REPRODUCTIVE RATE: CONTINUED DECLINE

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23996, 10 July 1943, Page 4

REPRODUCTIVE RATE: CONTINUED DECLINE

BRITISH BIRTH-RATE

[By a Correspond) (Published bj Many students of population, reflecting on the course of the birth-rate during previous great wars, foresaw in 1939 the possibility of an already serious position deteriorating further, in the last war the birth-rate and Wales had dropped by 1917 to 17.8 per 1000 of population—a fall of 2o.per cent, since 1914. In 1942, after three years, of the present war, the rate was o per cent, higher than the average for 1936-38. This is an unexpected development. Although the 1942 rate of 15.8 is well below the lowest point reached during the last war, the upward trend merits further analysis. About nine months after the outbreak of the war the number of births in England and Wales dropped considerably, and they were extraordinarily low from mid-year 1940 till the autumn of 1941. Subsequently a rise took place, and, according to the returns recently published by the Registrar-General, the number was higher in 1942 than in any year since 1928. In the five triennial periods from 1928 to 1942 the numbers of registered live births were as follows: — 1928- 1,952,800 1937-39 1.851,100 1931-33 1,826.500 1940-42 1,849,000 1934-36 1,801,700 . , The apearance of stability which these figures present suggests that those who feared the consequences of another major war were excessively pessimistic. But if we are not to get our perspective wrong these figures should be judged against the fact that 2.268,500 births were registered in the years 1915-17 to a much smaller population of mothers. More Married Women It might seem at first sight that the drop in marital fertility, which was so conspicuous from the 1880’s onwards, has been checked and that conditions have been stable during the last 10 or 12 years. Unfortunately, a closer study of the facts shows that this is not true. The number of births has remained stable, but the number of married women under 40 years of age has increased at the same time by about 20 per cent. Marital fertility, therefore, has continued its downward trend. How is it to be explained that the number of wives under 40 hais increased by about 20 per cerit. since the census of 1931, while the total population has increased by only 4 per cent.? The explanation is very simple. The number of marriages (especially of young women) has risen enormously in the course of the last deoade, and particularly since the outbreak of the war. The yearly numbers of marriages were as follows: — 1924-28 .. 296,700 1940 .. 470,500 1929- .. 313,100 1941 .. 387,500 1934-38 .. 353,500 1942 .. 368,000 1939 .. 439,700 This rise was due mainly to f an increase in the number of marriages of girls under 25 years, and it is safe to say that it meant an addition of at least 500,000 early marriages in the last decade. How many additional births might have been expected from 500,000 additional early marriages? The Reg-istrar-General’s Statistical Review for 1938 (which unfortunately has not yet been made available to the public) contains a table which “shows that if 1000 additional women were to marry at ages 22-23 in each year over a period of 10 years, the total births to be expected in the 10 years would-be 11,203, or 1120 per year.” On this assumption 500,000 additional early marriages in 1933r42, if spread evenly over the, period, should have resulted in 560,000 additional births. But even if we assume that 30 per cent, of the 500,000 additional young couples had no child by the end of 1942, 70 per cent, one child, and hone more than one child, the number of additional births should have been 350,000. Actually there were no additional births whatsoever. It might be argued that the nigh level of marriages which we have enjoyed for about a decade may be maintained indefinitely. But this again would be a delusion. The average number of girls born in 1927-42 was, 303,000. Of these girls about 275.000 may reach the age of 16. If they all marry at 16

:nt in “The Times.”] Arrangement.) there will be 275,000 brides each year. I But the average number of spinsters marrying in 1933-42 was about 355,0pP~w This enormous number of first m« /■ riages was possible only by depletu * the accumulated stock of spinsters who had reached adult age when .the freauency of msrrisgos W3s much smaller. This process must come to an end quite soon. It is impossible to keep the annual number of brides constantly above the level of the num- , ber of girls born 16 years earlier (minus the number of those who die >•; in childhood). We must therefore be- ( fore long expect a considerable de- y cline in the number of marriages. I Reproduction Rate j In the years preceding the war the / net reproduction rate for England and I Wales was 0.8. In .other words, the \ number of female births fell short by V 20 per cent, of the number which, other conditions being equal, would be required to replace in the next generation the women of reproductive age in the present generation. The yearly number of births in 1940-42 was about the same as in 1933-39, but as mortality, even of females under 45, has increased somewhat since 1939, the net reproduction rate in 1940-42 was below 0.8. The inauguration .of a population policy with the aim of raising the net reproduction rate to one is more necessary than ever. It would be deplorable if the rise in the number of births in 1942, welcome as it is, should create an impression that the solution of the population problem may, after all, not be so urgent. The conclusion is that no basic change in the fertility pattern has so far token place.. The tide of reproduction. which has been receding for over 60 years, has not yet turned. It will require something more than earlier marriage and the privileges now accorded to mothers to effect so fundamental a change of heart. Sir J. H. Clapham, speaking in his Sidney Ball lecture for 1942 as a historian “looking forward,” concluded that the . greatest of all future problems was that of population. That future |s. being determined now. What place is this problem being accorded in all our plans and discussions of the post-war world? Are we assuming that me future birth-rate and size of family will be much the same as it was before the war? If we are, or in other words if population is being ignored, then we are in danger of reconstructing only for the aged. Social Factors There are many aspects of post-war plans which concern this problem. Housing policy is one. It is something more, however, than a question of the size of the house and the design of the kitchen. One factor of great importance is that of family mobility. Are parents to be tied to the same house for the best part of their lives—before they know now many children they are going to have—or will they be able,: to move freely from one district to another and from one sized house to another? These and many other aspects of post-war housing, and, indeed, the whole social and economic environment, have a vital bearing on the future course of fertility. It is only necessary to study the Beveridge report to realise how the present and future population structure dominates the question of cost.' ■< The initial expenditure is due to the ; , . proposal to pay family allowances of 8s a week to second and subsequent, \ children. The financial burden which i W climbs with the years is mainly J accounted for by the growing ,- of old-age pensioners. Unless mis country completely reverses its atti-.. ; tude to those needing rest, and turns its back on the old, this expenditure becomes inevitable with or without the Beveridge plan. . The on l ?,2Sl-- ' neglected consequences of a ,60-year decline in fertility are now coming into view. But in shouldering this burden it would in the long run merely, make matters worse to ignore the claims Ol the unborn.