HOW AXIS WAS BEATEN

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23948, 15 May 1943, Page 5

HOW AXIS WAS BEATEN

Eisenhower Praises Alexander “A VERY SUBTLE CONCEPTION” (N.Z. Press Association—Copyright.) (Rec, 7 p.m.) LONDON. May 13, "This is one of the most complete and most decisive victories of history,” said General Sir Harold Alexander, DeputySupreme Commander in North Africa, in a talk to more than 500 officers. He added: “We have wiped out an entire army, and to-day stand masters of the whole of North Africa. This victory was of your making. Its fame and glory belong to you.” The Supreme Commander (General D. D. Eisenhower), addressing a press conference, paid a high tribute to General Alexander’s planning of the final blow in Tunisia. He said that in view of the Bth Army’s reputation and its

amazing efficiency in driving the enemy across 1000 miles of desert, there was little doubt that the Axis expected the Bth Army to strike the coup de grace. General Alexander, however, read the enemy’s mind and transferred three divisions from the Bth Army to the Ist Army. The Bth Army’s attacks at Enfidaville were merely a feint, and the whole scheme worked beautifully. The more reputation of the Blh Army tied down a largo body of the enemy and enabled the Ist Army and the American 2nd Corps to assemble an overwhelming force and smash through. "It was a very subtle conception,” added General Eisenhower, "and bears the mark of a great general." "Von Arnim split his tank forces, because he could not decide where the Allied punch was coming. This proved his undoing, but the real reason for our victory was the swift, heavy blow which drove through the German defences like a knife in the Mcjez cl Bab sector.” General K. A. N. Anderson, Commandor-in-Chicf of the Ist Army, made this statement to war correspondents at the Ist Army's headquarters to-day, reports Reuter. General Anderson continued: "Our successful attack cast of Mcjez cl Bab was made along a 3000-yard front with several hundred guns. Churchill tanks, and two infantry divisions, supported from behind by two armoured divisions. The attack went through like a knife through butter. “British tanks lacing south from Tunis had to fight a hard battle at Hammam Lif. where the Germans had machine-gun posts and also snipers in houses. British infantrymen with bayonets jumped from tanks at street corners and cleared out the hard-fighting soldiers of a Hermann Gocring regiment from the town, house by house, in savage fighting.” GIRARD'S PART IX CAMPAIGN “ WANTED SUPREME COMMAND” (Rec. 11.20 p.m.) NEW YORK May 14. The disclosure that General Giraud wanted to assume supreme command in North Africa is made by Hanson Baldwin in the “New York Times, in an article on his recent tour of Turn--51 Baldwin says: "When the American, Lieutenant-General Mark Clark, landed in North Africa from a British submarine last October, he carried a letter to General Giraud proposing that the latter go to North Africa when the British and Americans landed. General Giraud agreed, but stipulated that he should assume command of the cxn i - cply was not received, and when General Giraud arrived at Gibraltar on November 7, he was under the impression that he to take over the supreme command.” Baldwin adds: "The British and American scheme appointing General Giraud commander of the French armies in North Africa almost foundered on General Giraud s stubborn insistence, and only after an hour s discussion with General Eisenhower sod General Clark was agreement reached. "General de Gaulle was not chosen to lead the French armies because of his failure at Dakar and because preJiminary soundings indicated that he was not acceptable to the soldiers and people No deal was made with Admiral Darlan before the landings, but after the landings the Allies treated with Admiral Darlan because he was able to ‘deliver the goods’—order the cessation of French resistance- which General Giraud could not do.” After a long analysis of confused political and racial difficulties in North Africa. Baldwin concludes: "The basic concept of the British and Amciican plans was that French North Africa should bo treated as an ally, not as conquered or occupied territory. Sometime's we made bad mistakes, but they wore human mistakes. There was no hidden or sinister meaning to our errors as far as I could discover. AXIS LOSSES IN AFRICA CASUALTIES PUT AT 600,000 LONDON, May 13. It is estimated that German and Italian losses in the battles since 1940 in North Africa total 600,000 m killed, permanently disabled, and prisoners of war. The Germans’ casualties total 250 000 against the Italians’ 350,000. In all theatres the Allies have taken 150.000 German prisoners, whereas the British taken prisoners by the Germans total about 80.000. giving a credit balance of nearly two to one. Italian prisoners in Allied hands, exclusive of coloured troops, number 310,000. against 70,000 British held by the Italians. An analysis shows that the German total casualties up to the date of the battle of the Tunisian bridgehead were 100.000. and in the battle of the bridgehead 125,000. to which must be added a further 25,000 drowned at sea or permanently sick, etc. The Italian total casualties to the battle of the bridgehead were 275,000. and in the battle of the bridgehead about 53.000. to which must be added for drownings. permanent sickness, etc,, a further 25.000.