheless, they fought pretty well, and their parachutists fought superbly. These last were troops of the highest quality, experienced veterans of Crete and Russia, cool and skilful, Nazi zealots to a man. and fantastically courageous. To fight against them was an education for any soldier. One must assume that Germany has given up hope of _ again using these magnificent specialists in their proper part in attack if she is willing to sacrifice them as diehard infantry. A Sapper’s War

The nature of the ground and the enemy’s defensive methods threw a great deal of work oh our sappers in the way of repairing roads and bridges, building by-passes, and detecting and lifting mines. One might without exaggeration have called this campaign a sapper's war.- The skill and, even more, the courage _ and _ endurance which they showed in doing all this were beyond praise. General Alexander has described the work of the American sappers as the finest military engineering he ever saw, and ours were little behind them, except in equipment. But’ they were much overworked, and it would' be a good thing if the infantry could relieve them of some of their work. In the Highland Division a minelifting school was started, to which, during slack times, infantrymen were sent to learn how to detect and lift mines. This seems an experiment well worth extending. One might go further and, say that there is some danger of the infantry becoming too dependent on other arms to do detail jobs for them. Air Marshal Conyngham has pointed out that in winter the army will not be able to count on the unvarying air support which it has enjoyed here. In Tunisia, after our discovery that Churchills could climb hills, one noticed a growing tendency foil the infant),y, whenever, they were held up, to send for Churchills to remove the obstruction. .

Here the tendency has been to “send for” the light bombers ,or fighter-, bombers, and to rely almost entirely on the' sappers to clear mines. Of course, it is entirely proper to use the most efficient means of dealing with any situation when such means are available. But it may well be that in some future campaign our infantry may find themselves at times without air support owing to bad weather, without tank support because of mud or demolished roads, and without sufficient sappers to spare to lift mines. It would be a bad thing if'infantry lost the habit of self-reliance when such situations are liable to confront it; there is danger in over-specialisation.

[By a Correspondent of “The Times” in Sicily.] (Published by Arrangement.)

One problem, which was much da£ bated by soldiers during the SiciM»\ operations, was that of the bombiß*ilr>' towns through which our troops subsequently pass. Our air forces agf steadily to the view that such towny should be bombed to choke the enemyV communications, to cut off his front. . line transport, and to prevent him from • setting up strong defences in the towns # themselves. Our ground forces were?; painfully conscious of the fact that when they entered a bombed town they had to spend hours clearing a way through it for their own transport and so were unable to press on quickly after the retreating enemy and catch' him before he could establish himself firmly in his .next set of defensive post, tions. So much did this retard their advance that when the Americans be. 1 , .gan moving east from Palermo they asked that the towns ahead of them should, not be bombed. Worst of Both Worlds "

After two days they changed theifJ minds and asked for bombing to be - ?: resumed. They had found that they did >ll not gain the one advantage for which i they had hoped—namely, quicker '■ movement through the captured towns, because the Germans, before leaving each town, blocked the roads with de. -V molitions as effectively as our bombers. had previously done, so that we were' 1 getting the worst of both worlds. TheV writer did not have an opportunity of seeing the Americans in action, but in« formants whom I trust agreed in saying that they came on a lot during the ’ campaign and were now incontestably ' a first-class army. No army, even the' German, has ever been better equipped.,, and. in addition to their sappers their artillery work is magnificent. Our own gunners are as good as the next man but they are glad to go to the Ameri. - cans for tips, just as the American in. • fantry are glad to come to ours. Tanks were never used in large mufc. ber in Sicily by either side, exontti ’once by the Germans, when; 1 flay counter-attacked 11 the Americans Jjit'i 1 Gela and nearly pushed them back the sea. Most ofithe country was utterly unsuitable for tanks in the mass. In the mountainous part they were con. fined to movlngryn single file on the '' roads, and they were at the mercy'of--mines, ambushes, and anti-tank fin from the higher groujnd on the flanks/' The Catanian Plain offered them little or no dead ground and-, was rich ml'' 1 natural anti-tank obstacles and cover i U for anti-tank guns. This was-the jnaiufe i reason why we could never eohiddttjL either a violent break-through. -likflK that of Tunis, or a quick follow-up byf,tanks of an advantage gained by artil.T’ lery and infantry. But tanks m-smalnp numbers were used surprisinglyroften, | as can be seen from the size of tltetanki' losses on both sides, and thev did) valu- ft: able work. " \ |:- Naval Guns &■' | One tactical weapon which was nwchf: developed in the course of the cajn.% paign was the close support of trooprom land by naval guns at sea. AnotheiMa with which both we and the Americanoi were experimenting, towards the end,f? was the outflanking of enemy on the coastal roads by amphibious!# operations. We also tried several ali-fe borne landings, both of and of gliders, but with these we only partial success. They disclosed!" ■ weaknesses which cannot be here, but which are being carefully? studied. ‘ The whole campaign was an ijn-r : " mensely valuable experiment in the - : - planning and the staff work of an in-f : ; vasion and in the subsequent supply-', ing of the invaders. The of supply was extraordinarily good and*? worked faultlessly. Indeed, the at almost every point justified’ ourj l plans and exceeded our expectations.- •il We did not prevent, the Germans fronrffl evacuating a good many men and a : -.l good deal of material from the island,. £l but that was inevitable unless we were?,--.'l prepared to incur utterly uneconomic’ V i air and naval losses at the hands of- / enemy flak concentrations and coastal* : guns in the Straits of Messina. In every? ‘ other way , our defeat of the enemy?- - was rapid, efficient, and complete!